#threatreport #MediumCompleteness
From ClickFix to MaaS: Exposing a Modular Windows RAT and Its Admin Panel | 06-04-2026
Source:
netskope.com/blog/from-click…
Key details below ↓
💀Threats:
Clickfix_technique, Legionloader, Lumma_stealer,
🎯Victims: Windows users, Cryptocurrency wallets
📚TTPs:
⚔️Tactics: 3
🛠️Technics: 0
🤖LLM extracted TTPs:`
T1005, T1027, T1027.010, T1041, T1057, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1059.007, T1071, T1082, ...
🧨IOCs:
- Command: 1
- Domain: 2
- File: 26
- Registry: 1
- Path: 1
- Hash: 1
- Url: 3
💽Software: Node.js, Windows Registry, Windows Defender, Telegram
🔢Algorithms: xor, pbkdf2, ecdh, aes-256-cbc, base64, sha256
🔠Functions: setTimeout, reshuffleConfig
📜Programming Languages: javascript, powershell
💻Platforms: x64, x86
#threatreport:
Netskope Threat Labs has identified a new cyber threat campaign utilizing ClickFix, predominantly targeting Windows users. This campaign, which began delivering custom malware in early 2025, employs a modular NodeJS-based remote access Trojan (RAT) that is designed to execute malicious activities seamlessly while minimizing its detection footprint. This malware is delivered through malicious MSI installers that, when activated, covertly download and execute the payload without user intervention, avoiding traditional security measures.
The malware uses an innovative approach, ensuring all primary stealing modules and communication protocols operate entirely in memory, which prevents forensic analysis from easily revealing its functionalities. When the user interacts with a fake CAPTCHA, a base64-encoded PowerShell command operates in the background to download and install the RAT using the NodeServer-Setup-Full.msi package. The MSI installer is notably self-sufficient, carrying a full Node.js runtime and dependencies in its package, negating the need for prior installations on the victim’s machine.
Permanent access is maintained as the malware edits the Windows Registry, ensuring it launches every time the system starts. It achieves command-and-control (C2) communication through gRPC over the Tor network, significantly obscuring its operational infrastructure. This sophisticated C2 architecture supports bidirectional communication which allows for real-time command execution and data retrieval.
An operational security breach by the attackers disclosed an admin panel's protocol definitions, revealing their malware-as-a-service (MaaS) framework. This backend system is crafted to manage multiple operators and effectively track various cryptocurrency assets while allowing operators to execute commands, manage stored modules, and handle victim profiles. The framework's modularity not only facilitates versatility in data theft but also expands the malware’s capabilities beyond simple information gathering to arbitrary code execution.
Moreover, the malware implements multi-layered encryption to safeguard its configuration data before establishing C2 connections, utilizing either AES-256-CBC or XOR encryption methods. It scans for over 30 security products to assess the system's defenses before executing payloads, allowing attackers to adjust tactics accordingly.
The architecture of this malware represents a significant evolution in cyber threats, shifting toward modular, binary-less execution while targeting cryptocurrency wallets. By fully utilizing the Tor network for secure communications, the malware evades static defenses, marking a critical development in the landscape of cyber threats that analysts will need to closely monitor in the future.