Much has been made by USS Liberty conspiratroids about the idea that thIs incident has never been fully investigated - that it was swept under the rug and quietly forgotten. There is this notion floating around that the "mistaken identity" finding is purely and exclusively a ZIONIST conclusion and that those who promote it are, thusly, acting out of some slavish devotion to Israel and their paymasters in Tel Aviv. "Collect your $7000!" is a common refrain among the 'troids.
In fact, this incident has been the subject of NUMEROUS US investigations over the years which have all more or less concluded that the Israeli attack on the Liberty was the result of mistaken identity - fog of war, friendly fire, whathaveyou. In fact, the 1967 US Navy Court of Inquiry was chock-full of testimony from the sailors who were aboard the USS Liberty, including the ship's Commanding Officer, William McGonagle, who, despite being severely wounded, is credited with having saved the ship and crew and who remained on the bridge of his ship, observing the IDF activities. An excerpt of McGonagle's sworn testimony to the US Navy Court is attached to this post (see image), and one can read the entire USNCOI transcript here:
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Here (below) is a list of various other US investigations of the USS Liberty incident with a brief summary of their conclusions:
U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry June 10-18, 1967: The attack was a case of mistaken identity. Calm conditions and slow ship speed may have made American flag difficult to identify. No indication the attack was intended against U.S. ship.
CIA Report June 13, 1967: The attack was not made in malice and was a mistake.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Fact Finding Team (Russ Report) June 9-20, 1967: Outlined "findings of fact," bud did not make any findings about the actual attack.
Clifford Report July 18, 1967: No premeditation, but "inexcusable failures" by Israeli forces constituing "gross negligence."
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1967: Secretary of Defense McNamara testified he supported conclusion that the attack was not intentional.
Senate Armed Services Committee Feb. 1, 1968: No conclusion. Secretary McNamara makes comparison of attack on Liberty to that on Pueblo with regard to uncertainty about what was happening at the time of the incident.
House Appropriations Committee April-May 1968: Navy communications "foulup" and no conclusion regarding Israeli actions. Much of report remains classified.
House Armed Services Committee May 10, 1971: Critical of Navy communications, no conclusion regarding Israeli actions.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 1979: Responding to critical book by Liberty crewman James Ennes, Senate investigation found no merit to his claim attack was intentional.
National Security Agency 1981: Liberty was mistaken for an Egyptian ship as a result of miscalculations and egregious errors.
House Armed Services Committee June 1991: Responding to request from Liberty Veterans Association, Subcommittee on Investigations launched probe that concluded there was no evidence to support allegations made by the Association and no reason for further investigation.