The Ukrainian military is attempting to turn the Crimean Peninsula into the "island" of Crimea, and this is extremely important for the entire war.
How did we get here?
The Crimean Peninsula is connected to the mainland via two routes: the first is Crimea-Kherson (Ukraine) in the north of the peninsula, where three bridges serve this purpose: Chongar, Henichesk, and Armiansk. The second is Crimea-Krasnodar (Russia), via the Kerch Bridge.
Crimea was essential to the 2022 invasion because attacks on Ukraine’s southern front were launched from there. The invasion toward Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and later toward Mykolaiv and Odesa originated in Crimea.
The stabilized fronts in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia were maintained in the first months of the invasion solely because of Crimea, through which the supply lines ran, where the military bases were located, and from where some of the Russian airstrikes on this flank were launched. In 2022, the Kerch Bridge was targeted by the Ukrainians. That strike knocked down a section of the bridge, destroyed the railway lines, and damaged its structure. To this day, the Kerch Bridge has not been used as a serious military logistics route.
Fast-forward to 2026, and we arrive in May of this year when Ukraine began targeting the logistics lines connecting Russia and Crimea via the "land bridge" of Mariupol-Berdiansk-Melitopol. These lines sustain and keep the southern front alive.
What is happening now?
For more than a year, Crimea has been the target of Ukrainian “mid-strike” attacks that are part of a shaping, modeling, and groundwork operation. Russian bases, radars, air defense systems, and naval bases have all been simply obliterated during this period.
The two operations—the one against the Mariupol-Crimea lines and the one against Crimea itself—have led to a dire situation on the peninsula. The population is on fuel rationing. Military bases are no longer defended. The naval fleet was forced as early as 2023 to flee to Novorossiysk.
It must be understood that if Crimea becomes militarily (and civilian) unsustainable, the Russian southern front faces a danger unlike any seen before in this war. Crimea REMAINS essential to this front. So the Ukrainians have gotten to work and:
This week they struck multiple times at the three access routes from the mainland to the peninsula: the Chongar, Henichesk, and Armiansk bridges. Crimea is close to complete isolation (it will never be entirely so).
The only operational military route is the one in Armiansk, because the bridge crosses the old canal that used to bring water from the Kahovka reservoir (destroyed by the Russians in 2023) to Crimea.
Crimea is on the verge of becoming a new disaster for the “second army of the world.” This year, the Ukrainians will certainly do everything in their power to isolate the Russian army there, weaken the southern front, and thus try to turn the tide of the war (because yes, Crimea could be one of the keys to an unexpectedly favorable outcome for Ukraine).
What might follow?
These operations will continue and intensify during these summer months, because Ukraine has the necessary resources: equipment (FP-2 attack drones and Behemoth—we’ll be hearing a lot about this new “Shahed-type” drone, but Ukrainian-made, with a dual payload), identification technology, acquisition, AI-guided strikes, and the necessary financial resources.
In Crimea, this year, the fate of this war MAY be “decided,” at least in part. To give you an idea, the isolation and blockade of Crimea could open the possibility (in a best-case scenario) of liberating the Kherson region (on the left bank of the Dnieper) and liberating Melitopol, the collapse of the Zaporizhzhia front, the liberation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the liberation of Berdiansk, and forcing the Russians to redeploy units from the eastern front, opening up opportunities for Ukraine there as well.
Slava Ukraini!