Russias bank is opposite the Bank of England in London (🇬🇧 has to pay that 2nd SUKUK LOAN back by July) Hope they don't take another & 💷 goes missing like 🇧🇩 DFID 🔥Aid 2013 that NCA👀. ITS ♻️🇬🇧🏠 By 🌷 Aunt & Awami lot on 🏃‍♀️ in 🇬🇧. All Doc in Harvard

Peter Vowles Appointed New British High Commissioner to Nigeria By: TheRadarNewsNG The United Kingdom has appointed Peter Vowles as its next British High Commissioner to Nigeria, succeeding Dr Richard Montgomery CMG. According to an official announcement, Vowles will assume his new role in September 2026, bringing with him more than three decades of experience in international development, diplomacy, governance and public sector leadership across Africa and Asia. Vowles currently serves as His Majesty’s Ambassador to Zimbabwe, a position he has held since 2023. Prior to that, he was Transformation Director at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and previously served as British Ambassador to Myanmar. His extensive career includes senior leadership roles within the former Department for International Development (DFID), where he served as Director for Asia, the Caribbean and Overseas Territories, Country Director in Kenya, Head of Programme Delivery, and Deputy Country Director in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He has also held development and governance positions in India, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, working on health, security, institutional reform and international partnerships. Before joining DFID in 2006, Vowles worked with the World Bank, the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, Raleigh International and the consulting firm Mott MacDonald. His relationship with Africa spans much of his professional career, having worked in Zimbabwe in various capacities, including as a teacher with the Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture in the early 1990s and later as a policy and programme manager with Students Partnership Worldwide. As British High Commissioner to Nigeria, Vowles will oversee diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Nigeria, focusing on areas such as trade, security cooperation, governance, economic development and people-to-people ties. His appointment comes at a time when the UK and Nigeria continue to strengthen cooperation across security, investment, education and regional stability initiatives.

I don’t agree. DFID was, in part, an active way to repay parts of the world for the problems we caused. The UK does a lot of good in the world.

To put it bluntly, you can all fuck off with your Jo Cox tributes. She was a parasite. She was a groomed-for-politics functionary, NGOcrat and blobber, and part of Labour's crony aristocracy - giving rise to a class of professional politicians who've never worked outside of politics and lobbying. Cox was a Cambridge graduate in Social and Political sciences (a woke madrassa), polished off at LSE (the hellmouth of bad ideas) and headed straight into a Brussels internship under Kinnock. She then went into the NGOcracy (Oxfam/Gates Foundation), then through her party connections was gifted a safe seat on an all women shortlist - probably earmarked for a ministerial role in DfID. These people have done untold damage. Their narcissism and stupidity is the very reason Reform exists in the first place. These are the people who sign away billions of our money to fund NGO boondoggles, and sign up up to migrant pacts and net zero targets without consultation or consent - while flooding our streets with sexually incontinent third-worlders (in order to parade their own "compassion"). They did it to us because they felt entitled to do it to us - and called us far right bigots if we complained. They then have the audacity to preach to us about not creating division. I have nothing but hatred for what these people have done and I'm not going to pretend Jo Cox wasn't anything other than a self-serving narcissist much like her scumbag sex pest husband. They were made for each other. This is not to say I condone political violence. Especially not in this instance being that her replacement somehow manages to be a magnitude worse. I just won't say she was any great loss to the world of politics. We can do without her ilk. Purging every last one of them from parliament is the one useful function Reform serves.

Build back better with @RestoreBritain without Sukuk loans.Starmers mate🌷her aunt Hasina & Awami leauge owned Factories in 🇧🇩 yet DFID gave them taxpayer🔥 Aid 2013 Syndicate Syphoned/subcontracted&♻️💷bought🇬🇧💷. Don't let it happen again. All in Hansard @RupertLowe10

Build back better with @RestoreBritain without Sukuk loans.Starmers mate🌷her aunt Hasina & Awami leauge owned Factories in 🇧🇩 yet DFID gave them taxpayer🔥 Aid 2013 Syndicate Syphoned/subcontracted&♻️💷bought🇬🇧💷. Don't let it happen again. All in Hansard @RupertLowe10

Build back better with @RestoreBritain without Sukuk loans.Starmers mate🌷her aunt Hasina & Awami leauge owned Factories in 🇧🇩 yet DFID gave them taxpayer🔥 Aid 2013 Syndicate Syphoned/subcontracted&♻️💷bought🇬🇧💷. Don't let it happen again. All in Hansard @RupertLowe10

Peter, the claim has been made for fifty years now that any year the crop yield would be hit by evil "climate change" … but it hasn't happened. Below are decade-by-decade examples of failed predictions. Sorry, bro', but the climate grift is dead … w. === Below is a time‑ordered sampling of explicit scientific and official claims that climate change would cause future food shortages, famines, or serious food insecurity, with at least one primary or quasi‑primary source from each decade (1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 2010s, 2020s). 1980s: Early projections of climate‑driven food stress In 1980, a National Research Council report for the US National Academy of Sciences examined carbon dioxide–induced climate change and explicitly warned that changes in temperature and precipitation could significantly affect crop yields, thereby threatening regional food supplies, although it emphasized substantial uncertainty in magnitude and timing. The report summarized model experiments and empirical sensitivity studies indicating that agricultural production in some regions could decline under plausible warming scenarios, particularly where crops already operate near thermal limits, and noted that this could translate into food security problems for vulnerable countries if adaptation and trade were constrained. National Research Council, “Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Second Assessment” (1980) nap.nationalacademies.org/ca… In 1984, the US Environmental Protection Agency released a report on potential climate change impacts that included sectoral chapters on agriculture, projecting that climate‑induced shifts in temperature and water availability could reduce yields of major crops in parts of North America and other regions and thereby contribute to future food supply problems, particularly under high‑emissions scenarios and in developing countries with limited adaptive capacity. The analysis drew on then‑state‑of‑the‑art crop and climate models, stressed the large structural and data uncertainties, and did not claim inevitable global famine but did treat climate change as a plausible contributor to future food shortages. US EPA, “Projecting the Climatic Effects of Increasing Carbon Dioxide” (1984) nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/… A 1988 World Meteorological Organization and United Nations Environment Programme conference in Toronto on “The Changing Atmosphere” concluded that anthropogenic climate change posed a potential threat to world food supplies, particularly in low‑latitude developing countries, by increasing the risk of droughts and crop failures; participants called for substantial emissions reductions partly on the grounds of avoiding future food insecurity. This was an early example of a high‑level international scientific meeting explicitly linking greenhouse‑gas‑driven climate change to prospective food shortages, though the statements were broad and largely qualitative and did not quantify famine probabilities. Conference Statement, “The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security” (Toronto, 1988) public.wmo.int/en/bulletin/t… 1990s: IPCC First and Second Assessment Reports and FAO work The IPCC First Assessment Report (1990), Working Group II, reviewed early crop‑climate studies and concluded that projected climate change “may significantly affect agricultural production” and that “food security in some regions could be threatened” by reduced yields and more frequent droughts, especially in parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The report also emphasized that global production might still grow under some scenarios due to CO₂ fertilization and adaptation, so the strongest language about food shortages focused on vulnerable regions and on distributional and socio‑economic constraints rather than global aggregate output. IPCC First Assessment Report, WG II (1990) chapter on agriculture ipcc.ch/report/ar1/wg2/ A 1996 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) study on climate change and agriculture stated that climate change “could reduce agricultural production in many developing countries and increase the risk of hunger for millions of people” by mid‑21st century if emissions continued to rise and adaptation and international assistance were inadequate. It combined simple crop yield models with socio‑economic scenarios and stressed that climate change would act as a risk multiplier for existing food insecurity, highlighting particular concern for rain‑fed agriculture in sub‑Saharan Africa and South Asia under scenarios with more frequent droughts. FAO, “Climate Change and Agriculture: Impacts and Adaptation” (mid‑1990s chapter within “Climate Change and the Food Supply”) fao.org/3/w5183e/w5183e00.ht… The IPCC Second Assessment Report (1995) reiterated and sharpened these concerns, stating that climate change “could have major consequences for food security, particularly in tropical and subtropical regions” and that the balance of studies suggested increased risk of future food shortages in some developing countries even if global production remained adequate. It reported that modeled yield reductions for key staples under certain climate scenarios, combined with rapid population growth and limited capacity to import food, could increase the number of people at risk of hunger, although the report stopped short of precise famine predictions due to modeling limitations and uncertainties in socio‑economic pathways. IPCC Second Assessment Report, WG II (1995), chapter on food and agriculture ipcc.ch/report/ar2/wg2/ 2000s: Stronger quantitative projections of hunger risk The IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001) stated that climate change “is projected to decrease agricultural productivity in the tropics and subtropics for almost any amount of warming” and that under certain scenarios “the number of people at risk of hunger would increase” relative to a no‑climate‑change baseline, especially in Africa and parts of Asia. It cited integrated assessment and crop modeling work showing that, with climate change and without significant adaptation or trade liberalization, tens to hundreds of millions more people could face hunger by the 2080s, although some mid‑latitude regions might see yield gains. IPCC Third Assessment Report WG II (2001), chapter 5 “Food and Forests” ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/… A widely cited peer‑reviewed study by Parry, Rosenzweig, and colleagues (2004) used global crop and economic models to project that climate change could increase the number of people at risk of hunger by tens of millions by the 2080s under IS92 emissions scenarios, with the largest increases in South Asia and Africa. The paper reported that even allowing for moderate CO₂ fertilization and some adaptation, climate change scenarios with higher temperatures and altered rainfall increased the modeled population at risk of hunger compared with a no‑climate‑change counterfactual, although the magnitude of the increase was sensitive to assumptions about socio‑economic development and trade. M. L. Parry et al., “Effects of climate change on global food production under SRES emissions and socio‑economic scenarios,” Global Environmental Change 14(1), 2004, DOI:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2003.10.008 doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.… In 2007, the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) concluded that, while some higher‑latitude croplands might experience yield increases at low levels of warming, “in some African countries, yields from rain‑fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50% by 2020” under certain climate scenarios, which it linked to increased risk of food shortages and malnutrition in those regions. Subsequent analyses have debated the robustness of the “up to 50% by 2020” figure, noting that it reflected worst‑case combinations of climate and crop model results and did not represent a central estimate, but the AR4 language clearly framed climate change as a serious threat to future food security in vulnerable countries even on relatively short time scales. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report WG II (2007), Summary for Policymakers and chapter 9 on Africa ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/… 2010s: Food security as a central climate‑risk narrative The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5, 2014) stated that “climate change is projected to undermine food security” by reducing crop yields and increasing yield variability in many regions, and that the risk of food insecurity and the breakdown of food systems is “moderate to high” for additional warming above about 2–3 degrees Celsius depending on adaptation. The report synthesized multiple global and regional crop model ensembles and found that, beyond roughly mid‑century, negative impacts on yields of major cereals (notably wheat and maize in many hotter regions) were more likely than not, leading to higher food prices and increased numbers of people at risk of hunger in many modeled scenarios compared with baselines without climate change. IPCC Fifth Assessment Report WG II (2014), chapter 7 “Food Security and Food Production Systems” ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/… A 2011 review commissioned by the UK Department for International Development synthesized hundreds of crop‑climate studies and concluded that, on average, climate change was projected to reduce yields of major staples (wheat, maize, sorghum, millet) in many parts of Africa and South Asia by mid‑century, thereby increasing the risk of future food shortages in these regions without substantial adaptation. The meta‑analysis reported a mean overall 8 percent yield reduction across crops under climate change scenarios relative to no‑change baselines, with particularly large modeled declines for rain‑fed cereals in already hot and dry areas, and highlighted methodological limitations such as incomplete representation of CO₂ fertilization and socio‑economic adaptation in many underlying studies. UK DFID, “What are the projected impacts of climate change on food crops in Africa and South Asia?” (2011) assets.publishing.service.go… In 2015, a peer‑reviewed study by Wheeler and von Braun in The Lancet argued that climate change “will likely make the eradication of hunger and undernutrition significantly more difficult” by reducing yields, increasing extreme weather shocks, and interacting with poverty and conflict, and that climate‑related crop failures and price spikes could push tens of millions more people into food insecurity by 2050 compared with a no‑climate‑change baseline. The article explicitly framed climate change as a major future driver of food insecurity, not just through gradual yield losses but also via increased volatility and extreme events, while acknowledging substantial uncertainty in the magnitude of projected hunger impacts because of socio‑economic assumptions. Timothy Wheeler and Joachim von Braun, “Climate change impacts on global food security,” The Lancet 345(9980), 2013, DOI:10.1016/S0140‑6736(13)60701‑9 doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(1… 2020s: Continued projections of climate‑driven crises The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6, 2022) further emphasized that climate change “has already slowed the rate of growth in agricultural productivity” in some regions and that, under high‑emissions scenarios with limited adaptation, the risks to food security are “very high” by the end of the century. It reported that warming beyond about 2 degrees Celsius is projected to substantially increase the number of people exposed to moderate or severe food insecurity, particularly in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, and small islands, driven by both gradual declines in yields and more frequent and intense droughts, floods, and heatwaves affecting crop production, livestock, and fisheries. IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, WG II (2022) Summary for Policymakers and chapter on food security ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downl… A 2020 report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO on the state of food security and nutrition stated that climate variability and extremes are “among the leading causes of recent increases in global hunger,” and warned that increasing climate‑related shocks “could lead to rising food insecurity and malnutrition” in future decades if adaptation and mitigation are insufficient. Although the report is primarily observational rather than purely predictive, it includes scenario‑based projections showing that climate change, acting through more frequent droughts, heatwaves, and floods, is expected to increase the number of undernourished people in some regions compared with no‑climate‑change counterfactuals, even under relatively optimistic economic growth assumptions. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, “The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2020” fao.org/3/ca9692en/CA9692EN.… A 2026 study by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre published in Scientific Reports projected that, depending on socio‑economic pathway and emissions trajectory, more than one billion people could be exposed to severe food crises at least once by 2100, with climate change acting as a key driver alongside conflict and inequality. The analysis used coupled climate, crop, and economic models to calculate “crisis exposure” metrics under Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), finding that pessimistic pathways with high inequality and conflict could more than triple end‑century exposure to severe food crises compared with a sustainable development pathway that includes strong mitigation, while emphasizing that these were scenario‑dependent projections with large uncertainties. European Commission Joint Research Centre, “Climate change could expose over 1 billion people to food crises” (2026 news release summarizing Scientific Reports study) joint-research-centre.ec.eur…

Ukgov exploiting uk linked indian vips kins tonrun it's 23 Yr hr crimes rare heart tech cover up agenda .list includes Anant khare Dr krishna khare ex #NHS Dr atul khare #who Reji Pillai ex @wb Pooja pillai ex @ey Meenakshi nath ex @dfid Viren sharma ex dfid @unep Sonal bhat

2013 UK gov £18M aid. ILO & HSE,DFID & RICS & IFUSE & RAJUK. ALL in HANSARD HC Deb, 17 July 2013, Vol. 566, Col. 1083. HC. Deb, 3 June 2013, Vol. 564, Cols. 1195–1197., 10 December 2013, Vol. 750, Cols. 758–774.HC Deb, 18 December 2014, Vol. 589, Cols. 1629–1634 ALL IN HANSARD 👀

arbiterz.com/profile-uk-appo… Profile: UK Appoints Peter Vowles as New High Commissioner to Nigeria #HighCommissionertoNigeria #BritishHighCommissionNigeria #PeterVowles #UKdiplomat #NigeriaUKtrade #DFID

Well if its not syphoned like MissingRANA PLAZA 🔥(DFID)💷 🌷Aunt Hasina & AWAMI LEAGUE Factoty owners siphoned ♻️ to buy🇬🇧🏠 then maybe theyl renew 3rd SUKUK LOAN (ends july) Probably ♻️until "people wake up & realise us🇬🇧 been robbed by SUBCONTACTING SYNDICATES again

Ukgov exploited uk linked bank affiliated shagun khare Priya khare Sandeep aggarwal kins in prominent banks interfering misusing their influence in banking operations Aided by Sonal bhat khare ex DFID bjp kin sanju verma Ex hdfcsec

Just like the Missing money Hasina & Awami league siphoned off the UK through DFID 🔥 💰 & RECYCLED BY help of 🌷et Al to ♻️ buy 🇬🇧🏠, all referenced in Harvard...x.com/i/status/2066131633179… SUKUK SYNDICATES is next Siphon & left again to 👀 for missing 💷.

LIKE Hasina, Awami leauge who turned out owned factories after got 🇬🇧£ from DFID (NOW CEASED) for a 🔥 then more from 'Global warming Aid" Cos cried "sinking" no one sinking only us🇬🇧 Now 🇬🇧🇧🇩👀 siphoned 💷. All referenced Harvard yet🌷et Al, not arrested🚨 SUKUK SYNDICATE NEXT 1

tgus is my firsctyime yastinf coke sero sugar and why dfid i expect it to taste creamier than yhe normal coke

hhhhhhhey gulp ii have a huhquesiton but i may like embaressmyself dfid i imagine us being mutuals or did u . unf. its ok if u did but

I used to work for DFID. It isn't politicians who sign off aid. The vast majority is simply given to the large NGOs like the UN, Oxfam and save the children. The rest is dolled out by civil servants obliged to meet the then legally binding 0.7% target. 0.7% caused it.

Harga di pompa bensin gak pernah naik tanpa alasan ⛽ 👀 Energi adalah salah satu komoditas paling sensitif terhadap kondisi dunia, dan dampaknya kerasa langsung sampai ke kantong kita sehari-hari. 💸 #DFID #Pertamax #Pertamina

📊 Market Brief – 10 Juni Bursa saham Asia-Pasifik melemah pada hari Rabu setelah serangan baru AS terhadap Iran kembali memanaskan ketegangan geopolitik dan menekan sentimen investor. U.S. stock futures pun ikut bergerak di zona merah. #DFID #EURUSD #XAUUSD #GBPUSD #AUDUSD