Yes, yes, yes, combined arms and all that...
I read these opinion pieces being published by West Point and I wonder if these well-credentialed authors have really been paying attention. *The article was written by Canadian tankers btw.
Drones are NOT just the "next TOW." Why?
1. Remote UAS controller not at risk: A TOW or Javelin team is right there in the line of fire (or at least line-of-sight vulnerable). An FPV pilot can be kilometers back, often in a dugout or even further with fiber-optic relays. This removes the “suicide mission” calculus that limited massed ATGM use. Ukrainian operators routinely cycle through dozens of sorties per day from relative safety.
2. Cost differential & scalability: A heavy FPV runs ~$500–1,200. A T-90M is ~$3.8–4.5 million. Russian analysts themselves ran the numbers in early 2026: one T-90M = ~3,200 heavy FPVs; one BMP-3 = ~870. Ukrainian FPVs have accounted for an estimated 50–65% of Russian tank losses as of early 2025 (Forbes/OSINT tracking), with some T-90M batches showing ~50% of kills as final FPV strikes. Even at a pessimistic 20–43% hit rate per sortie (per Ukrainian veteran accounts), you’re still talking single-digit thousands of dollars to mission-kill a multimillion-dollar vehicle. TOWs/Javelins never offered that exchange ratio at scale.
3. Drones can (in fact) hold ground: We’re just entering the nightmare phase now. Right now drones excel at denial (exactly what the article says—they restrict mobility without controlling terrain). But with fiber-optic, AI/autonomous navigation, and loitering munitions, we’re already seeing the shift to persistent presence. Autonomous “last-mile” navigation has pushed success rates from ~10–30% to 70–80% by cutting out constant radio links and operator skill ceilings. Swarms AI target recognition reusable platforms (some Ukrainian systems now resupply themselves) start looking like cheap, attritable area-denial forces that don’t need 24/7 human babysitting. We’re not there for true “holding” yet, but the trajectory is clear and the article underplays it.
4. Automation - human-in-the-loop obsolescence: Already happening faster than most Western armies admit. Fiber-optic drones are unjammable; AI-enabled ones handle navigation and terminal guidance independently. Ukrainian sources in 2025–2026 report this is slashing both drone losses and required operator skill. The article’s “evolutionary” framing treats this as just better guidance systems. It’s not—it’s the removal of the vulnerable link that made past guided weapons (TOW, Hellfire, etc.) manpower-intensive and detectable.
5. Area denial is insanely economical in manpower & cost: One well-trained FPV section (a handful of operators production teams) can paralyze a mechanized battalion’s movement. Compare that to the crew, logistics, and fuel for equivalent ATGM teams or attack helicopters. Russian analysts themselves are now questioning whether tanks remain cost-effective precisely because of this.
6. Skill curve: Training a competent FPV pilot takes weeks. A tank crew or even a Javelin gunner takes months/years plus expensive platforms for live-fire practice. Ukraine has flooded the battlespace with operators from a civilian gamer/drone-racing pool. The article notes that poorly trained crews suffer more, but the flip side is that anyone can become a lethal drone operator extremely quickly. That’s not true for traditional mechanized warfare.
7. Dev cycle speed: Attritable = sprint. Bespoke = crawl. FPV airframes, warheads, EW countermeasures, and AI modules are iterating in weeks/months because losing a $700 drone is trivial. Tank armor packages, APS, or new IFV designs take years and billions. Ukraine’s drone ecosystem (modular 7–10 inch FPVs that can swap ISR/strike/relay roles on the fly) proves this. The article acknowledges rapid advance but treats it as historically normal. It isn’t—not at this price point and iteration speed.
*The authors correctly note that drones have helped create a static, attritional battlefield reminiscent of 1916. Where they err is in presenting this as a failure of drone warfare or proof that "combined arms" simply needs better integration. For the defender—Ukraine, outgunned in traditional metrics—this stasis is the win. Drones didn't just deny maneuver to the attacker; they made large-scale Russian armored advances prohibitively expensive in blood and treasure, freezing the front and preserving Ukrainian sovereignty. A static line where your country still exists is not "limited strategic effect." It is survival against long odds. History's tank-killers (Saggers, TOWs, Javelins) never achieved this scale of denial at this cost ratio. Drones did.
The Cold War and GWOT are gone people. Adjust your thinking.