You can’t take these pro third world morons seriously anymore. Their analysis sucks, and is clouded by extreme bias. Mute, unfollow, do what you need to do. But it’s clear who has won and who has lost.
1. Recurring Propeller Shaft and Coupling Failures (The Most Prominent Problem)
Both UK carriers have suffered serious issues with their propeller shaft couplings and alignments, often traced to construction-era misalignment or component installation problems (not officially deemed a full class-wide design flaw, but recurring enough to question build quality).
HMS Prince of Wales (2022): Shortly after departing Portsmouth for U.S. exercises, the starboard shaft coupling failed, causing significant damage to the shaft, propeller, and rudder. It required nine months of dry-dock repairs in Rosyth, Scotland; a similar issue was later found on the port shaft and fixed preemptively.
HMS Queen Elizabeth (2024): Routine pre-sailing checks revealed a starboard shaft coupling problem, forcing cancellation of its role in NATO’s major Exercise Steadfast Defender. This led to an extended docking and certification period in Rosyth (starting around mid-2024), which as of March 2026 was reported to be several months behind schedule, delaying its return to service.
These breakdowns have repeatedly disrupted deployments, with one carrier often covering for the other while it undergoes lengthy (and expensive) repairs.
2. Other Mechanical and Systems Reliability Issues
Early incidents included flooding: HMS Prince of Wales suffered major engine-room flooding in 2020 from a burst fire main, damaging electrical systems.
Leaks, fires, vibrations, and plumbing problems have also been reported. A notable example is “Showergate” in 2025, where hundreds of sailors on HMS Queen Elizabeth went nearly 170 days without reliable hot showers due to a faulty hot-water system and parts delays while the ship was in port for maintenance.
These have affected crew welfare and highlighted broader maintenance challenges on a complex new class of ships.
3. Extended Maintenance Downtime and Low Operational Availability
Both ships have spent disproportionate time in repairs or refit (e.g., Prince of Wales reportedly spent about a third of its early life in dock by 2023). This has meant the Royal Navy has often operated with only one (or zero) carrier available.
As of March 2026, HMS Prince of Wales was on heightened 5-day readiness notice amid Middle East tensions (and had recently completed an Indo-Pacific deployment), but HMS Queen Elizabeth remained in delayed overhaul.
Full Carrier Strike Group (CSG) operations require escorts, logistics ships, and air wing support that are also stretched thin.
4. F-35B Air Wing and Integration Challenges
The carriers rely on STOVL (short take-off and vertical landing) F-35B jets, but the UK fleet has faced chronic issues: spares shortages, trained maintainer/pilot shortfalls, and weapons integration delays.
A 2025 National Audit Office review found only about one-third of UK F-35s fully mission-capable (versus targets), limiting the effective air wing.
The STOVL design (ski-jump ramp, no catapults) also precludes carrier-based AWACS or electronic warfare aircraft, reducing situational awareness in contested environments.
5. Broader Operational and Strategic Concerns
Support and crewing shortages: Limited escort ships (e.g., Type 45 destroyers often in refit), only one aging solid stores ship for logistics, and personnel gaps make sustaining full CSG deployments difficult and expensive.
But they have working toilets and laundry