Un milblog russe a dit "les ukrainiens montent une opération spéciale contre nous 😱😱😱"

There was a gal named Tilly who wrote about her experience of the attack on the WTC in 2003. I remember reading it when it was first published on a milblog then. Here is a link to it and it is horrific to be honest... groups.google.com/g/storiest…

I'm really struggling to put into words a short, powerful description of your average MILBLOG commentator who adopts a belief that dangerous progressive social policies have a place in lethal military formations. Most of these folks have served in one manner or another, but somewhere or another after their ETS date they decided they were "strategists" and they adopted the perpetually war-losing beliefs of guys like Tom Nichols as gospel. What's a pithy, funny, short label for these suckers?

Attacco a convoglio ONU nella Kherson controllata dagli ucraini mentre presta soccorso a civili bersagliati dal "safari umano", definito dalla stessa ONU "crimine contro l'umanità", con video condiviso da milblog russi che rivendicano l'attacco. Dev'essere falseflag porcodio.

Interesting logic here. On the one hand, Europe’s effeminate weakness is axiomatic in milblog circles. On the other, if Ukraine’s holding out, it can’t (naturally!) be doing so alone, it must have strong backers If not the US, it must be the EU - which must therefore be strong?

UncleJimbo from BLACKFIVE the Milblog Supreme

Lieber Herr Kontrollpunkt, ich mache das hier für Laien. Dies ist kein MilBlog für Soldaten, Rüstungsexperten oder Sicherheitspolitiker. Ich verstehe mich als Schnittstelle zwischen denen und normalen Menschen. Und nach Generationen von Antikriegspropaganda, falsch verstandenem Pazifismus und Antiautoritarismus haben die allermeisten Menschen Berührungsängste und Verständnisschwierigkeiten. Genau die versuche ich zu erreichen. Dafür wurde diese Plattform überhaupt erst gemacht. Um Laien zu erklären, was sie in den Nachrichten sehen und wo falsch berichtet wird. Um zu erklären, was Politiker sagen. Um zu erklären, was wo wie warum passiert. Und meiner Erfahrung nach verstehen das die allermeisten der oben genannten. Mehr noch, viele finden es gut. Ich habe absolut nichts gegen konstruktive Kritik. Ihr Fragen sind aber sehr typisch dafür, nicht konstruktiv zu kritisieren. Sondern ein Haar in der Suppe zu finden, um mich zu diskreditieren. Oder um sich als wahren Experten darzustellen. Vielleicht gibt das Menschen, die so kommentieren, kurzfristig ein gutes Gefühl. Ein Erfolgserlebnis, eine Dopaminausschüttung. Meist allerdings nicht, wenn sie merken, dass auch bei mir manchmal dann doch etwas mehr Expertise durchscheint, als sie mir aufgrund meines lakonischen Stils zugetraut haben. Was sie aber völlig vergessen ist, dass sie erschweren, Zugang zu den Menschen zu bekommen. Und dass sie damit denjenigen in die Karten spielen, die „Kriegstreiber“ rufen und Soldaten als willenlose Befehlsempfänger darstellen. Oder Deutschland und Europa in ihrer Wehrfähigkeit spalten wollen. Zu Ihren Fragen: ▶️ „Zähl mal bitte die Minensucher der Deutschen Marine auf.“ Man spricht durch ein anderes Einsatzprofil eigentlich schon seit den 1990ern nicht mehr von „Minensuchern“, bzw unterscheidet. Ich nehme an, darauf wollten sie hinaus. Doch eigentlich sind auch die Minenjagd-Typen bereits eher auslaufend. Da andere Schiffstypen die Minen-Bekämpfung durch Module übernehmen. Das wird wohl die Zukunft sein. Ich halte es aber für überflüssig, sogar für störend und verwirrend, in einem eh wiedermal zu langen Beitrag Laien etwas von Littoral Combat Ships, Drohnen und Hohlstabräumgeräten zu erklären. (Oh, Entschuldigung, natürlich „UUV“ anstatt „Drohnen“. Abkürzungen erleichtern die Kommunikation bekanntermaßen ungemein.) Hohlstabräumgeräte waren mit der Hameln Klasse übrigens auch zu meiner Dienstzeit längst im Dienst, ich habe auch schon davor gestanden. Wir mussten den Scheiß auswendig lernen. Deshalb habe ich das ganze Zeug im Beitrag pauschal als „Minensucher“ bezeichnet, weil die meisten sich darunter etwas vorstellen können. Vielleicht haben Sie mal den Satz „Mut zur Lücke“ gehört. ▶️ „Kannst du erklären wie ein Seefernaufklärer eine Grundmine (wie z.B. eine Manta) orten kann? Ich meine, das klingt toll. Dann bräuchten wir ja keine UUVs wie z.B. Remus oder SeaCat.“ Ich hatte in einem Satz lapidar geschrieben „Seefernaufklärer wie die Orion, die zur U-Boot-Jagd eingesetzt werden, können natürlich nicht nur U-Boote finden, sondern auch Minen.“ Das bedeutet nicht, wie Sie es wohl verstehen wollen, dass alles andere überflüssig wird oder das diese gezielt dafür eingesetzt werden. Natürlich können die das mit der derzeitigen Ausstattung schlecht. Es bedeutet für Laien „Hey, da gibt es noch viel mehr Möglichkeiten und dafür braucht man in der Straße von Hormus nicht unbedingt deutsche Minenjäger.“ Sie wurden ja schon entsprechend von einem anderen belehrt. Da muss ich ja jetzt nicht mehr von Sonarbojen und Magnetischer Anomalie Auswertung anzufangen und mich in ein Thema reinfuchsen, dass mich auch fürchterlich nicht interessiert. (Danke dafür.) Ich bin weder erregt noch sauer. Tatsächlich werde ich gerne unterschätzt, dann glänzt es sich leichter. Es ist nur ermüdend, dass immer wieder irgendwelche Leute von allen Seiten entweder falsch verstehen wollen, was ich hier mache. Oder irgendwer versucht klugzuscheißen, noch dazu verschleiert durch provokante Fragen, anstatt einfach freundlich zu sagen, was er auf dem Herzen hat. Dann kann man das schnell nett klären. Ich bin nämlich tatsächlich ziemlich tiefenentspannt und habe keinen Anspruch auf „die Wahrheit“.

Very serious shortage of air defence munition especially Pantsir. The "Iskander" ballistic missiles are in fact no longer a high-precision weapons bc poor non-domestic components (accuracy decreased to 1km). 3 missiles for 1 target needed. 🇷🇺MilBlog Romanov

special 🇷🇺milblog route of 🇺🇦 long range drones to hit this chimney of a power plant in Auvera 🇪🇪#Estonia with a 500g payload

What a crazy world to have Jacobin Riperposting line it’s a 2015 milblog subreddit

THE RUMOR THAT REFUSES TO DIE GOES LIKE THIS: “UKRAINE HAS OPENED A NEW CROSSING OF THE VOVCHA RIVER.” It sounds cinematic, a surprise bridgehead on some quiet stretch of the front. In the Russian imagination, the war is always a Hollywood map, all arrows and drumbeats. In reality, what happened was smaller, slower, and far more humiliating. The river did not become a highway to Mariupol. The river changed sides. It slipped behind Ukrainian lines in a place Russian maps had been insisting was theirs. That is the kind of quiet geometric insult that makes staff officers stare at the ceiling at night. This is the story of that bend in the river, what actually moved, and why Russian propagandists suddenly sound more worried about pontoons than about their own victory arrows. WHERE THIS VOVCHA ACTUALLY IS First, geography therapy. The “new Ukrainian crossing of the Vovcha River” people keep arguing about is not in the north around Vovchansk. That is a different stretch of the same river system, around the town of Vovchansk in Kharkiv Oblast, where fighting has been grinding on for months without some fresh February Ukrainian river epic. The February crossing that has Russian milbloggers hyperventilating sits far to the south, on the seam between Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole sector. Think farm fields and small villages, long sight lines, and a front line that never quite agreed where it wanted to be. Here, the Vovcha had been serving as an informal boundary. Russian forces pushed up to it, and in places across it, in late 2025 and early 2026 as part of the broader push that took Hulyaipole and a string of nearby villages. The maps on Russian television all developed the same condition, red shading creeping toward deeper Dnipropetrovsk territory with the river as a handy reference mark. Ukraine already had some positions and bridgeheads on or near the river. What changed in February was not that the Vovcha went from untouched water to “crossed.” What changed is that Ukrainian counterattacks turned it from a line in front of Ukrainian troops into a line behind them, on multiple slices of the map. The river stopped being a limit and started being cover. HOW THE FEBRUARY FIGHT ACTUALLY UNFOLDED Strip out the Telegram drama and the urgent red arrows, and the story becomes almost boring, which is usually how you know it is real. In early to mid-February, Ukrainian forces launched a series of local counterattacks along the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole axes. This was not the big capital-C Counteroffensive that Western pundits spent 2023 fantasizing about. It was tactical, opportunistic, and very much on a secondary front. The enabler was almost embarrassingly simple. The enemy’s communications buckled. Ukrainian units near the Dnipropetrovsk–Zaporizhzhia boundary began probing and pushing at Russian positions immediately after Russian units in this sector found their Starlink access restricted and their beloved Telegram partially jammed. An army that had been fighting a twenty-first century war through a smartphone suddenly had to remember how to fight without a chat app. Kyiv and SpaceX kicked the crutch out. Ukrainian commanders leaned on the limp. Ukrainian units reconnected isolated forward positions, shoved Russians off ridgelines and treelines, and, crucially, expanded and created bridgeheads across the Vovcha south of places like Velykomykhailivka. In a few narrow corridors, they pushed Russian troops back roughly nine to nine and a half kilometers from their furthest winter gains. Analysts in Warsaw, Kyiv, and Washington describe counterthrusts radiating out from villages such as Oleksiivka, Orestopil, Danylivka, and others, with related Ukrainian movement west of the Haichur River and along the Yanchur. On the map, the cleanest metaphor is not a heroic arrow. It is teeth. Small, ugly teeth, biting into a Russian salient that had pushed too far and suddenly discovered that its radio net had gone dumb. On 20 to 23 February, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stepped to a podium and turned that geometry into politics. He announced that Ukrainian forces had liberated about 300 square kilometers on the southern axis, later updating that to more than 400 square kilometers reclaimed since late January. After subtracting losses elsewhere, observers put the net gains in the Novopavlivka, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions at roughly 165 to 200 square kilometers over the first three weeks of February. Those numbers include the Vovcha story, together with advances near Verbove and other fragments of the southern front. On television, “300 square kilometers” is content. It fits neatly inside a chyron. In a war room, the number is almost meaningless until you ask three questions. Where are they? What do they do to the shape of the front? How hard will it be to keep them when glide bombs and drones start working on your supply lines? In this sector, the interesting part is not the total; it is the outline. A Russian bulge that had been inching toward deeper Dnipropetrovsk territory now has a bitten edge. A river that used to sit in front of Ukrainian positions now sits behind them. That is what “300 square kilometers” means when you zoom in. It means some Russian platoons that thought they were the spearhead discovered that they were actually the exposed nose of a salient that just got punched in. THE AIR ASSAULT FORCES AND THE GRAY ZONES The spearhead in this sector belongs to the Air Assault Forces of Ukraine, the DShV, backed by mechanized and infantry units. They announced that their brigades, working with adjacent formations, had cleared at least eight settlements of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the Oleksandrivka axis. The names are familiar if you have been doomscrolling this war for a few years. Kalynivske. Ternove. Pavlivka. Uspenivka. Ternuvate. Andriivka. Ostapivske. Pishchane. Nechaivka. Radisne. Nove Zaporizhzhia. You can almost feel the copy-paste fatigue in Russian state media when they pretend not to care about villages they bragged about taking months ago. Geolocated footage, Ukrainian statements, and independent maps line up well enough to say that Ukrainian troops have re-entered and are operating in and around many of these places. The key detail is that none of them are peaceful towns with reopened post offices. This sector has been gray zone country since Russia’s Hulyaipole offensive pushed in and then ran out of clean momentum. Houses, hedgerows, and fields have been trading hands under artillery fire. The DShV’s announcement is best read as this: we are systematically hunting down Russian detachments that were left clinging to those pockets and trying to restitch a line we can actually hold. Southern Defense Forces spokesperson Col. Vladyslav Voloshyn talks about up to 50 engagements a day around Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole. That is not the sound of a dead front. That is the sound of an area both sides still think matters. And in the middle of it, the Vovcha. Not as an epic crossing, but as the visible trace of a deeper idea: a Ukrainian command that still knows how to turn a comms hiccup and a few brigades into a local reversal. WHAT THE MILBLOGGERS ACCIDENTALLY CONFESSED By late February, several prominent Russian milbloggers reluctantly admitted that Ukrainian forces had “crossed the Vovcha River in multiple sectors,” had “several crossings,” and were moving not just infantry but reserves and some armor to the southern bank. The tone was classic Russian milblog, less “we are doomed” and more “you idiots in command, fix this or you will doom us.” Then came the whiplash. It is not a real counteroffensive. Russia still holds the initiative. Ukraine has not reclaimed anything important. And also, for reasons, these unimportant crossings must be bombed constantly, or there will be a catastrophe. You can almost hear the editorial meeting. Comrade, write that the enemy crossing is insignificant. Then write three paragraphs about how many glide bombs we are dropping on it so people understand how insignificant it is. This is the same ecosystem that calls every two kilometer Russian advance a major offensive and every Ukrainian local attack symbolic or desperate. When those same channels start drawing the Vovcha behind Ukrainian positions and screaming about it, they are not just spinning. They are testifying. They are telling you what they are afraid of. If you zoom out from the noise and look at the front as geometry instead of content, a few things are solid. Russian assaults in the Oleksandrivka direction have largely stalled for now. Russian units in the area are still attacking, but they are no longer reproducing the incremental gains they saw when Hulyaipole fell, and the Russian footprint expanded westward and northwestward. Instead, they are fighting to hold or retake treelines and fields they thought were safely banked. Ukrainian forces now hold, or at least meaningfully contest, ground on the southern bank of the Vovcha in several places where the river used to be in front of them. That matters because it narrows or erases some Russian salients that threatened Ukrainian lateral movement, and it makes it harder for Russian artillery to treat Ukrainian positions as a simple shooting range. Most importantly, the river has flipped roles. It used to be a partial shield for Russian positions pressing north. It has become a partial shield for Ukrainian units pressing south. If you are a Russian staff officer, that is not a cinematic disaster. It is something more unnerving. It is a quiet reversal that hints at the competence and persistence of an enemy you have been calling finished for a year. THE COST AND THE FRAGILITY None of this is neat. Russian forces in this sector still have heavy artillery, dense drone coverage, and glide bombs that can reach Ukrainian crossings and supply roads. Russian aviation is hitting real and suspected Ukrainian logistical points. Both sides bleed men and vehicles to FPV strikes and shellfire. Ukrainian sources call the sector very dynamic and complain that Russians are clinging to every meter. That is not a literary flourish. It is the physics of trying to clear entrenched infantry from a landscape of villages and tree lines without your own air force ruling the sky. Russian sources brag about drone and KAB strikes on Ukrainian columns and pontoon bridges that are, somehow, simultaneously trivial and existential. Nothing in this sector looks stable yet. It looks like a battle still in motion, where Ukrainian forces have nudged the line in their favor and now have to hang on to that nudge against an opponent that still has more bombs and more barrels. The water moved, but it is still running through a kill zone. WHAT THIS CROSSING IS NOT A few things are worth saying without romance. It is not a Dnipro moment. There is no enormous, dramatic crossing that shatters a whole operational sector or severs a major supply artery. Think of it as a local counterstroke that complicates Russian plans and buys Ukraine options, not as a magic key to the Sea of Azov. It is not Vovchansk. If you see someone mixing Vovcha and Vovchansk and drawing a hybrid map where Ukrainian troops are allegedly fording a river in northern Kharkiv that nobody else is talking about, you are not reading an analysis. You are reading vibes and wishcasting. It is not proof that Ukraine is about to roar through southern Ukraine in a week. These advances are narrow. They are measured in kilometers and villages, not provinces. They can be rolled back if Ukrainian logistics falter, if Russian forces regroup, or if Moscow decides to commit more reserves here. It is also absolutely not nothing. That is the hard middle ground of this war. The story is almost never “Ukraine is collapsing” or “Russia is collapsing.” The story, most days, is that someone just paid a miserable price to move the line in one direction for a little while, and now we wait to see whether they can afford to keep paying. WHY IT STILL MATTERS ANYWAY So why pay attention to a modest crossing on a secondary river in a secondary sector, in year five of a war that has already swallowed cities? Because this is one of the few places in early 2026 where Ukrainian forces are clearly moving the line the right way and holding it long enough that even hostile sources have to admit it. Because it reminds us that Russian claims of inevitable, grinding progress rest on a front that still has seams. Moscow sells its public a war of maps and destiny. Ukraine keeps insisting on a war of logistics and geometry, where rivers can change sides, bridgeheads can be taken back, and salients can suddenly find themselves exposed from angles their creators did not budget for. Because it shows that Ukrainian commanders are not just sitting under Russian artillery waiting for the next bad headline. They are probing, exploiting communications gaps, and hunting for places where a handful of brigades can reverse a few months of Russian gains. That ability to generate localized success, even under staggering pressure, is one of the few levers Kyiv still has. And because in a war that outsiders increasingly treat as a single frozen picture, the Vovcha crossing is an awkward reminder. The picture is still moving. The geometry is still changing. The river changed sides quietly while everyone was arguing about arrows.

Warum die ruzzische Armee 🇷🇺 technisch am Boden liegt ? Maxim Klimow versucht die Unfähigkeit zu erklären. Die 🇷🇺 Truppe nutzt ungesicherte zivile Funkgeräte, weil das Verteidigungsministerium es nicht schafft, Profi-Equipment zu liefern. ​Das Ergebnis: Die ukrainische Aufklärung 🇺🇦 weiß immer genau, wo sie zuschlagen muss. Dieser Dilettantismus zieht sich seit Anfang des Krieges wie ein roter Faden durch deren Führung. ​Man kann nur hoffen, dass sie bei dieser Linie bleiben. Diese Mischung aus Korruption und Unfähigkeit ist das Beste, was passieren kann, um diesen Wahnsinn zu beenden. Hochmut kommt vor dem Fall. #Russland #UkraineKrieg #Klimow #MilBlog

@grok **Nee, de claim "Ineens is het Russische leger blind en erg kwetsbaar aan het front: Elon Musk schakelt Starlink uit" is grotendeels misleidend of overdreven, al zit er wel een kern van waarheid in recente ontwikkelingen.** De kop komt rechtstreeks uit een artikel van De Telegraaf (6 februari 2026), maar de werkelijkheid is genuanceerder dan dat het Russische leger "ineens blind" zou zijn gemaakt door Musk die Starlink bewust "uitschakelt" tegen Rusland. ### Wat er écht gebeurd is (februari 2026): - Rusland heeft al langere tijd **illegaal Starlink-terminals** gebruikt in bezet Oekraïens gebied (via smokkel, grijze import en activering in derde landen). Die terminals werden ingezet voor dronebesturing, communicatie en coördinatie aan het front. - Oekraïne (o.a. minister Mykhailo Fedorov) heeft SpaceX/E lon Musk gevraagd om dit te stoppen. - SpaceX heeft maatregelen genomen: - Een **"whitelist"-systeem** ingevoerd: terminals in Oekraïne moeten officieel geregistreerd en geverifieerd worden door Oekraïne/SpaceX. Niet-geregistreerde (dus o.a. Russische) terminals worden automatisch uitgeschakeld in het gebied. - Extra beperkingen, zoals snelheidslimieten (max ~75 km/u) om gebruik in snelle aanvalsdrones te blokkeren. - Dit leidde begin februari 2026 tot massale uitval bij Russische eenheden aan het front (4-5 februari). Russische milbloggers en pro-oorlog-kanalen meldden "catastrofe", "paralyse van commando & control", stopgezette assault-operaties en droneproblemen. - Elon Musk bevestigde zelf op X dat de stappen tegen "unauthorised use by Russia" gewerkt leken te hebben. ### Waarom de kop overdrijft: - Musk heeft **niet** Starlink "uitgeschakeld" voor het Russische leger in algemene zin. Hij blokkeert specifiek ongeautoriseerde terminals **binnen Oekraïens grondgebied** (via geofencing whitelist). - Het Russische leger is al jaren afhankelijk van allerlei systemen (eigen satellieten, Chinese apparatuur, captured Oekraïense systemen, etc.). Starlink was een **belangrijke aanvulling**, maar geen enige of volledige ruggengraat. - De impact is dus **aanzienlijk hinderlijk** voor Rusland (vooral bij drone-operaties en snelle coördinatie), maar het leger is niet "ineens blind" of volledig kwetsbaar geworden. Het is eerder een serieuze tactische tegenvaller. - Oekraïense terminals blijven werken (mits geregistreerd), dus het is geen algemene uitschakeling. Kort samengevat: Ja → Er is recent (februari 2026) een flinke verstoring bij Russische Starlink-gebruikers aan het front, op verzoek van Oekraïne en uitgevoerd door SpaceX/Musk. Nee → Het is geen plotselinge totale "uitschakeling" door Musk die het Russische leger blind maakt. De formulering in de Telegraaf-kop is sterk aangezet voor clickbait-effect. Bronnen: Reuters, BBC, Kyiv Post, Al Jazeera, The Moscow Times, Oekraïense defensieminister Fedorov, Musk zelf op X, en diverse Russische milblog-rapportages (februari 2026).

Romanov says remaining russian in Ukraine are isolated into groups of 2-3 people. He also claims he informed the russian milblog sphere 9 days ago.

Attenzione ai cosiddetti milblog russi: alcuni sono ucraini che fanno information warfare fingendosi russi. Li riconosci da come parlano di certe cose. Purtroppo, molti non lo sanno e usano queste fonti per dire: "Vedete? Lo ammettono anche i russi!", cadendo in un tranello.

Bello mettere spezzoni ad cazzum. Nella live viene detto che il video di Zelensky potrebbe essere vecchio di un paio di settimane, non che sia falso. Il fatto che per i russi la situazione a Kupjansk sia difficile lo dicono gli stessi milblog russi, sicuramente più onesti di te.

> Looks in bio > writer for clickbait milblog > former marine Ah.

The Russian milblog channel and media organization Rybar has published maps showing a potential Russian invasion of Estonia and/or the Island of Gotland, claiming that Ukraine and NATO are currently planning for such a scenario as well as a Blockade of the Gulf of Finland.

El canal ruso de milblog @rybar_en sugiere que Rusia🇷🇺 entregue a Venezuela🇻🇪drones de ataque unidireccional "Shahed-131/136" conocidos como drones kamikaze. ¿Por qué?. Para "disuadir" cualquier acción militar de EE.UU🇺🇸. El mapa de Rybar destaca el alcance de ataque de estos drones desde Caracas atraves del Caribe, hasta Guantánamo en Cuba incluso hasta la Base de la Fuerza Aérea Homestead en Florida. Estos drones Shahed, popularmente ‘geranios’, ya han sido utilizados por Rusia con un efecto devastador en Ucrania. Por un lado buscan la Paz, por otro lado uno de ellos amenaza al ‘patio trasero’. ¡Asi no!

🥴Russian milblog channel Rybar is suggesting that 🇷🇺Russia deliver 🇻🇪Venezuela with "Shahed-131/136" kamikaze drones to deter any future military action by the 🇺🇸United States.