The most interesting thing about the fallout from the rsETH exploit is where the capital fleeing Aave didn't go.
During the event, Aave lost nearly $10B in TVL. Those funds, for the most part, did not move to another lending protocol. Morpho ended the window flat. So did Fluid. Compound fell 13% and Euler lost about 40% of its supply.
The only one that gained was SparkLend.
SparkLend gained $1.27B over the window. The largest single depositor was Spark's own automated treasury contract which net-contributed $437M, roughly a third of SparkLend's total gain. Outside the treasury, the depositor base was top-heavy and focused within a handful of large wallets
In a bank run, people don't go to the bank, withdraw their funds, and then go deposit to the bank next door. The financial system is interconnected. If one bank is in trouble, they all could be.
So, Aave didn't break. They managed to plug the hole and cascading failures were averted. But.. the capital didn't come back. The entire sector remained contracted beyond the event
I think this is because Aave functioned as the trust ceiling for the category - the safest option onchain capital had. When the safest venue is in trouble, there is nowhere safer to run. And if Aave isn’t safe, the logical conclusion is that nowhere is.
In the same month, total stablecoin supply hit a record $320 billion. The capital is here. It just isn't lending.
Aave's USDC supply rate sits at 3.50%. SPAXX, Fidelity's government money market fund, is paying 3.29%.
The premium for DeFi lending's opaque risks is twenty-one basis points right now
Most depositors were likely unaware they had indirect exposure to rsETH until this event. The question now is what else they are unknowingly underwriting