Je moet echt niet en plein public tonen hoe lomp je wel bent. De meeste mensen hoeden zich daarvoor.

I am flabbergasted by the fact that the Euroclear discussion does not get more attention in the Belgian (@destandaard @hln @demorgen @sudinfo_be ...) and European (@politico ) Press. The discussion stands for the half-hearted EU(ropean) support for #Ukraine on one side and the geopolitical blindness of a European political class of the consequences of such an action on the other side. The fact that you "piss-of" Russia is not a sufficient reason to do it. (National) interests are not served by such type of emotions. In summary: -There are legal obligations. You cannot preach the "Rule of Law" by breaking the law -Consequences are potentially devastating: 1. Potentially 300 billion € liabilities (>50% GDP of Belgium or the budget to finance two years of national social security). This is even a heavy burden when shared among all member states. 2. It undermines € and EU's financial credibility in the long run -It is only kicking the can down the road. Ukraine needs structural help with a long term vision. The discussion will be back on the table within a year if these assets are transferred. EU (and others) only prove to the world that they are fundamentally unwilling or unable to help #Ukraine end (and hopefully) win this war. For more details (with thanks to #ChatGPT )👇👇👇 EU Use of Frozen Russian Assets: Legal Basis, Alternatives, and Financial Consequences The debate over using Russia’s frozen sovereign assets to support Ukraine sits at the intersection of international law, financial stability, and geopolitical strategy. The European Commission views these assets—amounting to roughly €150–€200 billion immobilised primarily at Euroclear in Belgium—as an essential resource to sustain Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction. Yet the legal, economic and systemic risks are significant, especially due to the 1989 Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between Belgium–Luxembourg and the USSR/Russia, and the implications for global trust in the euro. 1. Legal Context: The Belgium–Luxembourg–Russia BIT and Euroclear The 1989 Belgium–Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) BIT with the USSR, now applied to Russia as successor state, provides extensive protections to investors, including protection against expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and free transfer of funds. Crucially, it allows investors (including potentially Russian institutions and individuals) to initiate arbitration against Belgium for measures equivalent to expropriation. Although the treaty does not mention Euroclear, Russian claimants argue that frozen securities, cash balances and other financial instruments held through Euroclear qualify as “investments” under the BIT’s broad definition. Freezing is legally easier to justify than confiscation; the latter could constitute expropriation and give rise to large compensation claims. Because most Russian sovereign assets are custodised through Euroclear (a Belgian jurisdiction), Belgium is the state most exposed to arbitration. If the EU confiscated €150 billion of Russian sovereign assets, Russia or Russian investors could potentially claim the full value plus years of compound interest and damages—resulting in exposure of €170–€230 billion, and in maximalist scenarios even €250–300 billion. Belgium therefore insists on EU-wide guarantees before it agrees to any scheme involving the principal. 2. Ukraine’s Funding Needs Ukraine’s defence and essential-state functions currently cost around €50–70 billion per year. Excluding reconstruction, a €150 billion injection could fund Ukraine for roughly 2–3 years, depending on the intensity of the war and inflation in military procurement. If reconstruction is included, the duration shrinks significantly. The scale of this funding requirement is why the Commission seeks solutions beyond traditional grants and national budgets, which many member states consider politically or fiscally unsustainable. 3. Alternative Options Considered by the European Commission Besides outright confiscation, the Commission is evaluating three main pathways to support Ukraine: Direct national grants from EU member states.This is legally clean but politically difficult, as many governments face budget constraints and domestic resistance to increasing aid commitments. EU-level borrowing on financial markets.The EU could issue joint debt and use the proceeds to assist Ukraine. This spreads the burden but requires unanimous approval and raises concerns in fiscally conservative countries wary of expanding common debt. A “reparations loan” model, where frozen Russian assets are used as collateral rather than seized.The EU would raise funds on markets secured against the frozen assets, and lend these funds to Ukraine. The assets themselves remain technically owned by Russia until future reparations negotiations. This is the Commission’s preferred approach because it mobilises the scale of available funds while attempting to reduce legal exposure. These options are not mutually exclusive; the Commission envisions a blended model. The decision remains politically sensitive because confiscating sovereign assets historically breaks with long-standing principles of state immunity. 4. Why Using Frozen Assets Is the Commission’s Preferred Option The Commission favours using Russian assets for several interconnected reasons: Scale: Only these assets are large enough to cover Ukraine’s needs for several years. Grants or new EU borrowing cannot easily reach this magnitude without severe political resistance. Burden-sharing: Mobilising frozen assets reduces the fiscal load on national budgets at a time when many member states face high debt. Political narrative: There is strong political support across the EU for the principle that “Russia should pay for the damage it caused,” which is perceived as fairer than asking European taxpayers to finance Ukraine indefinitely. However, it would be very difficult to find unanimity in the Council among 27 member states for common funding. The political narrative therefore does not necessarily reflect the reality. Existing precedent: The EU has already begun transferring the profits (interest) generated by these frozen assets to Ukraine. Extending this to the principal is seen as a logical—if legally challenging—next step. Nevertheless, this preference clashes with warnings from central bankers, economists, and legal experts who argue that the long-term consequences may outweigh the short-term gains. 5. Consequences for the EU and the Euro: Financial and Economic Credibility Confiscating sovereign assets—especially those belonging to a major power’s central bank—would have profound implications for the EU’s reputation as a financial safe haven. a. Erosion of trust in the euro as a reserve currency The euro depends on global perceptions of legal predictability, neutrality, and respect for property rights. If the EU seizes central-bank reserves, many non-Western countries (China, Gulf states, India, ASEAN nations) may diversify away from euro-denominated assets. Even small shifts could reduce the euro’s share in global reserves, weaken its international role, and slightly raise borrowing costs across the eurozone. b. Potential capital flight Sovereign wealth funds and central banks may relocate assets away from Euroclear and European custodians to jurisdictions perceived as politically neutral, such as Singapore or Hong Kong. This undermines Europe’s financial infrastructure. c. Undermining Euroclear and the EU’s financial plumbing Euroclear and Clearstream are cornerstones of global securities settlement. Perceived politicisation of central-bank reserves could lead to reduced use by foreign institutions, shrinking Europe’s influence in global markets. d. Legal precedent and future risk premiums If assets can be confiscated for geopolitical reasons, markets will price in higher risk for holding funds in Europe. This means higher yields on government bonds and more expensive financing for banks and corporations. e. Retaliatory or emulative actions Other states may respond by seizing Western assets or by reinterpreting sovereign immunity more aggressively. This contributes to long-term fragmentation of the global financial system. f. Internal EU tensions Differing legal interpretations and financial exposures (notably Belgium’s) could deepen divisions within the EU, damaging the perception of unity and stability. Conclusion Using frozen Russian assets is attractive to the European Commission because it provides an unprecedented financing source for Ukraine without burdening national budgets and it steers away from the discord within the Council of the EU on the support for #Ukraine . However, the legal risks under the 1989 BIT and the broader dangers to the euro’s credibility and Europe’s financial reputation are substantial. Confiscation could generate hundreds of billions in potential liabilities and diminish global trust in the euro as a secure reserve currency. The EU therefore faces a difficult trade-off: mobilise these assets to sustain Ukraine’s defence in the short term, or preserve the integrity and stability of Europe’s long-term financial architecture.

Natuurlijk niet. Omgekeerd, wordt het anderen hopelijk ook niet kwalijk genomen dat ze in hun analytisch en denkvermogen net iets verder zijn geraakt dan de derailleur en en passant het zeemvel voor hun ogen hebben weggehaald.

Today I swung my front door wide open and placed my Remington 30.06 on the deck rail. I left six cartridges beside it, then left it alone and went about my business. While I was gone, the mailman delivered my mail, my neighbor across the street mowed his lawn, a girl walked her dog down the street, and quite a few cars stopped at the stop sign near the front of my house. After about an hour, I checked on the gun. It was still sitting there, right where I had left it. It hadn't moved itself off the deck rail. It hadn't killed anyone, even with the numerous opportunities it had presented to do so. In fact, it hadn't even loaded itself. You can imagine my surprise, with all the hype by the Left and the Media about how dangerous guns are and how they kill people. Either the media is wrong or I'm in possession of the laziest gun in the world. The United States is third in murders throughout the World. But if you take out just four cities: Chicago , Detroit , Washington DC and New Orleans , the United States is fourth from the bottom, in the entire world, for murders. These four Cities also have the toughest Gun Control Laws in the U.S. All four of these cities are CONTROLLED BY DEMOCRATS. It would be absurd to draw any conclusions from this data - correct? Well, I'm off to check on my spoons. I hear they're making people fat .

This random document fell off the back of a bus. Weird. This random document which randomly fell off the back of a bus (randomly) says MITRE is no longer supporting the CVE program as of April 16th, 2025. Which is crazy, because this random document is dated April 15th, 2025.

😂

BREAKING: Rumors now emerging that several Generals were caught shredding documents and the FBI raided the homes of several CIA officers.

"Grok, what movie character am I and why?" (Follow up with: "Make an image of me as that character!") x.com/i/grok/share/c16iwwbXf…