Elbridge Colbyās Beijing Mission: How an Overstretched Empire Tries to Buy Time from China
SCMP
scmp.com/news/china/military⦠reports that the Pentagon plans to send a highālevel delegation to Beijing āwithin weeks,ā led by Elbridge Colby, US Undersecretary of WAR for policy and key architect of the 2026 US National Defense Strategy. Officially, the purpose is technical: prepare arrangements for Defence Secretary Pete Hegsethās followāon visit, after he broke an eightāyear gap as the first US defence chief to set foot in China and the first to accompany a sitting president on a state visit since normalisation in the 1970's
On the surface, this looks like āstabilizationā and āguardrailsā after several tense years in the Western Pacific. But if you read this move alongside Wess Mitchellās Strategic Sequencing, Revisitedāpublished at Colbyās own Marathon Initiative Think Tankāplus the 2026 NDS, a different picture emerges
Most likely Colbyās mission is not a sign of genuine dĆ©tente. Itās a tactical pause by an overstretched hegemon that needs China to sit still while Washington struggles with Russia, Iran and a stillāunfinished alliance buildāup in Asia
The Real Problem in Washington: Too Many Fronts, Not Enough Power
Mitchellās sequencing paper admits in unusually blunt language that the US cannot handle simultaneous highāintensity confrontations with China, Russia and Iran. The American defence industrial base is overtaxed, munitions are limited, and political will is finite. His answer is a neat academic formula: sequence the enemies
The ideal script looks like this:
Engineer a āstrategic defeatā for Russia in Ukraine on a faster timeline than Chinaās Taiwan window
Force Europe to take over more of its own defence so US forces and money can shift to Asia
Use that breathing space to rebuild the US defence industrial base and harden the alliance system in the IndoāPacific
Only then confront China in a more decisive manner over Taiwan and regional order
The 2026 NDSāwhere Colbyās fingerprints are obviousāmirrors this logic. It openly ranks threats and theatres: China is the āpacing challenge,ā Russia is secondary, the Middle East and others are riskāaccepted sideshows but necessary to contain China. In theory, sequencing gives Washington a way to manage decline while still defending a USāled order
The problem for the US: reality didnāt cooperate. Russia cannot be ādefeated on scheduleā in Ukraine, Iran refuses to surrender, and China kept shifting the balance in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea in its favour. The neat sequence schedule broke down
When the Sequence Breaks, the Hegemon Looks for a Pause
Colbyās sudden importance as an envoy makes sense only against this background of strategic overload.
The US now faces:
A grinding, inconclusive RussiaāUkraine war of attrition that still consumes too many resources and political oxygen.
An Iran war with uncertain outcome which can drag on for years and end in the destruction of the GCC, petrodollar and permanent global energy supply shock
A PLA that is rapidly modernizing closing the US military capability gap especially around 1st and 2nd Island Chain while upgrades to US alliances and basing in Asia are still midāconstruction
Mitchellās model assumed the US could ādeal withā Russia and stabilize secondary theaters before Taiwan became truly dangerous. Instead, Washington is being squeezed from all three directions at once.
Under those conditions, sending the architect of the NDS to Beijing to talk āguardrailsā is not a gesture of friendship; it is a defensive move. The empire needs to slow one front downāChinaāso it does not get dragged into a threeāfront crisis it cannot win
āStrategic Stabilityā as Cover for a Harder Denial Strategy
The key to understanding Colbyās mission is the 2026 NDS itself. Publicly, the document is full of soothing words: āstrategic stability,ā āresponsible competition,ā āguardrails,ā ācrisis communication.ā But the operational core is a denial strategy along the First Island Chain: reorganise US forces and allies to prevent a rapid PLA fait accompli against Taiwan or decisive gains in the Western Pacific.
That means:
More forward fires and logistics positioned in Japan and the Philippines
Increased integration and interoperability of USāJapanāPhilippines forces
A defence industrial base rebooted around longārange munitions and maritime/air denial in the Western Pacific
āStrategic stabilityā is not a counterweight to this project; it is the lubricant. Crisis hotlines and militaryātoāmilitary mechanisms are meant to make aggressive US operations near Chinaās coast less risky for Washington, not to reduce the underlying pressure on China
So what does Colby probably wants from this visit?
1⣠Buy time
Washington wants to avoid major escalations over Taiwan and the South China Sea while the US finishes stabilising the RussiaāUkraine front, manages the Iran problem, and builds out its Asia alliance architecture. The message probably will be: āWe accept rivalry, but letās not collideāyet!ā
2⣠Codify ārulesā that favour US operations:
The milāmil talks, hotlines and crisis protocols are about setting patterns: how close US aircraft and ships can operate, how incidents are managed, how quickly senior leaders talk when something goes wrong. If the US can get China to normalise highātempo US presence just outside its red lines, the strategy of denial becomes cheaper for Washington
3⣠Calm allies while hardening them:
Australia, Japan and the Philippines are being asked to accept more US access, more deployments, and more risk. Colby can tell them: āDonāt worry, we have guardrails with Beijing.ā Stability with China is a sales pitch to make USāled militarisation more palatable domestically in allied capitals and for AUKUS members
This is not peaceāmaking. Itās risk management for the stronger side in the short term, and coalition consolidation for a more intense confrontation later.
China remains the āpacing challengeā and primary focus of longāterm denial planning in the NDS
Taiwan Island is the unspoken centre of US forceāplanning, even if the word is carefully downplayed in the unclassified text
The entire purpose of sequencing is to defend a USāled order more efficiently, not to accept a truly multipolar system where China, Russia and others have equal strategic agency.
This combination is dangerous: a declining hegemon that still refuses to accept multipolarity, but is now smart enough to manage its decline tactically
From an armchair strategist's perspective like me, the implications for Taiwan and the South China Sea are unsurprising but sobering.
Washington wants to prevent a āRussiaāstyle surpriseā in the Taiwan Strait, where the PLA moves faster than Western politics and logistics
It probably will therefore quietly accelerate arms, planning, and denial capabilities around Taiwan while using āstrategic stabilityā language to keep things calm
If Colby succeeds in locking in crisisāmanagement mechanisms, US decisionāmakers may become more willing to take risks near Chinaās red lines, believing they can control escalation
Expect more US and allied presence in and around the South China Sea, backed by new infrastructure in the Philippines and expanded roles for Japan
āGuardrailsā will not reduce the tempo; they will normalise it. The waters and skies around China will be busier, but with better telephone lines
For China, this is still encirclementājust with better customer service!
The US is not suddenly reasonable; it is simply overextended. āStabilityā with China will be a tool to save a failing sequencing plan, not a recognition of Chinaās legitimate security interests
For now I would draw three practical conclusions:
US engagement is tactical and reversible. Once Washington judges that Russia is āunder control,ā Iran is contained, and Japan/Philippines are fully wired into the First Island Chain, the US will likely feel freer to take more escalatory steps against China
The current windowāwhen the US is asking for guardrailsāis actually a window of relative leverage for China. This is the moment to deepen partnerships with Russia and the Global South, strengthen its own deterrent, and push for a multipolar architecture that will outlast any single US administration
ASEAN and other regional states should be sceptical of US claims that guardrails equal safety. What Washington really wants is a more predictable environment for its own forward deployments. Stability, in US usage, means āwe can pressure China without stumbling into war by mistakeā
For now, Colby probably will arrive in Beijing as the polite face of this strategy: smiling, talking about āresponsible competitionā and āavoiding the Thucydides Trap,ā while carrying a doctrine that still treats China as the main obstacle to a USācentric order.
The question for Chinese policymakers is not whether to meet him, but how to use this pause to ensure that when Washingtonās sequencing clock runs down, the balance of power looks very different from what the Marathon Initiative crowd expects