Viktig och korrekt analys över vad en europeisk förhandlingsdelegation ka. Och inte kan göra.
Lägg till att Ryssland inte ser eu som
En stormakt för vi saknar förutsättningar att projicera makt utanför vårt eget område.
Därför behöver eu inse att
Man ÄR
En geopolitisk spelare
Another negotiation wave is unfolding. This time, the UK, France and Germany, the E3, are looking for a formula to design talks.
There is no need to overstate Putin’s interest in negotiations. Today, he appears to be looking for a way to change the dynamics of the war, not a way out of it. But let us assume for a moment that Moscow is genuinely interested in exploring a pause.
In a potential Ukraine–E3–Russia format, there are three problems that need to be addressed before taking the plunge.
1. E3 has agency in Ukraine’s eyes. It does not have agency in Russia’s.
Moscow no longer sees Europe as an independent center of power. It despises Europe only slightly less than it despises Ukraine. For the Kremlin, Europe is not a negotiating party but a space of influence.
2. E3 has decisive leverage over Ukraine. It does not have decisive leverage over Russia.
Through bilateral and EU mechanisms, Europe can influence Kyiv through financial and military support, and the prospect of EU membership.
But Europe’s main instrument vis-à-vis Moscow, sanctions, suffers from a credibility gap. The Kremlin no longer believes they would be genuinely lifted even if an agreement were reached.
The same applies to the idea, floated by some, that Europe should resume purchases of Russian gas in order to regain leverage. In Moscow, this would be read not as Europe gaining leverage, but as Europe looking for an off-ramp back to business as usual.
A lever the other side does not believe in ceases to be a lever.
3. The format itself creates the wrong incentives.
Moscow would inevitably seek to turn E3 into a channel for Russian proposals, encouraging Europeans to persuade Kyiv to accept arrangements it would otherwise reject. This would create friction between Ukraine and its European partners precisely where unity matters most.
And when talks once again reach the question of territory, E3 will not be able to side with Russia without undermining its own principles. The process would likely run into the same wall.
The key to a breakthrough lies elsewhere: in Moscow abandoning its claims to the rest of Donbas and in Kyiv refraining from expanding its military gains in the air and on the ground. The obstacle is not the format. It is the substance.
A Ukraine–E3–Russia format may be useful if it helps clarify and expand support for Ukraine and test Moscow’s room for compromise.
As a pathway to a political settlement, however, it is difficult to see how it produces a fundamentally different outcome.
The juice may not be worth the squeeze.
Then again, diplomacy sometimes consists precisely of trying to squeeze juice from fruit that is clearly not yet ripe.