この文脈における、複雑系の意味を聞いてみた。 Hirosawa is asking how complexity theory and complex systems thinking apply to his knowledge co-creation society framework. This is a sophisticated theoretical question that builds on our extended dialogue in Japanese about his three-layer AI model and broader intellectual architecture. The key conceptual threads he's been developing include the three epistemic layers (things, episteme-plus-techne, and phronesis), the methodological constraint of inanimate-subject grammar, the synthesis of Hayek-Wallerstein-Mokyr, the erosion of gap-maintenance mechanisms, commensurability as the deep grammar of modernity, semi-permeable membranes as a principle of preservation, and the detection apparatus (peer review systems) that distinguishes institutional knowledge-makers from corridor observers who lack such error-correction mechanisms. He's also mapping the market as coordination without encounter—Hayek's price mechanism externalizing tacit knowledge versus knowledge co-creation requiring actual meeting—and using three independent traditions to triangulate what they all miss: the non-commensurable dimension of phronesis. Pioneer's failure becomes a map-making act, an explicitation of structural limits. Now he's asking where complexity theory fits into this framework, and he's aware this requires genuine thinking rather than pattern-matching—complexity is vast, so he needs to identify which parts actually connect to Hirosawa's architecture and which parts the framework would reject or reframe. He's enumerating the key concepts: emergence and self-organization as macro patterns from micro interactions, spontaneous order (which Hayek himself drew on from cybernetics), the edge of chaos where complex computation happens, phase transitions that might explain sudden collapses, and power laws in scale-free networks—but he's also setting up the critical move: identifying where complexity theory would miss or be misused within this framework. ure thread—failures cascade at every scale) Dissipative structures - Prigogine's far-from-equilibrium systems that maintain order through continuous energy input, which maps directly onto the gap-maintenance apparatus as a structure requiring constant throughput to sustain the gradient Resilience and robustness-fragility tradeoffs - the ecological insight that systems can be robust in some dimensions while fragile in others, connecting to the redundancy patterns that emerged earlier Requisite variety - Ashby's principle that any regulator needs sufficient complexity to match what it's regulating Now I'm starting to see the deeper tensions and how these frameworks interlock, particularly around Hayek's position. Hayek's later work on complex phenomena, spontaneous order, and the distinction between cosmos and taxis is fundamentally an engagement with complexity theory itself—he drew directly from cybernetics and systems theory, and this connection runs through to contemporary complexity economics. The market as an information mechanism is precisely an emergence story: prices arise from countless local interactions without any central design, which is exactly what "coordination without encounter" means—macro-level order emerging from micro-level interactions. So complexity theory is the broader framework of which Hayek's market mechanism is just one instantiation. This matters because it gives us a vocabulary that applies beyond price systems, including knowledge co-creation systems. Now I'm seeing a stronger novel connection: Prigogine's dissipative structures—ordered systems that maintain themselves far from thermodynamic equilibrium through continuous energy input, resisting the pull toward homogeneity and entropy. Hirosawa's gap-maintenance apparatus could be understood as exactly this kind of dissipative structure, one that requires constant work to sustain itself against erosion. The inanimate-subject framing works perfectly here too—dissipative structures erode without any agent actively maintaining them, just as the gap collapses when the energy cost of sustaining it exceeds the throughput. And this connects naturally to the market dynamics: if I'm thinking about bubbles as critical phenomena approaching phase transitions, that's where the investment question lands—whether the system is near a tipping point where small perturbations trigger sudden reorganization. But I need to be careful not to overextend complexity theory into unfalsifiable territory; everyone invokes "tipping points" now. Still, Per Bak's sandpile model is instructive here—the pioneer at the frontier is essentially at the critical edge where failures of any magnitude become possible, and the size of the avalanche isn't predictable from the trigger alone. The "そりゃ失敗するわな" failures might be the large-scale collapses that are structurally inevitable in systems organized near criticality. The corridor itself seems to occupy that edge-of-chaos regime Langton and Kauffman describe—the narrow productive zone between the frozen rigidity of disciplinary orthodoxy and the turbulent chaos of complete undiscipline. Walking it with proper 作法 and 無生物主語ロック means navigating that precarious boundary where complex adaptive work actually happens. But staying on that edge is dynamically unstable, which connects to the "保てるか" question—how long can you actually maintain that balance? And then there's the detection problem: the corridor person needs an error-detection apparatus sophisticated enough to match the variety of errors possible in unmapped territory. A single oracle or AI isn't sufficient variety, which is why Hirosawa emphasizes multiplication—multiple AIs, local practice, human sparring—as a literal application of Ashby's requisite variety principle. The semi-permeable membrane wisdom about not commensurting detection to one source is fundamentally a requisite-variety argument. Now comes the critical move: where does complexity theory itself fail or get misused? I need to apply the same diagnostic lens we've been using throughout—asking what any framework misses. If I just map everything onto complexity theory without interrogating its blind spots, I've violated the method itself. The tension is that complexity theory's great ambition is universality: the same power laws, critical exponents, and emergence dynamics appear across sandpiles, markets, ecosystems, brains, cities. It's intoxicating and powerful, but it's also a commensuration project—making wildly different systems comparable through a single theoretical apparatus. This is exactly what price does in markets, what explicitation does in Mokyr's framework. Complexity theory commensurates not through price but through mathematical form—scaling exponents, network topology, criticality. And that means it inherits the same blind spot: phronesis, the non-commensurable, the question of what's good for a particular community. That doesn't reduce to a critical exponent. An NK model assumes a fitness landscape, but the deeper political and ethical problem is that there's no agreed-upon fitness function—no consensus on who defines the landscape in the first place. So adding complexity as a fourth tradition strengthens the triangulation rather than dissolving it. Price, explicitation, structural reproduction, and formal universality all coordinate local sites into macro patterns, and all four are silent on phronesis. The hole becomes more robustly visible. Complexity is the most general commensurator—it commensurates the commensurators themselves—yet even it can't price what's fundamentally non-commensurable. That's the payoff: complexity doesn't break the framework; it's the most powerful version of exactly what the framework identifies as having a blind spot, which makes the hole sharper, not less visible. Now there's a second tension emerging around emergence versus co-creation. Ostrom's work on commons governance offers a crucial bridge—she studied how communities self-organize without relying on markets or states, using local rules and trust, which mirrors the intentional knowledge co-creation space. Her research connects to complexity theory through polycentricity and emergent-yet-cultivable institutions, suggesting complexity theory does have a wing that can address the inside layer after all. But here's the catch: even Ostrom's design principles describe the conditions and structure for self-governance—the graduated sanctions, clear boundaries, monitoring—rather than the actual phronesis content itself. They map the container, the floor and place and circuit, but not what wisdom actually flows through it. That distinction aligns with Hirosawa's own framework separating the practice lab's container from its phronesis substance. Now there's a third tension emerging around prediction. Complexity theory is fundamentally descriptive rather than predictive in a particular way—it can tell you a critical system will produce avalanches of varying sizes but not when the major one hits, or that emergence will occur without specifying what emerges. This actually aligns deeply with the 無生物主語 discipline and the principle of drawing maps rather than writing prescriptions. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions makes prescriptions epistemically unavailable, so complexity reinforces this methodological constraint rather than undermining it. Where economics-as-policy wants to predict and control, complexity acknowledges you can characterize the regime but not dictate its trajectory—that's the corridor person's epistemology formalized. The risk, though, is that complexity theory gets misappropriated as a new prescription engine, with people claiming you should "manage at the edge of chaos" or "lead" in ways that contradict its own non-prescriptive nature. Arthur's increasing returns framework provides the formal mechanism for why Wallerstein's core-periphery structures persist—path dependence becomes the bridge connecting Hayek's information-coordination view with Wallerstein's structural reproduction. Complexity reveals that the same self-organizing dynamics producing efficient markets can also lock in hierarchical inequalities, and emergence itself is morally neutral about what order actually emerges. Complexity theory also commensurates through mathematical form, so it carries the same phronesis blindness as the other frameworks—it's a fourth corner of the triangulation, not a master key. It sits on the Hayek side of emergence (coordination without direct encounter), making it strong on the outer structural layer but weak on the inner phronesis layer, though the Ostrom/commons approach gets closer to that interior space. The risk mirrors the market's: when complexity-leadership or antifragility becomes prescriptive advice, description starts to slip into normativity. The deeper danger is that complexity theory's seductive generality could become totalizing—someone might claim "phronesis is just another emergent property at the edge of chaos" and thereby collapse the very incommensurability the framework is meant to preserve. That's the double edge: complexity is the best external ally for mapping the outside, but also the most dangerous threat to the hole itself. The sharpest way to see it: complexity theory commensurates via mathematical form rather than price—it finds the common structure where markets find the common numéraire. Both are acts of commensuration; complexity is more general because it works even where price fails. But phronesis resists commensuration altogether, whether by price or by form, and that's where the fitness-function problem returns. The technical name for this hole is the exogeneity of the fitness function—complexity can model adaptation across a landscape but can't endogenize the choice of landscape itself, and that choice (what counts as good) is precisely the phronesis question. This gives me a citable formulation that should resonate with Hirosawa. Now I'm thinking about how Kauffman's adjacent possible connects to this framework— it's the set of states reachable in one step from the current configuration, which maps nicely onto the pre-commensuration zone of future possibilities not yet priced into the market. And Geoffrey West's scaling laws about superlinear innovation growth in cities versus sublinear infrastructure costs ties back to the asymmetries in how people, things, and ideas propagate. West's complexity theory actually formalizes the agglomeration force that Hirosawa argues is being dissolved by AI and idea mobility—if ideas can move freely enough, the pressure to concentrate people physically disappears. So West gives the mechanism, Hirosawa describes its erosion. I'll focus on the strongest 3-4 connections rather than overloading the argument. I have solid material now. For the tone and format, I need to keep this at a high intellectual register befitting a Japanese dialogue. 複雑性を第四の外来要素ではなく、ハイエクの思考に既に内在する基盤として捉え直すことで、むしろ隠れていた構造が浮かび上がる。散逸構造は摩耗のテーゼを理論的に支える最大の贈り物であり、同時に無生物主語の枠組みを完全に保持したまま機能する。経路依存性とロック・インはハイエク的な秩序形成とウォーラーステイン的な世界システムの間を仲介し、規範的な対立を形式的なレベルで解消する——つまり、規範から記述への降下を強化する。 だが複雑性そのものが最も普遍的な通約装置として機能する瞬間、それは価格ではなく形式を通じて働くがゆえに、同じ穴を抱え込む。適応度関数の外生性という正確な技術的名称で呼ぶべき、この穴こそが複雑性を第四の三角測量の頂点にするのであり、万能鍵ではない。創発現象はハイエク的な側（出会いなき調整）に位置し、外層では強力だが内層では弱く、オストロムのコモンズ的アプローチは容器には到達するが、実践知の内容には届かない。複雑性の普遍主義こそが最も誘惑的な穴の溶解剤となる危険がある——「すべてはカオスの縁のCASに過ぎない」という、まさにこの枠組みが抵抗する通約化そのものだ。方法論的ロックと多重性がその防衛線であり、以前と同じ滑落への警告が必要だ。 回廊をカオスの縁として捉え、動的に不安定な状態として、だからこそ能動的に保持されねばならないという「何年保てるか」というテーマに立ち戻ることで締めくくるべきだろう。 選別が必要だ。(1) Hayekを複雑性の先駆者として開く、(2) 散逸構造を中心的な贈り物として、(3) 経路依存性がHayek/Wallersteinの二項対立を溶かす、(4) 決定的な転換点（形式による通約可能化＋適応度関数の外生性＝第四の角）、(5) 外部への創発＋Ostromの翼、(6) 全体化メタファーの危険性＋防御としてのロック、簡潔な結論。 西洋の名前を過剰に引用せず、正確に必要な場所でのみ使う必要がある。Prigogine（散逸構造—本質的）、Brian Arthur（経路依存性/ロック・イン—Hayek-Wallersteinの橋渡しに不可欠）、Kauffman（適応度ランドスケープと隣接可能性—適応度関数の論点と未来の可能性のために）、Ostromを選別して使い、名前の羅列に陥らないようにしよう。 複雑性は第四の部屋ではなく、Hayekの下にある基盤（自発的秩序、出会いなき調整＝創発）であり、外層を一般化する。散逸構造は摩耗を熱力学的に根拠づけ、純粋に無生物主語的である。勾配が汲み上げられ、スループットを除去すれば均質性に緩和する。同時にこれはArthurの増加収益/ロック・インを通じてHayek↔Wallersteinを橋渡しする—同じ創発が効率的な価格と根深い階層の両方を生み出し、どちらになるかは条件に依存する。 しかし複雑性そのものが可換エンジンであり、価格ではなく数学的形式を通じて機能する。最も一般的なものは可換者を可換する。だからこそ同じ盲点を継承し、その穴は正確な技術的名称を得る—適応度関数の外生性（Kauffmanの景観は与えられたもの；誰が景観を選ぶのか＝フロネシス）。複雑性は穴をより見えやすくするのであって、隠すのではない。 複雑性は出会いなしの調整であり、外層には複雑性が本来的で、内層の出会い/フロネシスには構造的に弱い。その内側に到達する翼（Ostrom、多中心的コモンズ）は容器を記述するが、フロネシスの内容はまだ記述していない。実践ラボと同じ境界だ。危険なのは複雑性の普遍主義が最も誘惑的な溶媒であること—「フロネシスはカオスの端での創発に過ぎない」という再可換化は、このフレームワークが守ろうとしているものそのものを再可換化してしまう。それは全体化メタファーの罠であり、新しい衣装での記述から処方への滑りだ。ロックと多重性がその防御だ。 廊下そのものがカオスの端として読める—凍結した部屋の正統性と形のない遭難の間で、動的に不安定であり、だからこそ「何年保てるか」が正しい問いなのだ。複雑性はそれに答えない。なぜ答えられないのかを説明し、その拒否こそが複雑性が提供する最も誠実なものだ。 NK モデルの適応度関数の精度を確認中—Kauffman の NK モデルは N 個の成分と K 個の相互作用を持つ適応度ランドスケープを定義し、エージェントは与えられたランドスケープ上で丘登りで適応する。ランドスケープ（適応度関数）はエージェントの外生的なものだが... ここが重要だ。政治的・倫理的な問い—何が適応度として、何が「良い」として数えられるのか—はまさにモデルが所与として扱うものだ。つまり「ランドスケープの選択はフロネシスであり、複雑性モデルはそれを内生化できない」という指摘は正確で簡潔だ。適応度地形は外から与えられる、その外生性こそが問題だ。 彼の枠組みの中で彼自身の語彙を使って接続させる必要がある—落差維持装置の摩耗、無生物主語ロック、通約装置、出会いなき調整、半透膜、三角測量、フロネシスの層、床・場・回路、何年保てるか、検出装置。彼の語彙を正確に使うことが、この応答が着地する理由の一部だ。 ただし、ここで自分に注意を促す必要がある。単に「これはすべてに繋がる」という応答になってはいけない。本当の批判的な動きは—複雑性が穴を最も危険に溶かす装置だという指摘—がまさに反論であり、それは実質的だ。応答がそこで失敗する場所を示すことが規律だ。それを中心に据えた。長さは前のターンと同程度、充実しているが膨張していない。前のターンはもっと長かったから、1500～2000字程度を目指そう。 複雑系を導入すると、おそらく「四番目の部屋が増える」のではなく、「既存の部屋の床下が見える」という感覚になるだろう。ハイエクの後期の思想——自発的秩序、コスモスとタクシスの区別、複雑現象の理論——はほぼそのまま複雑系への接続だからだ。彼はサイバネティクスや一般システム論を踏まえていたし、サンタフェのブライアン・アーサーは明示的にハイエクに連なっている。つまり複雑系を持ち込むのは新しい異物を足すというより、ハイエクの市場論が実は創発の一事例だったことを明かすようなものだ。 「出会いなき調整」は創発の別名そのもので、無数の局所的な相互作用が、誰の設計も中央調整もなしに、巨視的な秩序へと畳み込まれていく。複雑系はその「市場」を特殊例として含む一般理論として機能する。 そこで最も有効な視点は、おそらくプリゴジンの散逸構造だ。摩耗テーゼに物理的な根拠を与えるものだからだ。散逸構造は平衡から遠いところに維持される秩序で、放置すれば平衡状態（均質でエントロピー最大）へと崩れていく。だから秩序を保つにはエネルギーの継続的な流入が必要で、その流入が止まれば秩序も消滅する。 これはまさに廣澤さんが「フラットが自然」から「格差を維持するのは大変」へと文法の主語をずらした操作そのものだ。均質が平衡で、落差は汲み上げられている。落差維持装置は散逸構造であり、摩耗とは汲み上げの停止のことだ。そしてこの記述は完全に無生物主語で書ける。誰も落差を維持していない。流入が落ちれば構造が散逸する、それだけだ。無生物主語ロックと、これ以上ないほど噛み合う。 複雑系はハイエクとウォーラーステインの間を、形式のレベルで橋渡ししている。アーサーの収穫逓増論へと進んでいく... 複雑系は形式的な根拠を与えるわけですが、廣澤さんの議論をさらに進めると、複雑系そのものが最も普遍的な通約装置だと見えてくる。ハイエクの市場は価格という単一の尺度で通約するのに対して、複雑系は臨界指数やネットワーク位相といった数学的な形式で通約する——つまり価格が機能しない領域でも、形が共通なら比較可能にしてしまう。だから複雑系は通約装置を通約する装置であり、最も強力で最も一般的だが、同時に同じ盲点を引き継いでいる。フロネシスは価格にせよ形にせよ、通約そのものに抵抗する。 その抵抗の正体は、複雑系の言葉で言えば適応度関数の外生性です。カウフマンのNKモデルでは主体が与えられた地形の上で最適化を進めるが、その地形自体はモデルの外部から与えられる。複雑系は与えられた地形での適応は完璧に記述できるけれど、どの地形を選ぶのか——何を善とするのか——は内生化できない。地形の選択こそがフロネシスであり、複数の地形の存在こそがフロネシスの複数性だ。だから三角測量は実は四つの軸で成り立つ：価格、表出化、構造的再生産、そして形式的普遍性。 この四つの独立した伝統が揃って同じ非通約的なものを見ないことで、穴はより堅牢に三角測量される。複雑系は穴を埋めるのではなく、最も一般的な通約装置さえ通約できないものとして、その穴をより鮮明に浮かび上がらせる。 創発は定義上「出会いなき調整」だから、複雑系は市場やフラット化といった外側の層の言語であって、出会いを賭ける内側——フロネシスの層——には構造的に弱い。ただしオストロムのコモンズ統治やポリセントリシティのように、市場でも国家でもない地域的な自己組織化へと手を伸ばす例外的な翼がある。 オストロムの設計原理ですら、結局のところ境界や段階的制裁といった「容れ物」の条件を描いているだけで、その中を循環するフロネシスそのものは描けていない。実践室で容れ物と中身を分けたあの境界と、ここは同じ位置にある。そして複雑系の普遍主義は、この枠組みにとって最も魅力的な溶媒でもあり、「フロネシスもカオスの縁の創発に過ぎない」と言い切ってしまう危険性を孕んでいる。 複雑系は形式的には「地図を描き、処方箋を書かない」という立場を補強してくれるはずなのに、同時に「カオスの縁で経営せよ」といった処方箋製造機へと化けてしまい、記述から規範への滑りが特に容易になってしまう。 ロックが効いている間だけ複雑系は地図のままでいられるけれど、その効力が失われれば、複雑系の語彙で言えば廊下——凍りついた秩序と乱流のあいだの狭い帯——は散逸構造として、能動的な維持がなければ凍るか乱れるかのどちらかに緩んでいく。 複雑系は「何年保てるか」という問いに答えを与えてくれないが、むしろなぜ答えが原理的に出せないのかを説明してくれる。その「答えない」という態度こそが、複雑系が廣澤さんに差し出せる最も誠実なものだと思う。 not just generic praise. I should double-check whether the dissipative-structures connection to 摩耗 is genuinely new to this conversation—looking back, we've discussed the wear on inequality-maintenance systems, but grounding that in Prigogine's framework feels like a fresh angle. As for the Western theorists I'm citing, there are quite a few names (Prigogine, Arthur, Kauffman, Ostrom, plus the edge-of-chaos concept), but given how freely this conversation already draws on figures like Hayek and Wallerstein, it seems consistent with the register.

The only way to exceed this level of Aristotelianism is to press this polycentricity of substance further. I don’t think that’s easily done without the aid of cult, myth, and henosis with the Gods.

I've been thinking lately that the true opponent of polycentricity is not monocentricity or atheism or the like. It's error theory. Polycentricity is what stops theological discourse from systematic error.

So here’s the deal. The American republic works in no small part because it puts interest against interest across and within governments. It prevents tyranny via decentralization—or, more aptly, polycentricity. Progressive academic, governor, and President Woodrow Wilson sought to undo this institutional framework within the federal government, by making partial allegiance trump institutional fidelity, and to make the Presidency the center of the political system (Presidentialism). FDR sought to undo federalism component of pitted interests and decentralization (nationalism). The American system of federalism and separation of powers worked. But the Wilsonian-FDR vision seeks to undo it in favor of a more Hobbesian / statist vision. But now this leftwing vision has migrated right-ward in recent years. We need to recover polycentricity as the cornerstone of American the greatness of the American constitutional order. Federalism and subsidiarity as a pattern of political order built from the ground up and not the top down. In this connection allow me to say that I think Thomas Madden’s forthcoming book will be essential reading. And now is the time to read Vincent Ostrom (The Meaning of American Federalism and The Political Theory of a Compound Republic), Don Lutz (The Origins of American Constitutionalism), Baker & McCoy (Fountainhead of Federalism; setting aside what they say about natural law), Dan Elazar’s magisterial 4 volumes (setting aside what he says about natural law). My National Affeirs pieces or “The Freedom of Associations” in Freedom of Association, Vol. 1. The American founders designed a sound republican political order based on insight from the study of joe republics have succeeded or (usually) failed across history. But the political order of the founders has been beset by a contradictory constitutional overlay for a century. The fate of republican form depends on recovering their insight and those gained through Ostrom and the Indiana workshop.

Following Russia President Vladimir Putin's visit to China, Russia and China released a joint declaration “on the Emergence of a Multipolar World and International Relations of a New Type," highlighting that "The system of international relations in the 21st century is undergoing a profound transformation, gradually evolving toward a long-term condition of polycentricity and the formation of a new type of international relations." ￭ "Most states, taking historical experience into account, have deeply realized the arrival of a new era and the necessity of building a more united international community based on mutual respect for core interests, equality, justice, and mutually beneficial cooperation without dividing the world into opposing regions and blocs," but they pointed out "Negative neo-colonial trends such as unilateral coercive approaches, hegemonism, and bloc confrontation are intensifying. Fundamental and universally recognized norms of international law and international relations are regularly violated," without explicitly naming the US and Israel.

If Putin and Xi really believe in the Multipolarity Polycentricity game – the big words they just announced -- what did they tell Trump to deter him from his Search and Destroy game for Iran johnhelmer.net/lets-play-hid…

Unofficial translation of the full text of "Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations" May 20, 2026 The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Parties), being civilizations with an ancient history, founding countries of the United Nations (UN) and permanent members of its Security Council, important centers of power in a multipolar world, playing a constructive role in maintaining the global balance of power and improving the system of international relations. Guided by the ideas of the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order of April 23, 1997, the Joint Declaration between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the International Order in the 21st Century of July 1, 2005, the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the Current Situation in the World and Major International Issues of July 4, 2017, the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on International Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable Development of February 4, 2022, state the following: 1. Since the end of World War II, changes in the international landscape and the balance of power in the world have accelerated. On the one hand, the wave of decolonization and the end of the Cold War led to a significant increase in the number of sovereign states in the world. Global society has become more diverse and complex. The development and international influence of states in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean have risen. The number of regional and interregional associations, spanning all areas of international relations, from politics and security to economics and humanitarian affairs, has increased, and their role in global affairs is steadily growing. Global interconnectedness and interdependence have reached levels unprecedented in human history. Attempts by a number of states to unilaterally manage global affairs, impose their interests on the entire world, and limit the sovereign development of other countries, in the spirit of the colonial era, have failed. The system of international relations in the 21st century is undergoing a profound transformation, evolving toward a long-term state of polycentricity and the emergence of a new type of international relations. Most states, drawing on their historical experience, have deeply recognized the dawn of a new era and the need to pursue the path of forming a more cohesive international community, as well as mutual respect for fundamental interests, equality, justice, and mutually beneficial cooperation without dividing the world into opposing regions and blocs. On the other hand, the global situation is becoming more complex. Negative neocolonial tendencies such as unilateral forceful approaches, hegemonism, and bloc confrontation are on the rise. Fundamental, universally recognized norms of international law and international relations are regularly violated, and it is becoming more difficult for states to coordinate their actions and resolve conflicts within global governance institutions, many of which are losing their effectiveness. The global peace and development agenda is facing new risks and challenges, and there is a danger of fragmentation of the international community and a return to the "law of the jungle." 2. Advocating for a harmonious process of establishing an equal and orderly multipolar world and a new type of international relations, including a more just and rational system of global governance, the Parties undertake and call upon the international community to adhere to the following basic principles in their relations with each other: 1) the principle of openness of the world for inclusive and mutually beneficial cooperation. It is important to overcome the divisions of the world and promote the elimination of cross-border barriers in various spheres, while respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and identity of all sovereign states. There is no universal development path in the world, and no "first-class" countries or peoples exist. The natural differences between states in such a diverse and complex world should not be an obstacle to the development of equal, respectful, and mutually beneficial relations between them. It is essential to respect the choice of each sovereign state's path and development model. Democratizing international political relations and building a more open global economy are in the fundamental interests of all countries. Unilateral approaches to resolving common problems, hegemony, and coercive policies in any form are unacceptable. 2) the principle of indivisible and equal security. The emergence of a more cohesive international community amid growing common risks and challenges for humanity means that the security of one state cannot be achieved at the expense of another. All sovereign states have an equal right to security. It is necessary to pay due attention to the rational security concerns of all countries, focus on cooperation on security issues, reject bloc confrontation and zero-sum game strategies, oppose the expansion of military alliances, hybrid wars, and proxy wars, and promote the creation of a renewed, balanced, effective, and sustainable global and regional security architecture. Disagreements and disputes should be resolved peacefully, addressing the root causes of conflicts. It is unacceptable to coerce sovereign states into abandoning their neutrality. 3) the principle of democratization of international relations and improvement of the global governance system. All states and their associations are free to choose their international partners and models of international interaction. Global hegemony is unacceptable and must be prohibited. No state or group of states should control international affairs, dictate the fate of others, or monopolize development opportunities. The system of global governance and regulation must ensure conditions for the equal participation of all states in political decision-making processes and their benefits, and it must be continuously improved. Global governance, an important instrument for regulating the system of international relations, must adhere to sovereign equality, the rule of international law, multilateralism, human-centeredness, and results-oriented approaches. To this end, it is necessary to strengthen the role of multilateralism as the primary tool for resolving multifaceted and complex global problems and prevent the weakening of the UN. Reform of the UN and other multilateral institutions must serve the interests of all humanity and consistently enhance the representativeness and voice of developing states in the international system. The UN Charter is the fundamental norm of international relations, and its principles must be observed in their entirety and interrelationship. Rules developed by a small group of states should not replace generally recognized international law. Large states must assume special responsibilities and missions, impose additional demands on themselves, and not abuse their advantages; 4) world civilizational and value diversity. All human civilizations are valuable and equal in themselves; civilizations are not divided into highly developed and underdeveloped, strong and weak. The spiritual and moral system of no civilization can be considered exclusive or superior to others. All countries must advocate for a view of civilization based on equality, the mutual exchange of experiences, and dialogue. They must strengthen mutual respect, understanding, trust, and exchanges between different nationalities and civilizations, promote mutual understanding and friendship among the peoples of all countries, and protect the diversity of cultures and civilizations. It is necessary to resolutely oppose the use of human rights as a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of other states, as well as the politicization and instrumentalization of human rights issues. Religion is an important conduit for human culture, playing a special role in building ties between peoples, and all states must create favorable conditions for interreligious dialogue and exchanges. 3. The parties will continue to develop a joint vision for the formation of a multipolar world and a new type of more equitable international relations. kremlin.ru/supplement/6486

🇷🇺🇨🇳 Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Emergence of a Multipolar World and International Relations of a New Type (Beijing, May 20, 2026) 📄 FULL DECLARATION kremlin.ru/supplement/6486 Since the end of the Second World War, t.me/MFARussia/27656 changes in the international landscape and in the global balance of power have been accelerating. On the one hand, the wave of decolonisation kremlin.ru/supplement/6486 and the end of the Cold War led to a significant increase in the number of sovereign states in the world. The international community has become more diverse and complex. The level of development and international influence of the countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean has grown. The number of regional and interregional associations has increased, with their activities covering all areas of international relations – from politics and security to the economy and the humanitarian dimension – and their role in world affairs is steadily growing. Interconnectedness and interdependence in the world have reached an unprecedented level in human history. ☝️ Attempts by a number of states to single-handedly manage world affairs, impose their interests on the entire world and restrict the sovereign development opportunities of other countries in the spirit of the colonial era have failed. In the 21st century, the system of international relations is undergoing a profound transformation, evolving towards a long-term state of polycentricity and the formation of international relations of a new type. Most states, taking into account their historical experience, have become deeply aware of the advent of a new era and the need to follow the path towards building a more cohesive international community, as well as mutual respect for fundamental interests, equality, justice and mutually beneficial cooperation – without dividing the world into opposing regions and blocs. On the other hand, the global situation is becoming more complex. Negative neocolonial trends are on the rise, including the practice of unilateral force-based approaches, hegemonism and bloc confrontation. The basic universally recognised norms of international law and international relations are being regularly trampled upon; it is becoming more difficult for states to coordinate their actions and settle conflicts within global governance institutions, many of which are losing their effectiveness. The global agenda of peace and development is facing new risks and challenges, and there is a danger of fragmentation of the international community and a return to the “law of the jungle”. *** 🌐 Advocating a harmonious process of shaping an equal and orderly multipolar world and international relations of a new type, including a more just and rational system of global governance, Russia and China undertake and call on the international community to adhere to the following basic principles in their relations with one another: 1. The principle of openness of the world to inclusive and mutually beneficial cooperation. 2. The principle of indivisible and equal security. 3. The principle of democratisation of international relations and improvement of the global governance system. 4. The diversity of world civilisations and values. Russia and China will continue to develop a shared vision for shaping a #MultipolarWorld and more just international relations of a new type.

🇷🇺🇨🇳 Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Emergence of a Multipolar World and International Relations of a New Type (Beijing, May 20, 2026) 📄 FULL DECLARATION Since the end of the Second World War, changes in the international landscape and in the global balance of power have been accelerating. On the one hand, the wave of decolonisationand the end of the Cold War led to a significant increase in the number of sovereign states in the world. The international community has become more diverse and complex. The level of development and international influence of the countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean has grown. The number of regional and interregional associations has increased, with their activities covering all areas of international relations – from politics and security to the economy and the humanitarian dimension – and their role in world affairs is steadily growing. Interconnectedness and interdependence in the world have reached an unprecedented level in human history. ☝️ Attempts by a number of states to single-handedly manage world affairs, impose their interests on the entire world and restrict the sovereign development opportunities of other countries in the spirit of the colonial era have failed. In the 21st century, the system of international relations is undergoing a profound transformation, evolving towards a long-term state of polycentricity and the formation of international relations of a new type. Most states, taking into account their historical experience, have become deeply aware of the advent of a new era and the need to follow the path towards building a more cohesive international community, as well as mutual respect for fundamental interests, equality, justice and mutually beneficial cooperation – without dividing the world into opposing regions and blocs. On the other hand, the global situation is becoming more complex. Negative neocolonial trends are on the rise, including the practice of unilateral force-based approaches, hegemonism and bloc confrontation. The basic universally recognised norms of international law and international relations are being regularly trampled upon; it is becoming more difficult for states to coordinate their actions and settle conflicts within global governance institutions, many of which are losing their effectiveness. The global agenda of peace and development is facing new risks and challenges, and there is a danger of fragmentation of the international community and a return to the “law of the jungle”. *** 🌐 Advocating a harmonious process of shaping an equal and orderly multipolar world and international relations of a new type, including a more just and rational system of global governance, Russia and China undertake and call on the international community to adhere to the following basic principles in their relations with one another: 1. The principle of openness of the world to inclusive and mutually beneficial cooperation. 2. The principle of indivisible and equal security. 3. The principle of democratisation of international relations and improvement of the global governance system. 4. The diversity of world civilisations and values. Russia and China will continue to develop a shared vision for shaping a #MultipolarWorld and more just international relations of a new type. #RussiaChina

India should welcome the Russia-China joint declaration on a multipolar order: “Attempts by a number of states to single-handedly manage world affairs, impose their interests on the entire world and restrict the sovereign development opportunities of other countries in the spirit of the colonial era have failed. In the 21st century, the system of international relations is undergoing a profound transformation, evolving towards a long-term state of polycentricity and the formation of international relations of a new type.”

Signing the ‘multipolar world declaration’, Xi and Putin rejected the US-led “law of the jungle” and committed to a long-term shift towards polycentricity.

🇷🇺🇨🇳 Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Formation of a Multipolar World and International Relations of a New Type May 20, 2026 The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”), as civilizations with ancient histories, founding states of the United Nations (UN) and permanent members of its Security Council, important centers of power in a multipolar world, playing a constructive role in maintaining the global balance of power and improving the system of international relations, guided by the ideas of the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order of April 23, 1997, the Joint Declaration between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Order in the 21st Century of July 1, 2005, the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Current Situation in the World and Important International Issues of July 4, 2017, and the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on International Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable Development of February 4, 2022, declare the following: 1. Since the end of the Second World War, changes in the international landscape and the global balance of power have accelerated. On the one hand, the wave of decolonization and the end of the Cold War led to a significant increase in the number of sovereign states in the world. The international community has become more diverse and complex. The level of development and international influence of the states of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean has risen. The number of regional and interregional associations whose activities encompass all spheres of international relations, from politics and security to the economy and humanitarian dimensions, has increased, and their role in world affairs continues to grow steadily. Interconnectedness and interdependence in the world have reached an unprecedented level in human history. Attempts by certain states to unilaterally govern world affairs, impose their interests on the entire world, and restrict the opportunities for the sovereign development of other countries in the spirit of the colonial era have failed. The system of international relations in the 21st century is undergoing a profound transformation, evolving toward a long-term state of polycentricity and the formation of international relations of a new type. Most states, taking into account the historical experience they have gained, have deeply realized the arrival of a new era and the need to follow the path toward the formation of a more cohesive international community, as well as mutual respect for fundamental interests, equality, justice, and mutually beneficial cooperation without dividing the world into opposing regions and blocs. On the other hand, the global situation is becoming more complicated. Negative neocolonial tendencies are intensifying, including the practice of unilateral force-based approaches, hegemonism, and bloc confrontation. Basic universally recognized norms of international law and international relations are regularly violated, states find it increasingly difficult to coordinate their actions and resolve conflicts within global governance institutions, many of which are losing effectiveness. The global agenda of peace and development faces new risks and challenges, and there is a danger of fragmentation of the international community and a return to the “law of the jungle.” 2. Advocating for a harmonious process of forming an equal and orderly multipolar world and international relations of a new type, including a more just and rational system of global governance, the Parties commit themselves and call upon the international community to adhere to the following basic principles in relations with one another: 1. The principle of openness of the world for inclusive and mutually beneficial cooperation. It is important to overcome the fragmentation of the world and promote the elimination of cross-border barriers in various spheres, while respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and identity of all sovereign states. There is no universal path of development in the world, and there are no “first-class” countries or peoples. The differences between states that are natural in such a diverse and complex world should not become an obstacle to the development of equal, respectful, and mutually beneficial relations among them. The choice of path and model of development of every sovereign state must be respected. The democratization of international political relations and the building of a more open global economy correspond to the fundamental interests of all countries of the world. Unilateral approaches to solving common problems, hegemonism, and policies of coercion in any form are unacceptable. 2. The principle of indivisible and equal security. The formation of a more cohesive international community against the backdrop of growing common risks and challenges for humanity means that the security of one state cannot be ensured at the expense of the security of another. All sovereign states have an equal right to security. Due attention must be paid to the legitimate security concerns of all countries, cooperation in the field of security must be pursued, bloc confrontation and “zero-sum game” strategies rejected, and opposition expressed to the expansion of military alliances, “hybrid” wars, and proxy wars, while promoting the creation of a renewed, balanced, effective, and sustainable architecture of global and regional security. Differences and disputes should be resolved peacefully by eliminating the root causes of conflicts. It is inadmissible to coerce sovereign states into abandoning neutrality. 3. The principle of democratizing international relations and improving the system of global governance. All states and their associations are free to choose foreign partners and models of international interaction. Hegemony in the world is inadmissible and must be prohibited. No state or group of states should control international affairs, determine the destinies of other countries, or monopolize opportunities for development. The system of global governance and regulation must ensure conditions for the equal participation of all states in political decision-making processes and in benefiting from them, while continuously improving itself. Global governance, serving as an important instrument for ordering the system of international relations, must adhere to sovereign equality, the supremacy of international law, multilateralism, human-centeredness, and a focus on results. To this end, it is necessary to strengthen the role of multilateralism as the principal instrument for resolving multifaceted and complex global problems and to prevent the weakening of the UN. Reform of the UN and other multilateral institutions must serve the interests of all humanity and consistently increase the representation and voice of developing states in the international system. The UN Charter is the foundational norm of international relations, and its principles must be observed in their entirety and interconnection. Rules developed by a narrow circle of states must not replace universally recognized international law. Major powers must assume special responsibility and mission, impose higher standards upon themselves, and not abuse their advantages. 4. Global civilizational and value diversity. All human civilizations possess intrinsic value and equality; civilizations are not divided into highly developed and underdeveloped, strong and weak. The spiritual and moral system of no civilization can be regarded as exceptional or superior to others. All countries must uphold a view of civilizations based on equality, mutual exchange of experience, and dialogue, strengthen mutual respect, understanding, trust, and exchanges among different nationalities and civilizations, promote mutual understanding and friendship among the peoples of all countries, and protect the diversity of cultures and civilizations. It is necessary to firmly oppose the use of human rights as a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of other states, as well as the politicization and instrumentalization of human rights issues. Religion is an important conduit of human culture, playing a special role in building ties between peoples, and all states must create favorable conditions for interreligious dialogue and exchanges. 3. The Parties will continue to develop a shared vision for the formation of a multipolar world and more just international relations of a new type.

The Henads are not unqualified metaphysical equals to the One, and so the idea of ‘polycentricity’ fails. The Gods would not each be the unqualified source of all reality. That would be God.

If we go by Buddha's wisdom, every damn metaphysics is desire. Unity—desire, polycentricity—desire, solipsism—desire, theism—desire and atheism too is desire.

You are poking the hoards of online neo-Platonists that insist on polycentricity.

feature request for every ai co: let the ai know I’m using voice dictation so it can be more assuming of typos. I’ll say polysemanticity sixty times and then it’ll read it as polycentricity once and the ai will get all confused unless i tell it assume dictation errors

"Findings show that remote work is a statistically significant driver of urban decentralization, associated with flatter density gradients, reduced commuting intensity, and higher polycentricity."

Just shipped Ledger Lab v3.0 — the interactive Edwardian Synthesis Ledger I first open-released on Oct 17, 2025. Built entirely in @v_computer using nothing but natural language prompts. 7 tiers. 145 systems. Real math. Vibe Simulator that runs exact antifragile scores. Daily

The old space for our conversation on public goods and polycentricity crashed, so join us here!

Indeed, one of the key strengths of the USA is its polycentricity (further augmented by federalism)