Why is Economic Security at the center of France’s G7 Agenda?
Join Director of International Studies at @i_montaigne@mtdtl and I as we discuss the future of economic security, critical minerals, and Europe-China relations on the Deep Dish podcast. brnw.ch/21x3gNZ
Reading this excellent piece by Chris Buckley on Xi’s search for “absolute loyalty,” it’s hard not to think the PLA’s new ideological rectification campaign could actually aggravate the very problem of “divided hearts” Xi believes plagues the military.
nytimes.com/2026/05/09/world…
🇮🇳💻 Three questions for Shyam Krishnakumar: India’s rise in semiconductors
Dr. @shyamkrishnak1, co-founder of the Pranava Institute, shares his insights ⬇️
bit.ly/4sXD1GS
🇨🇳 A new economic security consensus ? Semiconductor nationalism in China and the United States, and Europe’s choices
Read our Director of International Studies @mtdtl and Pierre Sel's latest analysis here ⬇️
bit.ly/4sfQY2I
🇪🇺🇨🇳 Semi-conducteurs et préférence européenne : leçons sino-américaines
Retrouvez l'analyse de notre directeur des Études internationales @mtdtl et de notre expert associé Pierre Sel ici ⬇️
bit.ly/4lvjGtT
🇫🇷 [Decoding France] - Nouvelle-Calédonie : test pour la stratégie de sécurité indopacifique de la France
Retrouvez l'analyse de notre directeur des études internationales @mtdtl et de Florian Ballier ici ⬇️
bit.ly/4srOM8e
📣 NOUVELLE PUBLICATION 🚨
Nous publions aujourd’hui une note d’enjeux de notre expert @FGodement "E‑commerce chinois : Shein, l’arbre qui cache la forêt".
Derrière le cas Shein, se cache un modèle d'e-commerce beaucoup plus vaste et en pleine expansion. #THREAD ⬇️
A Maduro-style Chinese special operation would carry a high risk of tactical failure due to Taiwan’s defenses, and an even greater risk of strategic disaster given Taiwan’s political dynamics.
@i_montaigneENinstitutmontaigne.org/en/exp…
China is stepping up antifascist rhetoric, military pressure, and legal instruments to lay the groundwork to legitimize future “targeted actions", whether military in nature or akin to law enforcement operations.
This is likely to continue intensifying in 2026/2027, and Beijing is unlikely to reconsider its strategy unless there is an electoral demonstration in Taiwan that the use of antifascism and targeted extraterritorial actions is counterproductive.
🇯🇵🇹🇼 "Japon-Taiwan : la mobilisation chinoise du registre "antifasciste"". Découvrez l'analyse de notre directeur des études internationales @mtdtl. ⬇️
bit.ly/4bl9aCu
Une analyse du rôle croissant de la rhétorique "antifasciste" dans la politique taiwanaise de la Chine - la construction d'un récit pour convaincre de la légitimité, voire de la légalité, du recours à des formes de violence. @i_montaigneinstitutmontaigne.org/expres…
China's angry statement at Trump's Venezuela strike can't all be about international law.
What else might it be unhappy about?
Maybe Beijing doesn't like that:
1: Trump now 'runs' Venezuela's oil, at a time when China needs an alternative to Iranian oil
2: Chinese radars didn't work against incoming US missiles
3: A Chinese delegation had just met Maduro.
"Whatever assurances Beijing gave in that meeting had a remarkably short lifespan," @michaelsobolik says
My take: Trump's Venezuela strike will likely change China's regional calculations
asia.nikkei.com/spotlight/tr…
China apparently has a working prototype of an EUV lithography machine.
- Secret lab in Shenzhen
- Team of former ASML engineers
- Reverse-engineered parts
- Yet to produce working chips
- Deep involvement by Huawei
- Aiming for use by 2028-2030
reuters.com/world/china/how-…
📢 New publication! We’re pleased to share the second CHIPDIPLO policy paper: “Autonomy or Indispensability? Identifying the EU’s Semiconductor Lodestar”.
CHIPDIPLO is a project led by Institut Montaigne with @CEIAS_eu, @CSDS_Brussels, @EU_ISS, and supported by the EU. #Thread