American Bankers Association CEO Rob Nichols sent the following letter on Sunday to every other bank CEO in the country, asking bankers for “immediate engagement” on stablecoin yield policy. Senate Banking Committee is slated to mark up landmark crypto bill Thursday

Letting the banks die isn’t a revolutionary idea. It’s a necessary one.

pDai has formed a massive Head and Shoulder patter on the weekly!

The issue with the “show me a precedent” framing is that you’re searching for a cycle that matches 2025’s plumbing, issuance, and policy configuration but that cycle doesn’t exist, because the mechanics that drive this one didn’t exist in the 90s, 2001, or 2007. Those cycles didn’t have: • trillion-scale TGA swings • RRP depletion • SRF backstopping • collateral multipliers this sensitive • QT interacting with record gross issuance • LDI/pension constraints • ETF flow reflexivity • sovereign accumulation of digital assets • and a Fed that already halted QT because reserves hit the floor So if we’re looking for a historical match on “late-cycle fragility easing new highs,” the answer isn’t in the ’95/’98/’19 bucket or the ’01/’07 bucket. The closest mechanical analogs are 2019 and 2020, but for completely different reasons than labor or credit: • In 2019, the Fed cut into fragility (repo blew out, reserves thin, credit tightening), yet risk assets made new highs before the COVID shock. • In 2020, the Fed eased into collapsing labor and collapsing credit and risk assets made their all-time highs immediately after the shock, not before. In both cases, the plumbing dictated the timing, not the “cycle” label. And that’s the key distinction here: You’re mapping 2025 to a credit-cycle recession template. I’m mapping 2025 to a plumbing-driven liquidity impulse in a system structurally starved of reserves. In a reserves-scarce regime, easing doesn’t just “shift who holds the risk.” It creates a reflexive bid for anything with structural demand which is why the assets that made new highs in 2019 and 2020 weren’t broad equities, but narrow, high-conviction trades with inelastic demand. That’s exactly the setup today. So to answer your question directly: No, there isn’t a perfect historical cycle where the Fed cut into late-cycle fragility and labor/credit softness and broad risk assets made durable new highs. But there are multiple cycles where liquidity interventions into fragile plumbing produced explosive upside in specific risk assets - even with deteriorating labor and tightening banks. And Bitcoin doesn’t behave like SPX in 2007. It behaves like the asset of last resort in a reserves-scarce system with a Federal bid behind it. That’s the difference in our priors. Same stress signals, different reflexive sequencings.