Into the Forest x5: From LDAP to Domain Dominance Join Hack The Box Zimbabwe as we dive into the Forest machine and explore a complete Active Directory attack path from anonymous LDAP enumeration to full domain compromise through DCSync. meetup.com/hack-the-box-meet…

🔴 Kerberoasting → Extract service account hashes offline 🔴 DCSync → Mimic a domain controller, dump all hashes 🔴 Golden Ticket → Forge Kerberos tickets = unlimited access Compromising AD = game over for the entire organization. This is why pen testers always target AD first

Whole World Acknowledge Me As CRTP Certified !! الحمدلله حمدا كثيرا طيبا مباركا فيه والحمدلله على توفيقه وفضله وجبره والحمدلله دايما وابدا على كل ما اعطاني اقولها بكل فخر وسعاده انا الان رسميا Red Team Certified Professional مره مره فخور بهذا الانجاز الي كنت اخطط له من اول يوم بديت فيه شهاده ال OSCP وسبحان الله شاءت الاقدار اني اليوم اجيب الهدف واحقق الشهادة والرحله في هذه الشهادة ما كانت سهله مره لكنها ممتعه الحمدلله تقريبا من 14-16 يوم اشتغل عليها كل يوم واقفل السلايدات واطبق اللابات والحمدلله الله ما يضيع تعب احد والمواضيع الي فيها جدا جميله 1- AD Enumeration & Bloodhound – mapping the environment before the attack even begins 2- Local Privilege Escalation – gaining a foothold and elevating from there 3- Domain Privilege Escalation – Kerberoasting, Constrained / Unconstrained / RBCD Delegation, abusing Protected Groups & Enterprise Applications 4- AD CS Certificate Trust Attacks – one of the most underestimated attack paths in modern AD environments 5- Domain Persistence & Dominance – Golden Ticket, Silver Ticket, Diamond Ticket, DCSync, Skeleton Key, AdminSDHolder, DSRM abuse, ACL abuse, Host Security Descriptors 6- Lateral Movement – moving through the network without triggering alerts 7- Defender Bypass – evading Microsoft Defender during post-exploitation 8- Forest-Level Escalation – cross-trust and inter-forest trust attacks 9- ACL-Based Persistence – staying persistent through Access Control List manipulation وغيرها من المفاهيم الكثيره والممتعه حرفيا كانت فتره دراسه جميله والاختبار من أروع الاختبارات الي ممكن تشتغل عليه البيئه والسيناريوهات الي جات مره ممتعه فعلا تتحدى نفسك وتشتغل على التقرير الي يخليك تتعلم كيف تكون حرفيا Red Team وتكون ال Mindset الخاصه بالريد Thank you so much @nikhil_mitt @AlteredSecurity for what u did and for everything I’ve learned from you Ur Bootcamp was magnificent & absolutely Fully of Insightful and valuable Informations & Ur Labs was an amazing labs I really enjoyed and Really appreciate all your efforts Thank you so much again الحمدلله انجاز اخر أحققه والحمدلله الشي الي كنت اطمح له وصلت له والحين هذي بدايه لتحدي جديد ومسار جديد وطريق جديد مافي شي اسمه نهايه فصل بل دايما عندنا بدايه فصل جديد بعد نهايه فصل قديم فالله يوفقنا جميعا ونحقق احلامنا وطموحاتنا ونكون في اعلى المناصب ونوصل للي نبيه يارب الله لا يضيع لكم ولا لنا تعب وشكرا لكل شخص تعلمت منه وساعدني وعلمني ووجهني وحمسني وحفزني وخصوصا كلاسي الي فيهم طلاب رهيبين ومبدعين انا محظوظ فيهم شكرا لكم جميعا والله يكتب اجركم يارب I Did It Finally!!🤩🤩

MFA was a strong control in the environment. It was also the key to breaking it. Legacy NIS Duo Auth Proxy a RADIUS shared secret = full domain compromise. New technical blog walks the full attack chain from unauthenticated Apache NiFi RCE to DCSync: ow.ly/1qCO50Z92mM

Microsoft Defender now audits inbound remote RPC calls at OpNum-level granularity through a Windows Filtering Platform integration, surfacing telemetry in Advanced Hunting and feeding detections like Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard, suspicious remote service creation, LSA secrets theft, RPC user / session discovery, and authentication coercion — with sample KQL queries for Remote Registry abuse, remote service creation, and NetrSessionEnum-based session discovery. core-jmp.org/2026/06/microso… #ActiveDirectory #AdvancedHunting #AuthenticationCoercion #DCSync #DefenderXDR #Impacket #KQL #LateralMovement #MicrosoftDefender #MicrosoftDefenderforEndpoint #MSRPC #NTLMCoercion #RemoteRegistry #RPC #secretsdump #ServiceControlManager #SharpHound #WFP

Windowsの横展開や認証情報の窃取で長年悪用されてきたRPC（リモートプロシージャコール）の乱用を、法人向けのMicrosoft-Defenderが関数の呼び出し単位で検知し、攻撃を妨害できるようになりました。RPCは、別プロセスや別マシン上の機能をあたかも手元の関数のように呼び出せるWindowsの中核プロトコルです。利用が膨大なうえ、SMB3などで通信が暗号化されると中身が見えないため、ネットワーク監視では「どのRPC関数が呼ばれたか」まで追うのは困難でした。Defenderは通信を復号する代わりに、ホスト側でRPCの呼び出しを直接観測。Microsoftは、暗号化の有無に関わらず攻撃に直結する関数の呼び出しを捉えられるとしています。 【仕組みと検知内容】 ・WindowsのWFP（通信制御基盤）と連携し、RPCのインターフェース（機能の大分類）だけでなく、その中で呼び出された個々の関数（OpNum）まで識別できるようになった ・監視対象は、サーバー側のホストに入ってくるリモートのRPC呼び出しに限定。通常の通信を妨げない監査専用フィルタで収集し、送信元の端末を見る必要はない。ローカルや外向きの呼び出しは対象外 ・監視されるのはリモートレジストリ、サービス制御マネージャー、タスクスケジューラ、WMIなどの主要インターフェース。攻撃ツールImpacketによる手動操作型攻撃、リモートからの不審なサービス作成、LSA（認証情報を扱うWindowsの仕組み）シークレットの窃取、RPCを使ったユーザーやセッションの探索、サーバーに攻撃者への認証を強要する攻撃の検知が提供されている ・例えばリモートレジストリの保存操作は認証情報の窃取、リモートのサービス作成は横展開の兆候といったように、呼び出された関数から手口を推定できる。DCsyncやSecretsDump、SharpHoundといった定番ツールも、RPC悪用の例として挙げられている ・ワークステーション向けは一般提供、サーバー向けは段階的に展開中。Advanced HuntingのDeviceEventsで「InboundRemoteRpcCall」をクエリすれば、自環境のRPC活動を確認できる 詳細は以下を参照： techcommunity.microsoft.com/…

Complex attack chain exploits trust relationships between legacy NIS authentication and modern MFA infrastructure to achieve domain compromise. Shows how security controls evaluated in isolation can create unexpected attack pathways when interconnected. Key technical details: • Initial RCE via unauthenticated Apache NiFi processors, escalated to root access • Domain credentials harvested from /etc/fstab mount configurations • NIS server exposed MD5Crypt password hashes without authentication (ypcat queries) • Duo Auth Proxy config contained cleartext AD service account credentials RADIUS secrets • RADIUS shared secret enabled decryption of proxied authentication traffic • SQL Server service running as Domain Admin enabled NTLM relay via xp_dirtree coercion Attack methodology: • Lateral movement from NiFi → NIS password cracking → 53 Linux servers via SSH spray • MFA bypass through packet capture RADIUS secret decryption on auth proxy • Privilege escalation via PowerUpSQL ntlmrelayx to Domain Admin SQL service account • Persistence through new DA account creation via xp_cmdshell DCSync for full domain extraction DFIR artifacts: Monitor for xp_dirtree queries to external SMB shares, unusual RADIUS traffic patterns, NIS ypcat queries from non-standard sources, and cleartext credentials in config files across auth infrastructure. #DFIR_Radar

CTI as a Code in Practice: Reactive Investigation — LifeTech Pharma ift.tt/7vRoV98 A complete walkthrough of the methodology applied to a real training scenario: pharmaceutical IP theft, dual entry points, and a DCSync that changes everything. All organizations, name…

ADScan: Active Directory Pentesting from a Single CLI 💀🔥 Replace the traditional AD toolchain with one Linux-based framework. 🔥 Key Capabilities: • AD Enumeration • Kerberoasting & AS-REP Roasting • ADCS (ESC1–ESC16) Assessment • DCSync & Credential Harvesting • Password Spraying • BloodHound-Compatible Data Collection • Native Attack Path Analysis • Workspace & Evidence Management • Docker-Based Deployment • No Windows Required 🔗 github.com/ADScanPro/adscan Built for Pentesters, Red Teamers, AD Security Assessments, and HTB Labs. #ActiveDirectory #RedTeam #Pentesting #ADSecurity #BloodHound #Kerberoasting #CyberSecurity #InfoSec

Today on TryHackMe, I completed the Boogeyman 3 challenge room, where I traced a full enterprise attack chain using ELK. The attacker sent a phishing email to the CEO with a fake PDF that was actually an ISO file containing a malicious HTA. From there it was clear that mshta.exe executed the payload, a DLL was dropped and run via rundll32, persistence was set via a scheduled task, and C2 communication was established over port 80. The attacker then bypassed UAC using fodhelper.exe, downloaded Mimikatz from GitHub, dumped credentials, and moved laterally across machines using Pass-the-Hash. They eventually reached the Domain Controller, they ran a DCSync attack to dump AD hashes, and deployed ransomware. I learnt that every action a threat actor takes leaves a trace in the logs. tryhackme.com/room/boogeyman… @ireteeh @segoslavia @commando_skiipz @RedHatPentester @TemitopeSobulo @tryhackme @_DeejustDee @cyberjeremiah #BlueTeamer #tryhackme #Cybersecurity #LearninginPublic

Help my agent did a dcsync and started modifying OU’s

AD-Lab-Research — Real-World Active Directory Attack Paths & Detection Engineering 🛡️💀 Most AD repositories focus on exploitation. This one focuses on something more valuable: how attacks actually look from the defender's perspective. Highlights: • Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) attack chains • Kerberos, Delegation, RBCD, and DCSync research • Credential Guard and Remote Credential Guard analysis • LSASS access detection and telemetry studies • Defender, Sysmon, Windows Event Logs, and KQL-based detections • Detection gaps, control limitations, and real-world attack visibility What makes this repository different is its focus on the gap between attack techniques, security controls, and defender telemetry—helping Blue Teams understand what they can actually detect. 🔗 github.com/osherjacobs/AD-La… #ActiveDirectory #DetectionEngineering #ThreatDetection #BlueTeam #SOC #DFIR #CyberSecurity

The Hacker Recipes is the AD attack bible that OSCP prep guides forget to mention. Kerberos delegation abuses. NTLM relay chains. DCSync paths. Constrained vs unconstrained delegation. thehacker.recipes/

ゆっくりセキュリティラボ解説(DCSync攻撃) youtu.be/Sf8EZ41zgrU?si=yJpI… @YouTubeより

The attacker performed LDAP reconnaissance, executed DCSync on the Domain Controller BURNINCANDLE-DC.burnincandle…, 10.0.19.9, and forged a Kerberos Golden Ticket valid until September 2037 achieving full domain takeover with long-term persistence. Observations from PCAP Analysis:

Impacket for Pentester: Net Script 🔥 Telegram: t.me/hackinarticles ✴ Twitter: x.com/hackinarticles Impacket is a powerful Python toolkit used by pentesters to interact with network protocols and perform advanced Active Directory attacks, lateral movement, and credential abuse. ⚡ Key Features of Impacket (.NET / Network) 🔍 Low-level access to SMB, RPC, LDAP & Kerberos 🧩 Multiple tools like psexec, wmiexec, smbexec ⚙️ Supports password, NTLM hash & Kerberos auth 🛡️ Enables remote command execution 📡 Automates AD attack techniques 🎯 Attack Capabilities 💥 Lateral Movement via SMB (psexec, wmiexec) 🧪 Credential Dumping (secretsdump, DCSync) 🧬 Kerberos Attacks (Pass-the-Ticket, PtH) 🌐 MSSQL exploitation & remote queries ⚡ ACL abuse & privilege escalation 📖 Article: hackingarticles.in/impacket-… #ActiveDirectory #Impacket #RedTeam #Pentesting #CyberSecurity #EthicalHacking #InfoSec

4. DCSync attack abuses replication rights to extract hashes from Domain Controllers. Detection:Event ID 4662, Access Mask = 0x100 5. NTDS.dit ExtractionStealing the NTDS.dit file containing all domain hashes. Detection:Sysmon Event ID 1: ntdsutil.exe with ifm or create full

🚨 Weekly Content Drop🚨 This week’s drop brings a new Sherlock built around a full Windows domain compromise chain and the start of a new Season with Reactor. 🔎 New Sherlock: JobApplicant Difficulty: Hard Creator: chicken0248 Tech: Windows, Kerberos, IIS, NTFS Investigate a compromised web application portal where configuration abuse allows a PDF file to behave as a script and act as a webshell. From there, trace the attacker’s path through data exfiltration, domain controller access, Kerberoasting, AD CS certificate template abuse, DCSync, Golden Ticket persistence, and operational cleanup. Also dropping this week: ☢️ Reactor — First Machine of the Season Linux | 20 points | Releases 23 May 2026 #HackTheBox #HTB #WeeklyContentDrop #Sherlock #DigitalForensics #SOC #Kerberos #WindowsSecurity #IncidentResponse #CyberSecurity

🔴 Active Directory Attack Cheat Sheet 🔥 Telegram: t.me/hackinarticles ✴ Twitter: x.com/hackinarticles A complete visual roadmap of modern Active Directory attack chains ⚠️ ⚡ Covers Full Attack Flow 🔍 Recon & Enumeration 🔐 Credential Access (Kerberoast, NTLM Relay, Spray) 🚀 Privilege Escalation (ACL Abuse, ADCS, GPO Abuse) 🌐 Lateral Movement (Pass-the-Hash, WinRM, SMBExec) 🛡 Persistence (Shadow Creds, Golden/Silver Tickets) 💥 Domain Dominance (DCSync, Trust Abuse, Forest Takeover) 💡 Modern AD attacks follow structured attack paths — moving from initial access to full domain compromise through misconfigurations, weak ACLs, delegation abuse, and credential attacks () ⚠️ One weak permission can become a complete enterprise compromise 🗺️ Explore the map: kypvas.github.io/ad_attack_a… #cybersecurity #activedirectory #redteam #pentesting #infosec #osep #oscp

вона чудово оффлоадиться на CPU, це MoE, у мене RTX 5070 із 12Гб, маю 128К KV кешу на GPU, а експерти на CPU. Швидкість при цьому prefill 2100tok/sec, decode ~35tok/sec(у мене Codex сьогодні мабуть повільніше працює) Але так, якщо все в VRAM то буде значно краще.