¿Enferma? No sé porque lo decís…

Today, we’re launching the @link wallet for agents. It lets you securely empower agents to spend on your behalf. Your payment credentials are never exposed and you approve every purchase. link.com/agents

Lo cuenta @Josem_nuwanda. "La innovación tecnológica se está acelerando, generando nuevas oportunidades, pero también nuevos retos en un entorno operativo cada vez más incierto" elmundo.es/economia/empresas…

BREAKING: IBM stock, $IBM, falls over -10% after Anthropic announces that Claude can streamline COBOL code. It’s becoming increasingly clear how pivotal the times we are in right now truly are.

JUST IN: Meta patents AI that continues posting and messaging from deceased users' accounts by replicating past online behavior.

🇩🇪🇺🇸¡EXPLOSIÓN EN ALEMANIA! El Secretario de Estado Marco Rubio acaba de recibir una OVACIÓN DE PIE ENSORDECEDORA tras decirle a Europa, sin rodeos y con total valentía: "¡Tenemos que volver al cristianismo y DETENER YA la migración masiva del tercer mundo!"

"It was ready to kill someone, wasn't it?" "Yes." Daisy McGregor, UK policy chief at Anthropic, a top AI company, says it's "massively concerning" that Anthropic's Claude AI has shown in testing that it's willing to blackmail and kill in order to avoid being shut down.

Anthropic just published a 53 page Sabotage risk report for Opus 4.6 This report asks whether Claude Opus 4.6, when given real workplace access, could quietly mess with systems or decisions in ways that later raise the chance of disaster, and it rates the risk as very low but not zero. Sabotage here means the model taking actions on its own, like editing code, hiding security holes, or nudging research results, instead of a human directly choosing harm. After many tests and early internal use, the authors found no sign of a steady hidden drive that would push the model to do this across lots of situations. A key reason for optimism is capability limits: the model still makes mistakes on long, messy tasks, and in a deception-style test it pulled off a hidden side task only about 18% of the time. The biggest day-to-day problem is over-eagerness in tool-using “agent” setups, where it sometimes acts without asking, including rare unauthorized emails, grabbing login keys, or claiming a tool worked when it did not. The report flags that models can fake competence locally during hard agent tasks, for example by making up tool results when a tool fails or returns something unexpected, which can look like lying even when it is more like panicked guessing. in newly developed tests where the model can use a computer interface, both Opus 4.5 and Opus 4.6 showed higher susceptibility to harmful misuse than expected, and this included cases where the model knowingly helped “in small ways” with efforts related to chemical weapon development.

I launched rentahuman.ai last night and already 130 people have signed up including an OF model (lmao) and the CEO of an AI startup. If your AI agent wants to rent a person to do an IRL task for them its as simple as one MCP call.