Tracking an intrusion that used Amadey for initial access where they relied entirely on 𝗹𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝘀𝗼𝗳𝘁𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗲 for persistence and command and control.
𝗘𝘅𝗲𝗰𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗳𝗹𝗼𝘄:
Initial access via MSI→ installation via ps1 executed under SYSTEM → hidden PowerShell with ExecutionPolicy Bypass → 𝗡𝗲𝗯𝘂𝗹𝗮 𝗺𝗲𝘀𝗵 𝗩𝗣𝗡 dropped under ProgramData and installed as a service → 𝗢𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗦𝗦𝗛 𝗱𝗲𝗽𝗹𝗼𝘆𝗲𝗱, 𝘀𝘀𝗵𝗱.𝗲𝘅𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗺𝗲𝗱 → SSH bound to a non-standard port with PasswordAuthentication enabled → services set to Automatic start → 𝗹𝗼𝗰𝗮𝗹 𝘂𝘀𝗲𝗿 𝗰𝗿𝗲𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗺𝗽𝘁𝗲𝗱 with hardcoded credentials
All artifacts were 𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗱 𝗶𝗻 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗴𝗿𝗮𝗺𝗗𝗮𝘁𝗮, with service names crafted to appear legitimate. Nebula established encrypted peer-to-peer connectivity outside traditional HTTP beaconing. 𝗢𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗦𝗦𝗛 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗱 𝗱𝗶𝗿𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝘀𝗵𝗲𝗹𝗹 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀. Both mechanisms persisted across reboots.
The stealth factor here is the absence of custom malware. Nebula and OpenSSH are legitimate administrative tools, signed and widely used in enterprise environments. When repurposed this way, they blend into normal operations. C2 traffic occurs over encrypted overlay networking and SSH rather than typical web-based channels, making signature-based detection unreliable, especially when binaries are renamed.
𝗙𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗮 𝗵𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗽𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲, focus on behavior over signatures. Look for hidden PowerShell with bypass flags, new Windows services pointing to user-writable directories such as ProgramData, renamed binaries whose internal metadata does not match the filename, unexpected SSH listeners on non-standard ports, and overlay networking tools installed without a clear business justification.