不沾砂糖是要怎麼吃？🤨

【ACE8キャラクター紹介③】 ターシャ・セヴェルスカヤ/CV：安済知佳 ジョーカー隊3番機。階級は少尉。ユークトバニアのアクロバット飛行チーム「ズヴェズダ」のスターパイロット。エンデュランスでの広報映像撮影中に戦争に巻き込まれ、そのまま空母内に留まることとなった。 #ACECOMBAT ＃ACE8

😂

大可取消歸化入藉制度，只保留永住路徑。為甚麼不呢？

哈曼大人

只給30天全家滾蛋是挺殘酷的，賣家當時間都不夠，起碼該給90天。其他就沒甚麼好說的，人家國家要如何處理外人在留資格是他們的權限。

Trump and sons to be ‘forever’ exempt from tax audits ft.trib.al/ca4OS8P

這看不起廣東不是

Modern London 😂😂😂

───────────── #魔法使いの夜 キャラクタービジュアル解禁 ───────────── 蒼崎青子（CV.#戸松遥） 現代に生きる魔法使い。 ただし見習い。 高校入学から魔術師として 祖父の遺産を継ぐ事に。 #TYPEMOON #ufotable

◤￣￣￣￣￣￣￣￣￣￣￣￣￣￣￣￣￣￣◥ 『機動戦士ガンダムSEED FREEDOM ZERO』 　　　　 　🎬劇場公開決定🎬 ◣＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿◢ 『#SEEDFREEDOM』の前日譚―― 劇場公開が決定。 『機動戦士ガンダム #SEEDFREEDOMZERO』の詳細は 続報をお待ちください。

連意粉卷帶都要不上色了。看是對政府的抗議多於真的能省油墨

有實物發表了。這難怪會被日本政府請喝茶呀，完全是擺爛式抗議不是？

得Anima係好老母

黑白別注版？

AI 虚拟女友一个月赚4.3万美金！ 我今天看到这个帖子，直接看呆了。 一个21岁的 Austin 大学生，用 AI 造了一个叫 Maya 的 OnlyFans 账号，第一个月就赚了4.3万美元。 问题是——照片里那个女孩，根本不存在。 Maya 22岁，UCF 心理学辍学生，1247个付费订阅者，单月最高一个粉丝就刷了1847美元。 她没有拍视频，没有真人打字，所有消息都是 Claude Code 写的，所有照片是 Flux 生成的，声音是 ElevenLabs 合成的。整个 Maya 只是他 MacBook 里四个 .md 文件。 以前造一个 AI 虚拟网红要花半年甚至一年半，现在只需要4个星期，下一个可能就是一个周末。 作者详细写了 Maya 的四个文件： persona.md 写她完整的人设、背景、喜好； voice.md 锁声音风格； flux.md 固定长相和拍摄风格； brain.md 记录每个订阅者的记忆和互动历史。 Claude Code 每次回复前都会读这四个文件，从不崩人设，也从不忘记粉丝说过什么。 真的很感慨，技术栈已经简单到可怕的地步。 以前的 Aitana López 花了18个月，现在 Maya 4周就跑通了。 这已经不是科幻，而是任何一个有 laptop 的人都能复制的路径——从 OnlyFans 到 Instagram、TikTok、Twitch，随便哪个平台都能套。 AI 让“虚拟人”成本降到了几乎为零，剩下的唯一瓶颈，是你有没有那个 taste 去决定这个虚拟人要成为什么样子。

‼️🚨 BREAKING: An AI found a Linux kernel zero-day that roots every distribution since 2017. The exploit fits in 732 bytes of Python. Patch your kernel ASAP. The vulnerability is CVE-2026-31431, nicknamed "Copy Fail," disclosed today by Theori. It has been sitting quietly in the Linux kernel for nine years. Most Linux privilege-escalation bugs are picky. They need a precise timing window (a "race"), or specific kernel addresses leaked from somewhere, or careful tuning per distribution. Copy Fail needs none of that. It is a straight-line logic mistake that works on the first try, every time, on every mainstream Linux box. The attacker just needs a normal user account on the machine. From there, the script asks the kernel to do some encryption work, abuses how that work is wired up, and ends up writing 4 bytes into a memory area called the "page cache" (Linux's high-speed copy of files in RAM). Those 4 bytes can be aimed at any program the system trusts, like /usr/bin/su, the shortcut to becoming root. Result: the next time anyone runs that program, it lets the attacker in as root. What should worry most: the corruption never touches the file on disk. It only exists in Linux's in-memory copy of that file. If you imaged the hard drive afterwards, the on-disk file would match the official package hash exactly. Reboot the machine, or just put it under memory pressure (any normal system load that needs the RAM), and the cached copy reloads fresh from disk. Containers do not help either. The page cache is shared across the whole host, so a process inside a container can use this bug to compromise the underlying server and reach into other tenants. The original sin was a 2017 "in-place optimization" in a kernel crypto module called algif_aead. It was meant to make encryption slightly faster. The change broke a critical safety assumption, and nobody noticed for nine years. That bug then rode every kernel update from 2017 to today. This vulnerability affects the following: 🔴 Shared servers (dev boxes, jump hosts, build servers): any user becomes root 🔴 Kubernetes and container clusters: one compromised pod escapes to the host 🔴 CI runners (GitHub Actions, GitLab, Jenkins): a malicious pull request becomes root on the runner 🔴 Cloud platforms running user code (notebooks, agent sandboxes, serverless functions): a tenant becomes host root Timeline: 🔴 March 23, 2026: reported to the Linux kernel security team 🔴 April 1: patch committed to mainline (commit a664bf3d603d) 🔴 April 22: CVE assigned 🔴 April 29: public disclosure Mitigation: update your kernel to a build that includes mainline commit a664bf3d603d. If you cannot patch immediately, turn off the vulnerable module: echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf rmmod algif_aead 2>/dev/null || true For environments that run untrusted code (containers, sandboxes, CI runners), block access to the kernel's AF_ALG crypto interface entirely, even after patching. Almost nothing legitimate needs it, and blocking it shuts the door on this whole class of bug...

ハッキング