Afghanistan and its Vicinity at a Glimpse Edited by Omar SAMAD for “World Affairs 21c” on Substack A fast, structured look at Afghanistan and its neighborhood, key decisions, shifts, and near‑term trajectories. 1. About UNAMA’s Mandate Extension The UN Security Council unanimously renewed UNAMA for another year under Resolution 2822 (2026). Key mandate areas to watch: • Strategic Review by March 2027 evaluation of priorities, efficiency, and operational constraints. • Doha Process: Ongoing debate over the depth and conditions of UN‑led political engagement. • Women’s & Human Rights: Strong language urging reversal of restrictions on women’s education, work, and UN access. • Other topics: Humanitarian Access, Aid delivery, counterterrorism concerns, and regional friction. Notables: • The U.S. and some member states again called for a UN Special Envoy to coordinate the efforts. • Preambular text reiterates the need to restore Afghanistan’s financial system and enable use of central bank assets for the Afghan people. • A key wording shift from “de facto authorities” to “relevant authorities” in UN terminology signals no implied or imminent legitimacy, while allowing pragmatic engagement within the defined framework.  Regional actors are expected to follow their own bilateral policy priorities. Taliban’s Dual Reactions: While one wing may view the mandate extension as positive, seek humanitarian access, and technical engagement, another wing frames the mandate as external interference and “political pressure.” This wing prefers less engagement and more control over international operations. This dichotomy will shape how Kabul engages the UN and others in the coming year. Meanwhile, current Afghan rulers signal interest in SCO membership, per media reports. 2. U.S.–Iran Preliminary Framework (June 15) A 14‑point draft aims to stabilize a volatile region: • 60‑day ceasefire extension • Reopening the Strait of Hormuz (incl. de‑mining) • Lifting the U.S. naval blockade • Phased release of $24B in frozen assets • Pause in regional hostilities, including Lebanon Outlook Short‑term de‑escalation and improved oil flows are likely. Long‑term nuclear constraints, sanctions relief, and verification remain uncertain amid mistrust, Israeli objections, and internal politics. Signing is targeted for June 19 in Switzerland. Germany, Italy, France, and the UK signal readiness to lift sanctions. 3. Pakistan: A 2026 Reality Check Despite persistent efforts to mediate in the Gulf/Mideast conflict, areas to watch: • Governance: Hybrid civil‑military system with COAS dominant over a fragile PML‑N/PPP coalition. Polarization and selective accountability persist. • Security: TTP and BLA activity resurges in KP and Balochistan; cross‑border tensions with Afghanistan. • Society: Inequality, rights concerns, and political fragmentation strain cohesion. • Economy: IMF‑supported stabilization with 3.6–4.1% growth, easing inflation, and rising reserves. Debt servicing consumes 43% of the federal budget; structural weaknesses remain. Afghanistan–Pakistan dynamic: Cross‑border region militancy remains the core friction point. A sustainable path forward requires third‑party‑mediated diplomacy, potentially via China or OIC partners, focused on verifiable Taliban action against anti‑Pakistan groups, improved border management, accountability for civilian harm, and incremental economic cooperation. India–Pakistan: Relations remain tense but stable under the post‑2025 ceasefire. Military posturing continues, alongside disputes over the Indus Waters Treaty and periodic unrest in Pakistan‑administered Kashmir. 4. Regional Diplomacy in Kabul Senior officials and experts from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan are expected in Kabul this week for an MFA Strategic Studies Center conference. N/1

It looks like @aishabbwahab is first leading this race and headed to run in November’s ballot. Tabrik. Congratulations! Wahab is the first Afghan-American woman elected to public office in the U.S. She’s a progressive Democrat from Hayward/Fremont area, known for work on housing, civil rights and issues of concern for the majority of her constituents.

Afghanistan’s New Geopolitical Fault Lines or Just Déjà Vu? By Omar SAMAD and Ghaus JANBAZ May 29, 2026 Tensions between Afghanistan–Pakistan are often described as cyclical clashes or internal militant violence that, while tragic, appear contained within a new yet tense and fragile equilibrium. Recent publications on this topic, including reporting in The New York Times, emphasize the persistence and human toll of these confrontations but largely frame them as part of a prolonged local or tribal conflict. However, such an interpretation underestimates the extent to which the current phase reflects a deeper structural shift with serious policy implications within an increasingly volatile global order. The latest major escalation earlier this year, which claimed hundreds of lives, coincides with deteriorating economic ties, disruptions in trade and transit corridors, and growing uncertainty around regional connectivity initiatives once seen as the foundation for South and Central Asian economic integration. More importantly, the conflict is unfolding against the backdrop of a subtle but significant geopolitical realignment. Russia is cautiously expanding engagement with the Taliban, signaling a pragmatic adjustment of its regional policy, while the United States–preoccupied with rising tensions in the Gulf–has adopted a more distant, observational stance. These shifts are reshaping strategic calculations in both Kabul and Islamabad, narrowing the space for cooperation. This article argues that the bilateral crisis cannot be understood or addressed in isolation or within a narrow prism, but must be situated within a broader regional and great power context that risks turning Afghanistan once again into a contested geo-political arena. Or is it merely as part of practical hedging in an increasingly multipolar world? The Afghanistan-Pakistan Dilemma

3/ China: Beijing is shifting from observer to active mediator. It is interested in: Afghanistan’s resources (estimated at $1–3 trillion) Preventing threats from ETIM (East Turkistan Islamic Movement) Expanding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and CPEC via Pakistan. Beijing negotiates with the Taliban as the "Afghan Interim Government" without formal recognition, focusing on economic integration while maintaining security cooperation through joint border patrols and infrastructure investment. China’s mediation efforts have tacitly secured a shaky ceasefire between the two neighbors. Adding importance to the process, there are unconfirmed reports of another round of talks to be held in Urumqi soon, but no side has acknowledged yet. Iran: Pursues pragmatic engagement with the Taliban despite past hostility, cooperating on:  Border security and narcotics water resources trade Yet Iran faces its own constraints such as ongoing tensions in the Gulf, limited fiscal capacity, and competing domestic priorities. Iran's strategy balances conditional engagement with the Taliban while preserving leverage through border access, trade, and water sharing arrangements. Iran may opt for full recognition of the Emirate when the opportunity presents itself. Central Asia: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan pursue multi-vector policies and develop transport corridors (including the Trans-Afghan railway and TAPI pipeline), while remaining concerned about terrorism and drug trafficking. Each country maintains its own engagement pathway with Kabul. India: Maintains cautious engagement through humanitarian and economic assistance, avoiding direct security involvement. India's concerns include Pakistan-based terrorism, the safety of its diaspora, and geopolitical rivalries. India's path forward involves supporting an Afghan-led reconciliation process, and providing development assistance with partial engagement of the Taliban directly. Turkey and Gulf States: Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia Act as mediators and investors, maintaining contacts with Kabul without formal recognition. Qatar hosts a Taliban political office and continues to facilitate dialogue. The UAE focuses on trade, investment, and humanitarian assistance. United States and the West: Act in a fragmented manner. The U.S., preoccupied with Gulf tensions and Iran, has adopted a distant, observational stance while maintaining sanctions on the Taliban and cutting all humanitarian assistance to the country. European partners are similarly divided, some advocating for conditional engagement on humanitarian grounds, others insisting on human and gender rights prerequisites for normalization. President Trump's motivations appear driven by “detainee diplomacy”, the prospects for a nostalgic deal over the use of Bagram air base–linked at some level to Pakistani prodding and transactionalism–and avoiding new military entanglements while prioritizing great power competition with China and Russia. United Nations: Effectively limited to humanitarian coordination, lacking instruments of enforcement or influence. With China now leading the Afghan file as the new penholder at the Security Council (while the U.S. continues to head the 1988 Sanctions Committee), consensus is weak but has the potential to improve if the P5 member states agree on a pragmatic approach while holding Kabul/Kandahar accountable. Only 31% of Afghanistan's humanitarian appeal (to provide basic food assistance to more than 90% living under the poverty line is funded, and accountability mechanisms remain absent. Risks and Prospects N/3