Some napkin math on $GLXY. It's market cap is around $12B. $GLXY has three core businesses: > its crypto balance sheet, currently around $3-4b; > its crypto Investment Banking type business; > its data centre business. Essentially, $GLXY already has 800MW approved and leased to $CRWV and has another 800MW approved (@novogratz said we'll learn of the tenant by July hopefully). If you apply the same margins as their $CRWV deal, that is 2.4B in revenue and 2.16B in EBITDA (90% EBITDA margins). Say you slap a 15x P/ EBITDA, that's $32B on its data centre business alone. Say 1.6GW comes online 2028? So since market is forward looking, that's a FY 2027 price. It also seems very likely that $GLXY can have 3.5GW come fully online by 2031/2032. Applying the same metrics, that's $5.25b in revenue and 4.725b in EBITDA in 2031/2032 just from the data centre business alone. At15x P/EBITDA that's $70b ($170 per share) in 7 years. It's crypto IB business is another beast altogether, but I think it can conservatively be valued at $5B (bull $20B). Conservatively, $GLXY should at least be $5B (IB Business), $30B (data centre, accounting also for 1.9GW more in study), and $3B crypto balance sheet. That adds up to $38B. $GLXY is trading at $12B now. I am long $GLXY.

"If I'm sitting in Strategy's c-suite, I now know I can acquire Bitcoin cheaper if I sell every once in a while and spook the market when I do it" Dave on why Strategy will keep selling Bitcoin to drive the price down "They're gonna do it again and again and again until the market is fully inoculated against it. You can't do that kind of legal manipulation more than a few times before people catch on that they're gonna get their faces ripped off by shorting against it" "I learned something and they learned something last week. They probably also regret paying back the convert, but that's a different thing"

90% chance that Strategy has bought BTC last week according to Polymarket...

Only one scenario saves bitcoin:native and $MSTR in the short-term. Saylor has to come out and say (via Monday's 8K, or next Monday's 8K): "I sold $4 bn of MSTR and BTC... we now have 2.5 years before we have to raise money again... dividends are covered for 2 years, debt doesn't mature til sept 2028 (puttable in 2027) and that's easy to refinance via more converts". If he does that, the market rips, and might even rip 20-30%. It once again makes MSTR uninteresting for years, but that's a good thing. STRC probably goes back close to $100, but he won't be able to sell more. And while capital markets might be closed to MSTR for awhile, it at least buys a ton of time, and in that time who knows what other catalysts might pop up. He should have done this last week instead of that misguided $2.5mm teaser sale. If he doesn't, and he continues to just wait it out (only has 5 months), or he sells tiny amounts as he goes (just enough to pay each monthly dividend), this selling won't stop

i'm not in Saylor's inner circle, but this $MSTR story has gotten so out of hand, my only guess is this: - MSTR could have sat and done nothing before they started pumping out $billons of prefs... it would have made MSTR boring (little buys, no sells), but it would have been stable x.com/jdorman81/status/19959… - But the push into these prefs was based on him clearly thinking $BTC was about to moon — not sure what he saw to think that (4 year cycle, flows, ???) but that's the only reason to take that sort of miscalculated risk to screw up his balance sheet so badly -- he must have thought BTC was about to fly and he could easily pay the pref dividends with future BTC sales. - Then BTC started falling, and the market got spooked because the $15 bn in prefs have a $1.5 bn/year annual dividend, so he raised $2 bn in cash via stock just to alleviate any near-term default concerns — that bought him almost 2 years of runway to pay dividends. Smart move At that point, he could have chilled for a little, and even though he now has every stakeholder pinned against each other, there was at least no near term risk x.com/jdorman81/status/20342… - But then for some unknown reason, he decides to take that cash buffer and buyback 2029 maturity bonds instead of using it to fund the annual dividends (at a discount, so it's at least mildly accretive to MSTR). This is a baffling decision for a company with cash flow problems. Why pay off 0% coupon debt with the only cash you have? The only bull case is that underestimating Saylor's capital markets chicanery has been a losing proposition for years. Maybe there was a plan? That plan may just be selling BTC, which he will have to do eventually, but if he does this while BTC is in a death spriral it's going to crush BTC and MSTR. So again, why buyback the debt now and force your hand sooner than you have to? Maybe he is going to refinance those converts with new longer-dated converts? He has sworn off converts, so I doubt it, but that would at least logically make sense. But TLDR -- this is the first time that MSTR, BTC and Pref holders are really in bind. Someone is going to lose badly here, and it will happen in the next 4 months.

Don't take my word for it. Take @Polymarket 's. There is only one thing a prediction market actually sells. Not odds, not liquidity, not volume. Those are commodities. The product is a single promise: that once your capital is committed, the question you bet on cannot be quietly rewritten underneath you. Everything else is built on top of that promise, and when it breaks, nothing else the platform offers means anything. @Polymarket is about to break it on one of the largest disputed market of its year, a contract that has now traded roughly $292 million and is still climbing, and it is doing so in direct contradiction of its own published rules. The facts are not in dispute. The market asked one event-based question: “MicroStrategy sells any Bitcoin by May 31, 2026?” The rules resolve it YES if Strategy sold any bitcoin by 11:59 PM ET on that date, and they name the primary resolution source in plain text: information from MSTR. This was never a question about disclosure timing or filing schedules. It asked whether an event happened. It happened. Strategy’s own 8-K reports 32 BTC sold between May 26 and May 31, presented “as of May 31, 2026, 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time,” squarely inside the window. That is not a rumor, an inference, or a hostile reading. It is the exact primary source @Polymarket chose, confirming the exact event the market was written to track. Under the rules as written, this resolves YES. So how does it resolve NO? Only by rewriting the question after the outcome was already known. After the deadline had passed, after the filing was public, and while the market was still open, @Polymarket appended an “Additional context” note that quietly converted “did Strategy SELL by May 31” into “was the sale ANNOUNCED by May 31.” That condition appears nowhere in the original rules. It surfaced only after the outcome was already public. And understand who did that. @Polymarket is not a bystander to this outcome. It proposed the “No” resolution, and it authored the very context now being used to defend it. This is not a neutral referee reporting what token holders decided. It is the house writing new rules in the middle of the hand. Here is the problem, in their own words. @Polymarket’s documentation states that a clarification “cannot change the fundamental intent of the question.” That is not my standard. It is theirs. Turning an event-based question into an announcement-based one is the textbook example of changing the fundamental intent. The rule exists specifically to stop this maneuver. By their own published standard, this is a breach. There is no honest “No” reading that survives the design, either. Strategy reports its bitcoin activity on a weekly cadence, usually on Mondays. A sale executed in the final days of any month can never be publicly confirmed before a month-end deadline. So a “No” here is not a finding about whether Strategy sold. It is a wager on SEC filing calendars, which is not the question anyone was offered when they put their money down. This is where integrity stops being an abstraction. A platform’s character is never revealed when following its own rules is free. It is revealed when following them is expensive, when the rules point one way and the largest holders of @UMAprotocol’s voting tokens point the other. Independent reporting has already documented how concentrated that voting power is, and how a system that punishes minority voters quietly pushes everyone toward whatever the biggest wallets want, regardless of what actually happened. If that machinery is allowed to override a platform’s own written rule and its own chosen source, the resolution process is not arbitration. It is theater with a settlement layer. Anyone who takes @Polymarket’s mainstream ambitions seriously should sit with this. A platform pursuing the legitimacy that regulators like @CFTC exist to confer cannot, in the same breath, demonstrate that its outcomes answer to token weight rather than to its own rulebook. If it will rewrite its own rule to steer a market approaching $300 million, the only fair question is what any registration it holds or seeks is actually meant to guarantee. Integrity rules abandoned the moment they become inconvenient are not integrity. They are marketing. There is a clean precedent for doing the right thing. @Polymarket has overruled its own oracle before and refunded the affected side when an outcome was indefensible. That option is on the table right now. The event happened inside the window. The primary source confirms it. The original rules require YES. So the platform faces a choice it cannot escape, and both doors are open to the public. Resolve it YES, and the rulebook means something. Resolve it NO, and you will have answered, permanently and on the record, that your rules hold only until they cost you. On a market that has moved nearly $300 million, that single decision is the most honest disclosure @Polymarket will ever make about its own integrity. $MSTR #Polymarket #PredictionMarkets #DeFi