Johannes Maccovius' treatment of the distinction between the will of God properly speaking, and the will of sign: 'The will of God is called the will of good pleasure, which the theologians set in contrast to the will of sign; a distinction that arises only from the ambiguity of the term. For the will of sign is not properly a will at all, it is nothing other than the word of God. The will of good pleasure, however, is properly called will. 𝙄𝙩 𝙞𝙨 𝙘𝙖𝙡𝙡𝙚𝙙 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙬𝙞𝙡𝙡 𝙤𝙛 𝙜𝙤𝙤𝙙 𝙥𝙡𝙚𝙖𝙨𝙪𝙧𝙚 𝙣𝙤𝙩 𝙛𝙧𝙤𝙢 𝙞𝙩𝙨 𝙤𝙗𝙟𝙚𝙘𝙩, 𝙖𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙤𝙪𝙜𝙝 𝙞𝙩 𝙬𝙚𝙧𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙘𝙚𝙧𝙣𝙚𝙙 𝙤𝙣𝙡𝙮 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝 𝙩𝙝𝙤𝙨𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙥𝙡𝙚𝙖𝙨𝙚 𝙃𝙞𝙢, 𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝙖𝙡𝙡 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙤𝙘𝙘𝙪𝙧, 𝙬𝙝𝙚𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙧 𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙡 𝙤𝙧 𝙜𝙤𝙤𝙙, 𝙃𝙚 𝙬𝙞𝙡𝙡𝙨 𝙗𝙮 𝙃𝙞𝙨 𝙬𝙞𝙡𝙡 𝙤𝙛 𝙜𝙤𝙤𝙙 𝙥𝙡𝙚𝙖𝙨𝙪𝙧𝙚, 𝙗𝙪𝙩 𝙞𝙩 𝙞𝙨 𝙘𝙖𝙡𝙡𝙚𝙙 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙬𝙞𝙡𝙡 𝙤𝙛 𝙜𝙤𝙤𝙙 𝙥𝙡𝙚𝙖𝙨𝙪𝙧𝙚 𝙛𝙧𝙤𝙢 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙢𝙖𝙣𝙣𝙚𝙧 𝙤𝙛 𝙬𝙞𝙡𝙡𝙞𝙣𝙜, 𝙗𝙚𝙘𝙖𝙪𝙨𝙚 𝙬𝙝𝙖𝙩𝙚𝙫𝙚𝙧 𝙃𝙚 𝙬𝙞𝙡𝙡𝙨, 𝙬𝙝𝙚𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙧 𝙩𝙤 𝙚𝙛𝙛𝙚𝙘𝙩 𝙤𝙧 𝙩𝙤 𝙥𝙚𝙧𝙢𝙞𝙩, 𝙝𝙖𝙨 𝙣𝙤 𝙘𝙖𝙪𝙨𝙚 𝙚𝙭𝙘𝙚𝙥𝙩 𝙃𝙞𝙨 𝙤𝙬𝙣 𝙜𝙤𝙤𝙙 𝙥𝙡𝙚𝙖𝙨𝙪𝙧𝙚. Here, however, the Adversaries raise a tumult, and most ineptly. For since the will of sign is also called the revealed will, and the will of good pleasure is sometimes hidden, they ask whether God can command what He does not will, or forbid what He wills; and whether, in this way, two contrary wills are established in God. Likewise, whether by this reasoning dissimulation must be attributed to God. It is clear, first of all, that God commands certain things and yet does not will them to be done. Thus, for example, He commanded Abraham to offer his son, and yet He did not will this to be done, as the outcome shows. He commanded Pharaoh to let the Israelite people go, and yet He did not will this, for He adds, “I will harden Pharaoh’s heart.” Likewise, He forbids unjust homicide, and yet He willed that it should be committed upon His own Son, for He willed Him to be slain for us. Yet no contrary wills are present here. For the will of sign is not properly called will, as we have already said; nor is the will of good pleasure to be said to contradict the precept. 𝙁𝙤𝙧 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙘𝙚𝙥𝙩 𝙙𝙤𝙚𝙨 𝙣𝙤𝙩 𝙨𝙞𝙜𝙣𝙞𝙛𝙮 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙚𝙣𝙙 𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝙬𝙝𝙞𝙘𝙝 𝙞𝙩 𝙞𝙨 𝙜𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙣; 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙞𝙨 𝙠𝙣𝙤𝙬𝙣 𝙩𝙤 𝙪𝙨 𝙤𝙣𝙡𝙮 𝙛𝙧𝙤𝙢 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙚𝙫𝙚𝙣𝙩. 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙘𝙚𝙥𝙩 𝙞𝙩𝙨𝙚𝙡𝙛 𝙤𝙣𝙡𝙮 𝙢𝙖𝙠𝙚𝙨 𝙠𝙣𝙤𝙬𝙣 𝙬𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙂𝙤𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙦𝙪𝙞𝙧𝙚𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙪𝙨. Thus, to the argument by which some here attempt to show a contradiction between the will of God and His precept, the reply is easy. They argue thus: “He who wills one thing and commands another has a will contrary to His command. But God sometimes wills one thing and commands another. Therefore…” Response: He who wills one thing and commands another does so if he commands with an end different from that which he wills. But God never commands with an end other than that which He attains through the command. For example, He gave Abraham the command to sacrifice his son; the end attained was not the offering of Isaac, but the testing of Abraham’s faith. Therefore God gave him this command not that he should perform it, but that, by his readiness to perform it, he might be proved. Likewise, God gave Pharaoh the command to release the people, not because He willed it to be done, otherwise He would not have hardened him, had He willed him to obey, but that, by his disobedience, Pharaoh might be convicted of his own malice. You will say: “But in this way God will be justly accused of dissimulation, whereas every vice must be excluded from His most holy nature, and therefore also dissimulation.” Response: First, this is false. For by commanding this or that, He does not feign that He wills what He commands; nor can this in any way be inferred from the nature of a precept.

A few stanzas from Particular Baptist minister, Benjamin Wallin's (1711-1782) hymn titled "The Heretick Unmasked": 'A round subjection he affects to sacred words reveal'd; All other language he rejects; And thus he lies conceal'd. But all this seeming to believe And own this word divine, but an engine to deceive, And cover his design To creeds no rev'rence he affords, And thus his notion states, That truth runs best in Scripture words, While truth is what he hates.'