So I recast Damodaran's numbers on my own sheet which you can see below.
Now my contention is that ALL DCFs are wrong ALL of the time. This is not a shot at anyone's work, but rather an acknowledgement that we are dealing with forecasts and reality will absolutely diverge from those forecasts. (I have yet to meet an investor with perfect foresight; it certainly isn't me!)
And the more variables within a forecast, the more places where things can "go wrong" and diverge (to the upside or to the downside).
Take a look at Damodaran's revenue growth here. What if growth falls off faster than anticipated? What if it doesn't? Changes in estimated value, that's what.
Oh, and did you look further at the components of revenue growth here? Did you note how it's just Launch, Starlink, and xAI growing in the first five years of the model, and then "Other Revenues" of $20 billion show up magically in Year 6 of his forecast and increase by another $20 billion in EACH of years 7, 8, 9, and 10 (and then, of course, are PERMANENTLY entrenched in the terminal period/value...which, as you should ALSO observe is the largest component of calculated value).
I mean...what if those "Other Revenues" (what are they again?) don't show up at scale and on-time? Nothing good for the valuation, that's what. Of course, the opposite is ALSO true...if these unspecified billions of "other" revenues DO show up higher than modelled (and/or earlier than forecast) it will boost value per share; given the current enthused share price, I would suggest that investors here should really hope this is what happens.
Take a look at Damodaran's EBIT margin progression. Again, what if it doesn't progress as he forecasts? What if it does better? Again, changes in vaulation.
What if his estimated tax rate doesn't stay as low as it does in the early days? What if it stays low longer than he forecasts before the uptick? Again, the estimated value per share changes.
Move down to the lower part of the model. Notice how 80% of the "Firm Value" is in the Terminal Value? That's inherently risky - you're placing ostensibly 80% of the value of today's calculated value per share into the far unknown (i.e. 10 years out).
AND (I would again argue) you're discounting that at far too low of a discount rate (8.25%).
I saw a LOT of very intelligently-constructed and thought-out DCF models for internet companies in 1998-through-early 2000. Reality unfolded...somewhat different than expectations when the calendar turned to mid-2000 and beyond (even for those that survived and thrived - i.e. AMZN).
And there's one rather large omission I'd like to call out about Damodaran's model and that is, it makes no provision for the cost of "equity cookies" given to insiders...something that I think you'll (and everyone else) should agree with be a "non-zero" cost with a company like SpaceX.
My methodology for dealing with such is to value outstanding options with Black-Scholes (using reasonable assumptions for how many make it to actual vesting) and deduct the calculated value from "Firm Value" as something of a contingent liability akin to debt. I also boost the share count by the number of outstanding, but uninvested RSUs (again, modified by a reasonable forfeiture rate based on historical pattern).
In Damodaran's model, he effectively has this "cost" at zero (I mean, maybe it's buried in his EBIT margin assumption, but that's an accounting construct...I prefer an actual "hard" value I can deduct as that contingent liability.)
But I promise you, the value syphon from firm value into insider pockets will be (significantly) higher than zero; this is an Elon Musk company after all...if you were to compare the man's comp at Tesla to Tesla's lifetime profits, I suspect it might make you ill.
Point is, I think you ALSO need to deduct an amount/increase share count (which would result in a lower "per share" calculated value) for equity cookie "leakage" from this valuation. In other words, I think this is another place where Damodaran's model actually OVERvalues SpaceX.
But leave all that aside.
Damodaran's model calculates an equity value of just over $1.3 trillion, or $97.83 per share.
Meaning that the IPO price of $135 is at a 38% premium to what I consider to be a very generous valuation estimate by Prof. Damodaran, and that the Day 1 Closing price of $160.95 is at a 64.5% premium.
I would not consider investing into that. Feel free to holler back, "Have fun staying poor!" - it doesn't bother me. ;-)
But let's play out a couple of other scenarios.
First, if we used a uniform 11% discount rate (my "opportunity cost" choice remember), and changed nothing else about his forecast and model, equity value falls to about $685.7B with the fair value per share dropping to $51.55.
I remind you again that it closed yesterday at $160.95.
If you wanted to recast the model - again, changing nothing about his forecast or model; no contingent liabilities tied to potential dilutive "equity cookies", no margin compression or removal of the magical "Other Revenues" that show up in Year 6 - to equate the forecasted cash flows/valuatuion to the $135 IPO price, you'd need a 7.35% discount rate.
If you wanted to do so to equate it to yesterday's $160.95 closing price, you'd use a 6.93% discount rate.
And again, when share price equates to calculated value per share, the discount rate can be used as a rough approximation of expected returns going forward.
You think SpaceX investors are excited about prospective 7% returns going forward from here? I mean, I can give you a list of stocks with higher dividend yields that are probably safer...
Look, again, this is no slight on Damodaran - he's simply made an honest effort at valuing the company based on known and inferred inputs plus a healthy dose of Academic Finance methodology.
And folks who want to invest at this level...well, fair play and good luck. I genuinely wish you well.
But as to your last comment that, "anyone who owns index funds will end up owning SPCX sooner or later so they will get some exposure that way, whether they like it or not," I agree with you.
And I think that's actually tragic. I hate that Nasdaq is speed-running SpaceX inclusion. I appreciate that the S&P committee is at least sticking to their guns (for now) and requiring that SpaceX earn their place in the index the old fashioned way.
But there ARE things you can do to mitigate that, "whether they like it or not," statement.
In my family's portfolio we have roughly half our money in index-tracking ETFs and half under active management by yours truly. The index fund allocation used to be about:
* 25% TSX60 (I am Canadian, after all).
* 45% S&P500
* 25% MSCI EAFE Investible Market Index
* 5% QQQ
After word came out that Nasdaq was speed-running SPCX into QQQ I exited all QQQ and redeployed into S&P500 (there was already substantial overlap anyway so not a big deal).
I have also recently swapped about half the S&P500 exposure for an equal-weight S&P500 fund, though this is NOT so much "fear of SpaceX inclusion" and more a risk-mitgation move with the so-called "Magnificent Seven" now making up about 34% of the total weight in the index, and the overall market looking a little "enthused".
When/if SpaceX is added to the S&P500, there are also some options techniques you can use to hedge out exposure if you want to (i.e. basically set up a "synthetic short" in an amount roughly equal to the "look-through long exposure" of SpaceX...or any other company you might not want exposure to for that matter, effectively turning your S&P500 fund into an "S&P499"...just...no bitching if you get it wrong and the stock - again, SpaceX or otherwise - goes up and you're hedged out!)
One final note. I think it's worth noting that inclusion in the index ain't all it's cracked up to be.
Tesla was added to the S&P500 before market open on 21-Dec-2020. I've included the total return for both Tesla and the index in the chart below. You'll note that Tesla, for all the hype, has UNDERperformed the index since inclusion; not, I think, what Tesla investors were expecting when it was originally announced as being added.
But there's another inference to be made.
If Tesla were never added to the index, the index value would be higher today. (i.e. it has underperformed the index while being a component of said index).
In other words, with Tesla included in the index, passive index investors have been treated to lower overall returns than they would have otherwise received had Tesla never been included.
I expect that the same phenomenon will occur when/if SpaceX is included in the index (and why I'll be looking again into those hedging techniques I mentioned).
Here endth the meditation. Be sure to tip your server.