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Jun 12
Last month, the @Symfony blog posted about some results from Claude Mythos.
symfony.com/blog/claude-myth…
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Jun 12
If you're curious, the skills I used to find these bugs and more are still internal-only (for now), but they build atop Trailmark.
blog.trailofbits.com/2026/04…
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Jun 12
While it's certainly possible Mythos could have found the same bugs if its operator invested more time and focus on HtmlSanitizer, most defenders don't have access to Mythos. I sure didn't.
To be terse: Less FOMO, more resourecefulness.
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Scott Arciszewski retweeted
Jun 12
RSA private keys biased toward 0 bits can be factored by swapping a hard math problem for an easy one: integer factorization becomes polynomial factorization.
We found hundreds of real-world keys vulnerable to this. Many traced to a type mismatch in CompleteFTP (now patched): each 32-bit limb got only 8 bits of randomness. We recovered 603 RSA and 74 DSA private keys. blog.trailofbits.com/2026/06…
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Jun 10
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Jun 10
Can't wait to show everyone what I've built atop this little tool :)
Trailmark is a cool foundational piece of code, but it's not the headliner. That will come later :D
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Scott Arciszewski retweeted
May 19
.@obsdmd asked us to audit their Sync protocol. Our engineers delivered eleven findings.
Five went above and beyond the original scope and found system-level issues that weren't specific to Sync itself.
We see this pattern often with our clients. We respect scope as a delivery contract, but we have a professional obligation to surface what our engineers see.
Anything they catch is flagged, and the client decides what to do. When a finding warrants it, the report includes an Exploit Scenario, the path from observation to working exploit. We take an attacker's mindset, and exploit scenarios show our clients what a bug costs them.
With security-first teams like Obsidian, that meant five system-level findings that were either patched or explicitly acknowledged:
1. Math.random used for password and salt generation (High severity, medium difficulty)
2. Variable-time comparison of password-reset tokens and MFA recovery codes (High severity, high difficulty)
3. TOTP codes replayable within the validity window (High severity, high difficulty)
4. Plaintext storage of MFA secrets and recovery codes (High severity, medium difficulty)
5. Password reset without MFA (Medium severity, medium difficulty)
Two new security audits of Obsidian Sync by @cure53berlin and @trailofbits are now available on our Security page.
All findings have been addressed via remediations and disclosures validated by the respective auditors. Read more:
obsidian.md/blog/cure53-tob-…
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May 15
Making non-deterministic processes even more non-deterministic
github.com/trailofbits/skill…
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Scott Arciszewski retweeted
‼️🚨 Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 just hit a wall. For the first time in 19-years, ZDI rejected dozens of working zero-day RCE submissions because organizers ran out of contest slots.
Rejected hackers are now going public with PoC demos and direct vendor disclosures, breaking Pwn2Own's usual secrecy.
▪️ AI surfaces a massive wave of 0-day RCEs.
▪️ Submissions overwhelm ZDI past max capacity.
▪️ Slots run out. Researchers with working chains get rejected.
▪️ "Revenge disclosures" begin. ← we are here.
Confirmed casualties so far:
▪️ @xchglabs : 86 vulnerabilities prepared (PyTorch, NVIDIA, Linux KVM, Oracle, Docker, Ollama, Chroma, LiteLLM, llama.cpp). All rejected. Now reporting directly to vendors with writeups dropping as patches land.
▪️ @ggwhyp : full-chain Firefox RCE on Windows. Rejected. Publicly demoed (HTML page → cmd.exe → calc.exe). Responsibly disclosed to Mozilla.
▪️ @yunsu_dev : working RCE chain, rejected. Submitting elsewhere.
▪️ @ryotkak : tried to register for 3 weeks. ZDI confirmed "at maximum capacity, can't add extra contest days." Considered canceling flight and hotel.
▪️ @anzuukino2802 : Claude Code RCE PoC. Rejected.
▪️ @desckimh : 0-day RCEs in Ollama and LM Studio. Rejected.
Reported impact: a community-estimated 150 researchers tried to register. Accepted contestants are now being warned about collisions. Rejected vulnerabilities going to bug bounty programs may trigger pre-event patches that invalidate the work of those who got in.
ZDI has not publicly addressed the capacity issue. The event still runs May 14-16 in Berlin.
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Scott Arciszewski retweeted
May 7
This is such a great multi-faceted piece of work from @inf_0_: blog.trailofbits.com/2026/04…
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Scott Arciszewski retweeted
May 7
We beat Google's zero-knowledge proof of quantum cryptanalysis by exploiting bugs in their Rust ZKP code, then forged a proof with better metrics. Plus 11 new public reviews, Trailmark, MuTON and mewt, dimensional analysis, and more. May Tribune: mailchi.mp/trailofbits/may-2…
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Scott Arciszewski retweeted
May 4
new sticker candidate just dropped
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Apr 24
The amount of squabbling over bugs, bug quality, AI bug extermination, how security is doomed/not doomed/unchanged/improved based on bugs… it’s ridiculous. Bugs are not the totality of cybersecurity.
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Apr 24
Another cool thing that came from this work: Wycheproof test cases for BLS-12-381.
github.com/C2SP/wycheproof/p…
Check out the vector-forge skill: github.com/trailofbits/skill…
Apr 23
When Claude reasons about code, it reasons about lists, but the questions that actually matter are graph questions.
We just open-sourced Trailmark to make it easy for security engineers to parse source code into a call graph for Claude. 🧵
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Scott Arciszewski retweeted
Apr 23
When Claude reasons about code, it reasons about lists, but the questions that actually matter are graph questions.
We just open-sourced Trailmark to make it easy for security engineers to parse source code into a call graph for Claude. 🧵
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