Gaza’s exceptionalism? There is a strange and recurring theme that treats Palestinians in Gaza as exempt from the basic realities of modern war. It suggests Gazans should remain exactly where they are, face no disruption, and expect reconstruction to simply restore the pre-October 7 reality, as if the devastation, the tens of thousands killed, and the political collapse should carry no structural consequences. This view ignores how every major conflict from Iraq and Syria to Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Ukraine involved mass displacement and population relocation for their safety and security, shifts in governance, the removal of armed groups, and major political restructuring. Gaza is the only case where displacement has been entirely internal, leaving civilians with almost no safe alternatives and facing unbearable hardships and challenges, caught in between Israeli bombardment and Hamas’s control.
The exceptionalism narrative insists that everything in Gaza must be smooth and consequence‑free: aid should flow flawlessly; civilians should never be asked to temporarily relocate; all needs must be met while everyone stays put; reconstruction should be guaranteed without any commitment to a new political or social contract; and Gaza should receive unlimited aid while its leaders retain the freedom to launch wars, provoke neighbors, and reject peace under the banner of “resistance.”
A second pillar of this exceptionalism point of view is the belief that Hamas, the actor that triggered this disaster, is entitled to a say in the next steps and deserves to remain politically intact and recycled into yet another reconstruction phase, as has happened for two decades. Whether out of romanticization of “resistance” or avoidance of hard choices, this view demands rebuilding Gaza while its captors stay in place.
But the international community and donor states will not fund a future where Gaza is expected to thrive while still held by jihadist adventurism and nihilistic governance. There is no perfect humanitarian delivery system, no perfect reconstruction with everyone staying put, and no scenario where Hamas is confronted while the population remains entirely stationary. Two decades of jihadism marketed as “resistance” have created consequences that can no longer be deferred.
If Gaza is to be rebuilt and reborn, difficult decisions are unavoidable. The alternative is the status quo: a slow drip of aid that leaves two million people trapped in rubble, sewage, and despair. Creating genuinely safe zones outside of the “Yellow Line,” secured by an International Stabilization Force, is essential to moving civilians out of Hamas’s grip, shielding them from renewed Israeli attacks, and enabling the eventual rebuilding of Gaza.