Few points on the announcement of a US-Iran deal:
- Image of US power significantly diminished. Washington could not bring Iran to heel, could not open the Hormuz Strait, could not push Saudi into war, could not impose normalisation with Israel, could not protect its allies against cheaper Iranian missiles despite its more expensive technology, could not get NATO to join the war, could not get Europe to join the war, could not convince China to pull away from Iran, and could not stop Gulf states privately negotiating with Iran to exclude themselves from Iran's list of targets.
- Israel overreached and failed. It successfully dragged US to war with Iran, but failed to achieve any strategic aim. No regime change, no Arab-Israeli coalition, no newly annexed territories, publicly slapped down by Trump after attacking Beirut, forced kicking and screaming into a deal it adamantly opposed, and now faces a US public opinion that squarely blames Tel Aviv for dragging America into a war there was no need to fight with potentially generational political consequences for the US-Israeli relationship (Israel cannot fight any war without US funds, troops, weapons, and diplomatic cover).
- Saudi Arabia vindicated. Refused to be dragged into conflict, resisted UAE campaign to get Arab states to join Israel's attack, resisted pressure from Trump to normalise in exchange for security, deepened coordination with Pakistan and Turkiye over integrating supply chains and routes, and successfully negotiated its own de-escalation with Iran.
- Turkiye's Erdogan staves off Israeli attempts to use the war with Iran to drive a wedge between him and Trump as the latter instead asserts their personal friendship, thanks him publicly for helping to bring the deal, and affirms his belief in Turkiye as a stabilising force by promoting Tom Barrack (who the Israelis deeply resent for his alleged partiality and positive view of Ankara).