Agree with this, with one angle to add. India's bind these years traces back to one thing: it staked its whole strategy on an assumption that is now failing, that the US will stay dominant, so the safest move is to line up behind the strongest power. The tariffs, the Russian oil, Hormuz, access to advanced AI models, these look like scattered frictions, but they are symptoms of that one premise coming loose.
The harder part is this: an America anxious about its own position increasingly treats partners as a resource for solving its problems, with little owed in return. And because India has few real alternatives, that dependence becomes leverage in Washington's hands.
The deepest obstacle is cognitive. For the sake of elite pride, India's planners keep refusing the one adjustment that matters, taking seriously the possibility that China comes out ahead in the long run, and building that into their thinking rather than treating it as something unsayable. Admitting it costs nothing. Failing to see it is the real danger.
To put it bluntly, since 2017, India has chosen the worst of the available paths.
By aligning itself with the US, it has obtained almost none of the resources that would strengthen its strategic autonomy and has instead grown more dependent.
By confronting China, it has lost manufacturing capital and technology that could once have been acquired effortlessly. Counter-intuitively, these flows of capital and technology—though they appeared to deepen dependence—were in fact the essential foundation for Atmanirbhar Bharat.
India now finds itself stranded between the two powers and exposed as collateral damage, as Marco Rubio puts it, in their strategic contest.
This has left it vulnerable to American pressure on multiple fronts—tariffs, trade in Russian oil, killings in the Strait of Hormuz, and access to advanced AI models. Washington did all the above with little concern for India’s basic dignity or core interests.
The roots of this grand misjudgement lie in India’s long-held belief that the US would always remain dominant and that the safest course was therefore to stand with the strong. That assumption is now being questioned even inside the Trump administration, throwing India’s strategic planning into disarray and leaving it without credible contingency plans.
Three uncomfortable realities have become clear: 1) an America gripped by anxiety is unlikely to offer its partners meaningful support; it is rather more inclined to treat partners as expendable assets to be drawn upon when needed. Yes, India is simply seen as the bloodbag.
2) The path dependence created by long-term reliance on American financial systems, software ecosystems and geopolitical arrangements has become a potent instrument of leverage precisely because India has few realistic alternatives.
3) for reasons of elite izzatl and face-saving, Indian policymakers have so far refused to undertake the necessary recognitive rerouting—above all, to seriously contemplate the possibility that China may be prevailing in the broader contest and to adjust its choices accordingly.