IncreaseChlorineLevel()
That function was the core of ZionSiphon - OT malware aimed at Israeli water treatment and desalination plants, detailed in Darktrace's April 16, 2026 analysis. It appended Chlorine_Dose=10, Chlorine_Pump=ON, Chlorine_Flow=MAX, Chlorine_Valve=OPEN, RO_Pressure=80 to target config files, and wrote 100 directly to the Chlorine_Dose Modbus register.
Target validation used Base64-obfuscated Israeli IPv4 ranges - 2.52.0.0/14, 79.176.0.0/13, 212.150.0.0/16 - XORed against a key of 5 derived from "Israel". Secondary checks probed for plant names like Mekorot, Sorek, Hadera; processes DesalPLC or ChlorineCtrl; and C:\DesalConfig.ini.
Network discovery scanned Modbus on 502, DNP3 on 20000, S7comm on 102. Only Modbus was implemented beyond stubs.
It spread via USB by copying itself as a hidden svchost.exe with malicious .lnk shortcuts, persisting in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run as SystemHealthCheck.
Then the whole operation collapsed on an encoding mismatch. The stored tag for the IP ranges did not match the expected XOR output of "Israel". IsTargetCountry() returned false and the binary self-destructed.
Base64 strings decoded from the binary: "In support of our brothers in Iran, Palestine, and Yemen against Zionist aggression. I am '0xICS'" and "Poisoning the population of Tel Aviv and Haifa".
One wrong XOR tag kept the poison out of the water supply.