I had a nice chat with Pete after all these years recently. We covered a number of things, including my chats with others in our community from rank and file community members to leaders at our major entities in regards to this abd other core issues, but one area was how we do governance and engage on
#Cardano $ADA.
For my part, I made the case in more detail than I will here, about how I think "Governance" should be reduced and streamlined down to voting yearly or every other year on elected paid panelists who are in charge of a reimagined intersect that should become our core "org" that is also in charge of the treasury budget along the lines of my org idea I've discussed publicly, and that's about it ostensibly. It tackles most of his concerns too.
No more growing and fragmented proposals in an all you can eat raid on the treasury by everyone. We meet the community where people actually are, and their interest, expertise, and bandwidth actually is vs what we'd idealized it to be. Dreps neither have the time, expertise, bandwidth, nor incentives apart from good will, to engage with this chaotic mess. It leads to the list of issues he mentions in his post.
We can do away with most if not all of it by taking this basic approach. We've run the experiment now and we've seen the results. We should pivot accordingly. We need one center point of *gravity* rather than centralization for coordination and direction. Just about everyone I've shared this idea with loved the basic spirit and directionality of it. That's worth noting in and of itself.
Charles often spoke of how web 2.5 is winning. Not web2, but also not quite web3. I'd apply the same lense for governance. The genesis keys are burned and we can't go back to top down control via orgs we have no say over ala governance 1.0. But so too can we not go full fragmented chaos as we have now via governance 2.0.
We should strike a reasonable compromise with governance 1.5 by having a more streamlined and reimagined intersect as our core org without the committees and nonsense most do not want to engage with anymore. The founding entities can work with them as it makes the most sense for them. As they all have differently remits, structures, and needs as their own orgs.
A yearly vote on the paid panelists made of expert cardano people and outside top tier talent (biz dev, marketing, etc) that run a responsive org that can grow over time in what it handles, that we have say over, that gives quarterly reports, with a dashboard of kpis/goals so dreps and community people can track progress and make an informed vote. That's it. That's governance, apart from maybe some minor adjustments. It sounds like a sigh of relief to just about everyone that considers it.
Solicitation and begging: Constant DMs, messages, and pressure from proposers/projects asking (or begging) for votes.
Conflicts of interest: Difficulty voting objectively when proposals involve projects, people, or ecosystems you're connected to, risking accusations no matter what.
Being labelled a shill: Accusations of bias or being "paid" just for neutrally mentioning or supporting a project with a governance proposal.
Scrutiny and backlash: Votes are heavily criticised regardless of direction, with accusations of poor judgment, favouritism, or incompetence from delegators, community members, or rival groups.
Time and review burden: Properly evaluating proposals requires deep dives into complex details (tech, business models, budgets, risks, team credibility). Without talking to all proposers or fully understanding everything, it feels irresponsible to vote on behalf of others. Many proposals demand significant research time.
Lack of time/energy/commitment: The ongoing responsibility drains personal bandwidth, especially when combined with work, life, or other Cardano contributions. It's a voluntary role with no (or limited) compensation for most.
Burnout and fatigue (DRep/Voter fatigue): The volume of proposals (e.g., dozens in budget cycles such as the 2026 process), combined with meetings, debates, time zone issues, and constant community engagement, leads to exhaustion. Governance isn't a part-time hobby for active DReps. It's a serious time sink.
Lack of compensation or incentives: Many DReps invest hours reviewing, rationalising votes, and communicating with delegators, but rewards are indirect or absent for smaller ones. Discussions often focus on whether DReps should be paid, since the work resembles unpaid, high-stakes volunteer labour. I was originally told 1 hour a month at the most.
Low or inconsistent participation pressure: Delegators expect high activity and clear rationales, but real life intervenes. Inactive DReps face criticism, and even active ones deal with accountability demands (e.g., public explanations for every vote). Some feel the social pressure or "performance" expectations aren't sustainable. I built a website and published all my rationales on-chain or on X, but that still isn't good enough.
Toxicity and community dynamics: Harsh criticism, conspiracy accusations, double standards in judging proposals, or polarised debates make the role unpleasant. Inconsistent voting rationales across DReps highlight broader governance growing pains.