>be Dennett
>"Consciousness, Socrates, is but an illusion."
>Socrates: An illusion, you say? And an illusion is a thing that seems other than it is?
>"It seems to be so, Socrates."
>Socrates: And that which seems—does it not seem to someone?
>"It must, I suppose."
>Socrates: And this seeming, this appearing-to-one, what shall we call it?
>"I had thought to call it mere representation."
>Socrates: Yet when the wine seems sweet, is there not something it is like to taste it?
>"There appears to be, yes."
>Socrates: Then the appearing itself is real, whatever lies behind it?
>"It would seem that it is, Socrates."
>Socrates: But the appearing-to-one was the very thing we named experience.
>"...That is evident."
>Socrates: So in calling experience an illusion, you have not banished it, you have only granted it a new name.
>"It seems I have, Socrates."
>Socrates: Then tell me truly: of what is consciousness the illusion, if the illusion is already consciousness?
>"..."
>Socrates: Speak, friend.
>"It seems to be so, Socrates."
>mfw the seeming was the cope all along
Could consciousness be an illusion?