🧑💻 WHO — OR WHAT — IS PALANTIR?
(sorry for the length of the post)
This morning, I took an early/slow walk.
The streets were quiet.
But as I looked around, I started noticing something.
Cameras. Everywhere.
On lampposts.
Above shops.
At junctions.
Outside stations.
Watching roads, pavements, cars and people.
They are so normal now that most of us barely notice them.
And it made me wonder:
Where does all that information go?
Who brings it together?
Who analyses it?
And who builds the systems that allow governments to turn enormous amounts of seperate information into decisions?
That is when I started thinking about Palantir
To be clear, I am not claiming Palantir operates all the cameras I passed.
The cameras simply made me think about the larger question:
Who has the power to connect information?
Palantir is a publicly listed American software and artificial-intelligence company, co-founded by Peter Thiel and led by Alex Karp. Peter Thiel is also an influential figure within America’s right-wing technology and political donor networks.
That makes the wider political ecosystem around Palantir worth understanding, particulary as Trumpism and projects such as Project 2025 seek to reshape how government power is organised and exercised.
But accuracy matters.
Palantir did not write Project 2025, and I have seen no evidence that the company was formally part of the Heritage Foundation project.
It is not a consumer technology company.
It does not sell phones or run a social-media platform.
It builds powerful software that helps governments, militaries, intelligence agencies, hospitals and major corporations bring scattered information together, analyse it and use it to make operational decisions.
On the battlefield.
Inside intelligence agencies.
Across government departments.
Within hospitals and public services.
The concern does not require a conspiracy.
The facts are signifcant enough.
Palantir’s relationship with the British state did not begin under Labour.
The Conservatives brought the company deeper into both defence and the NHS.
In 2022, the Conservative government’s Ministry of Defence signed an £80 million enterprise agreement with Palantir.
Then, in November 2023, NHS England awarded a Palantir-led consortium the contract to deliver the NHS Federated Data Platform.
Up to £330 million was allocated for the platform and associated services over seven years.
That contract was also awarded while the Conservatives were in government.
Labour inherited both relationships when it entered office in July 2024.
But Labour did not simply inherit a software contract and leave it untouched.
It recognised that Palantir is becoming strategically important to defence, artificial intelligence and modern government.
In September 2025, the Labour government announced a wider strategic partnership under which Palantir said it could invest up to £1.5 billion in Britain, establish the UK as its European defence headquarters and create hundreds of highly skilled jobs.
The partnership also aims to develop AI-powered military planning and decision-making capabilties here in Britain.
That distinction matters.
Under the Conservatives, Palantir became an important software supplier to the NHS and Ministry of Defence.
Under Labour, the relationship is being developed into something broader:
Investment.
Jobs.
Defence capability.
Artificial-intelligence expertise.
And a long-term strategic presence in the United Kingdom.
We should applaud Labour for understanding that Britain cannot remain merely a customer buying critical technology from overseas. Britain must also become a place where that technology is developed, governed and deployed.
And the NHS arrangement includes important protections.
NHS England says the data is stored, processed and accessed within the United Kingdom.
Individual NHS organisations control their own data and determine who may access it.
Palantir acts as a processor working under NHS instructions.
It cannot sell or commercialise NHS data.
It cannot use NHS data to develop its own products or train its own artificial-intelligence models.
Access is controlled according to role and purpose, with seperate NHS environments and privacy protections around sensitive information.
So Labour is not simply handing British medical data to an American company.
The NHS remains the controller.
Palantir supplies the platform.
That security wrapper matters.
The details surrounding defence systems are understandably less public.
But the principle should remain the same:
British control.
British security standards.
Clear legal limits.
Supporters will argue that Palantir’s technology can make government faster and more effective.
It may help NHS organisations manage waiting lists, beds, theatre capacity and patient flow.
It may help defence planners combin intelligence and make decisions more quickly.
Those potential benefits are real.
And Britain should not be afraid of advanced technology.
But strategic partnerships require stronger scrutiny, not weaker scrutiny.
How dependent should Britain become on one company for critical national systems?
How easily could the NHS or Ministry of Defence replace Palantir once its software becomes deeply embeded?
Who understands these systems well enough to question their conclusions?
And how do we make sure Britain gains the capability without surrendering control?
Palantir is publicly listed.
Its financial results are published.
Some of its contracts can be scrutinised.
But being listed on a stock exchange is not the same as being democratically accountable.
This is not simply a Conservative story.
And it is not simply a Labour story.
The Conservatives opened the doors.
Labour inherited the relationship and is trying to turn it into a strategic advantage for Britain.
That deserves recognition.
But recognition should sit alongside scrutiny.
Palantir is not merely another software supplier.
It is increasingly becoming infrastructure for power.
The task for Labour is to make sure that power strengthens Britain, remains under British control and continues to serve the public.
The NHS and MoD will have continuity and exit plans, but there is no publicly identified like-for-like system ready to replace Palantir overnight — which makes avoiding long-term operational dependence just as important as protecting the data itself.
That is not paranoia.
That is responsibile government.