Laura Palamar retweeted
Jun 10
The intitial Magnet GrayKey extraction contained the 2:27 am search. Nobody disagrees. That was always the status quo.
The defense position was consistent: the search was exactly what it proported to be - a 2:27 am search that took place at 2:27 am.
But that status quo would have been fatal to the Commonwealth's case. It had to find people who might be able to convince jurors that the 2:27 am search was something *other* than what it proported to be. This came as an urgent directive from Michael Morrissey himself.
The Commonwealth had to get jurors to think that the 2:27 am search took place hours *after* its 2:27 am timestamp. It desperately needed a change in the status quo. So it bought one.
That kind of alchemy isn't lost on jurors. I suspect the final straw for some jurors was when Ian Whiffin got on the stand and told them, with a straight face, how he simply changed the Celebritie software to make it disregard the timing of this unique search. An Orwellian masterpiece.
Some jurors might have rolled their eyes in disbelief, just as I did. I'm sure others listened on as Whiffin explained how Magnet's GrayKey system, when paired with Magnet's own Axiom analyzer, continued to show the 2:27 am search took place at 2:27 am.
Remember, at this point, the Commonwealth was *not* investigating the death of Officer O'Keefe. That investigation lasted only a day or so back in 2022. The Commonwealth was not "seeking the truth." Rather, by its own admission in papers filed with the Court, the Commonwealth was seeking to disprove and discredit defense theories and arguments. That's something very different.
So, once Whiffin established the defense case with his own words, what else was the defense to do?
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Yeah. And, you think I wear a tin hat— nope, as I went down this rabbit hole— I was nauseated. I am just following the data and obvi., the money.
It only gets worse— Graykey, magnet forensics, Cellbrite, Paragon, Carbyne, AKA the Epstein Reporty Homeland Security. M&A that toxically festers into perversion.
It’s time to wake up —that one day in September back in 2001 was the ICO that ripped away our privacy.
That is where Peter Peter Pumpkin Eater spawned from — TIA, Total information awareness— it was government funded, and then pulled. Apparently he obtained all that data— think roving wire taps, and then the government pulled the funding or do the story goes—supposedly.
That’s the roots of “Palan you know what.” Oh, in early days “Palan you know what’s” stomping grounds were on the top floor of the JPM building—running surveillance on all employees messages, actions, searches, communiques, looking for sus behavior. But yet they missed the London Whale that rocked the market? They missed the toxic garbage of 2008, with a big beautiful backstop of our tax dollars, to the tune of $30B, right? Maiden Lane?
Fun fact — Howie Lutnuts —NY Schools’ including Kindergartens’ first day that year was not on the 11th. It was the week before.
So many more Epstein connects. We are one nation under surveillance without liberty nor Justice for all.
I had a whole thread on the “Palan you know what,” pod I listened to in law school in 2018.
I will link below when I find, if it hasn’t been erased.
Jun 9
🦔Leonardo is a $17 billion defense contractor. It built a system called SignalTrace that clips sensors onto the license plate readers already mounted on street poles, overpasses, and police cars across the US. Every time you drive past one, the sensor grabs the Bluetooth and WiFi signals from every device in your car, ties them to your plate, and logs the time and location. Your phone, your AirPods, your kid's tablet. All of it goes into the same file. A friend rides with you once and their devices are linked to your plate.
Leonardo has sold this to police departments since at least 2023. There is no federal law covering it, no opt-out, and no warrant requirement.
My Take
None of the pieces here are new. Your phone has always broadcast a signal. The license plate cameras were already there. Leonardo just connected them and found a buyer. Nobody had to break a law or build anything from scratch. They assembled a surveillance system from parts already in place and sold it before anyone noticed.
Most people found out this week from a 404 Media investigation. Leonardo received the patent in 2024. By the time you hear about something like this, the deals are done and the sensors are on the poles. That's how it works now.
Hedgie🤗
404media.co/this-company-wil…
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Not unreleased, literally every law enforcement agency uses cellebrite tech.
The other vendor is graykey
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Jun 4
I don’t think it took GrayKey 8 months to unlock an iPhone that only had a four-digit numerical passcode.
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Jun 3
Funny how the Feds didn’t request evidence from the NCDAO/MSP, presumably the targets of their investigation. I wonder if the Feds would have been provided all the missing surveillance footage in a timely fashion? I wonder if the versions they would have received would have been inverted and contained different colored timestamps? I wonder if the portable GrayKey extract of Jen McCabe’s iPhone would have been a full file extract and would have contained the original hash value? I wonder if the cruiser dash cam footage would have been as clear as the footage obtained via the FOIAs?
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May 31
主な機能：
ロック解除（パスコード突破）
論理抽出・物理抽出・ファイルシステム抽出
削除データの復元
LINEなどのアプリデータ解析
位置情報（GPS・基地局・Wi-Fi履歴）の抽出
12,000機種以上に対応
他にも Magnet ForensicsのGrayKey や、警察独自開発のAI解析ツールも併用されています。
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May 31
Maybe he should talk to the FBI… or maybe he’s right that the IMessages are secure but then they pivot and get the phone unlocked and read the messages before they get encrypted. Here is an answer from Grok about this when I asked how the police accessed the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone:
How Police/FBI Accessed the iPhone
• They did not force Apple to create a backdoor. A federal judge ordered Apple to assist by creating custom software (to disable the auto-erase after 10 wrong passcodes, remove delays, and allow brute-forcing), but Apple resisted on privacy and security grounds. The case became a major public dispute. 
• The FBI ultimately unlocked it without Apple’s direct help. In March 2016, the FBI announced they had accessed the phone with assistance from an unnamed “third party” and dropped the court case against Apple. 
Later reports (2021) revealed the third party was Azimuth Security, an Australian cybersecurity firm. Their method:
• Exploited a vulnerability (starting with the Lightning port/accessory interface, involving code from Mozilla used by Apple).
• Bypassed the auto-erase feature (which wipes the phone after too many failed passcode attempts).
• Allowed unlimited passcode guessing (brute-forcing the 4-digit code, which is feasible on older devices like the 5C). 
It reportedly took hours once the exploit was in place. The iPhone 5C (running iOS 9 at the time) was an older model with weaker protections compared to modern iPhones.
Modern Context for Law Enforcement iPhone Access
Police and the FBI now routinely use commercial tools from companies like Cellebrite (UFED) and Grayshift (GrayKey) for locked iPhones. These tools exploit software vulnerabilities to bypass locks, extract data, or brute-force passcodes on certain models/iOS versions. Success depends heavily on:
• The iPhone model and iOS version (newer ones with Secure Enclave and latest updates are much harder).
• Whether features like auto-erase or strong passcodes/biometrics are enabled.
• If the phone is in “Before First Unlock” (BFU) state or has been inactive long enough to reboot into a more secure mode.
For recent cases (including the 2026 Paladin Club Apartments shooting in Wilmington, DE), no public details indicate special iPhone access issues or methods used. In most routine investigations, they rely on the above tools, cloud backups (if available), or warrants for iCloud data. 
Apple has strengthened encryption significantly since 2015, making older exploits ineffective on current devices. Law enforcement capabilities have also improved with specialized vendors.
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Only GrapheneOS can protect you.
All of THEM can have tools to systematically compromise modern smartphones.
Before First Unlock (BFU): If a device is powered off, data encryption is tightly bound to user credentials via the chip's Secure Execution Environment. If no hardened Secure Element is present as is common with budget MediaTek processors hackers and authorities can exploit immutable Boot ROM vulnerabilities to extract encryption keys and run infinite, automated, offline brute-force attacks against your PIN.
Once a device has been unlocked just once, the cryptographic barrier disappears. The lock screen becomes mere UI; the decryption keys reside directly in the memory. In this state, forensic systems use advanced hardware, such as the Cellebrite Turbo Link or GrayKey, to emulate malicious USB peripherals. These tools exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel's USB drivers to achieve immediate code execution, completely bypassing the lock screen overlay to copy the Full File System (FFS).
Even safety features designed to counter these attacks are under constant siege. Apple's "USB Restricted Mode" has faced bypass flaws allowing logic bugs to re-enable data ports on locked iPhones, while updated forensic software explicitly ships "Safeguard Modes" designed to suppress and block mobile inactivity auto-reboot timers.
The defense is absolute: a numeric PIN under 6 digits is completely defenseless against automated brute-forcing. Only GrapheneOS lowers these risks by aggressively restricting USB data surfaces and implementing swift, highly customizable auto-reboot triggers to clear device memory and return phones to a secure, encrypted BFU state before a forensic acquisition can take place.
osservatorionessuno.org/blog…
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