I’m looking to talk to people who work with mobile app security inside companies.
I want to better understand your real workflow, tools, pain points, and what still feels too manual.
There’s a reward of your choice for the interview.
Form: hub.oversecured.com/cusdev
[1/3] It's common to get a ParcelFileDescriptor pointing to a directory through an Android ContentProvider. But can you actually turn that into a directory listing?
[2/3] Examples:
- FileProvider pointing to files/cache directories
- A misconfigured ContentProvider that can be tricked into returning a ParcelFileDescriptor pointing to a directory
We launched Android DAST. And the first problem we hit is that login flows block everything.
So we used LLM to log in automatically. This is what debugging looks like
An attack on Android content providers that researchers might overlook
[1/4] Android has a mechanism to restrict access using the exported attribute or by requiring permissions
[2/4] But system apps ("android.uid.system" and maybe systemui) automatically bypass these restrictions and can access arbitrary components
[3/4] It's trivial to force a system app to call ContentResolver.query() or openInputStream() for an arbitrary Uri
[4/4] If the implementation of ContentProvider.getType(), query(), openFile() does anything other than simply returning a ParcelFileDescriptor or data from a database (making directories, debug mode, dumping logs), an attacker can trigger it this way and gain privilege escalation
We’re hiring a Mobile App Security Expert!
What you'll do:
- Research Android/iOS internals and ship new SAST/DAST checks
- Turn real-world findings into PoCs and write-ups
- Be the technical voice with customers: explain findings, advise architecture, guide CI/CD setup
New Android host validation bypass technique!
[1/4] All parsed URIs in Android are android.net.Uri.StringUri objects. However, the scheme parser only looks for the ":" delimiter
[3/4] This will only work if the scheme isn't validated either. This attack can increase the impact in cases when, e.g., the victim's access token is appended to the request headers
[4/4] Limitations:
1. The lack of scheme validation
2. You also need to bypass the network security config:
- Easy case: usesCleartextTraffic is set to "true"
- Hard case: checking the app's network security config and trying to load your own host (or you control DNS responses)
🚨 Security Alert: Over 2 billion Android users and 100 million Pixel users may be at risk of file theft, VPN bypass, unauthorized Bluetooth access, and geolocation leaks. Visit our blog for details.
blog.oversecured.com/Disclos…
We have updated scan reports for all Google phone apps and additionally included reports for Wear OS, Android TV, Android Desktop, and Android Auto!
Time to report the vulnerabilities to bughunters.google.com!
blog.oversecured.com/Oversec…
Android bug hunters, your chance to get rewards from Google
Only Google has agreed to release the reports without prior fixes. I see dozens of valid bugs (and I submitted 0 of them)
NEW - A whole bunch of fresh Xiaomi vulnerabilities discovered by researchers who say they're serious and all users should update ASAP.
forbes.com/sites/thomasbrews…