Because sex is a true binary,
โx is a woman implies x is a sexual objectโ (hereafter p)
is a strong example for those who believe in essences.
โx is an objectโ means x can be the value of a variable, such that things can be predicated of x; โx is sexualโ means x can reproduce by combining genetic material with a member of the opposite sex.
โx has a heart implies x has kidneysโ admits counter-examples at boundary cases; p does not.
โx is human implies x is mortalโ is an inductive generalization; p is not.
Intersex conditions give no counter-example, since you can either deny that the sufferer is a woman, irrespective of whether he is a sexual object, or admit that he is a woman, and maintain that she is a sexual object. Either way, the conditional p holds.
Unattractive women give no counter-example, since, qua woman, x is still defined as a sexual being, irrespective of her lack of appeal relative to other women.
p is true not merely by virtue of meaning, but because real, biological sex is binary.
p is comparable to โx is blue implies x is coloredโ.
Iโm inclined to think p is analytic ร priori in spite of being more than merely conventional. We construct our class of women, construct our classes of females of other species, and note analytically that all these classes are subsets of a now constructed class of sexual objects.
Hence there must be analytic propositions that are more than merely conventional; hence there must be essences.
Some might argue p is synthetic ร priori, since p is knowable ร priori, (say to some monk whoโs never seen a woman but knows what one is), yet p is not merely linguistically trivial or conventional, like โx is a bachelor implies x is unmarriedโ. p gives real information about a real class of objects. I think synthetic ร prioricity is best rejected if possible, and I think it is possible to reject it.
Iโm not afraid of essences. I even quite like them.