Everyone's reacting to the Miasma attack with the same advice: rotate your tokens. That's cleanup. It doesn't answer the question that actually matters — how do you prove a package is what it claims to be before it reaches your build?
Because here's the part the coverage keeps burying: those Red Hat npm packages were validly signed. Provenance checked out clean.
They were credential-stealing malware anyway. A signature only tells you who published something. It can't tell you the code still matches its source. That gap is the entire attack.
An SBOM doesn't close it. An SBOM is an inventory — a list of what's in your software. It cannot tell you whether those contents were altered after the fact. Miasma walked straight past inventory-based tooling.
What stops it is a CBOM: a cryptographic bill of materials that fingerprints the actual contents and issues a verifiable receipt that the code hasn't been tampered with — signed-but-tampered included.
That's what we built.
Every check produces a receipt with its own ID and its own fingerprint, independently re-checkable by anyone, at any time. Run it again next week and it tells you if something moved underneath you. It cross-references live vulnerability intelligence as it builds, supports re-checks, and can diff two receipts to show exactly what changed between versions.
You're not trusting a vendor's word, you're holding proof.
And this stops being optional in months, not years. CMMC Level 2 enforcement lands November 10. EU CRA, DORA, NIS2, EO 14028, NIST 800-171 and 800-161 are all converging on the same demand: prove your software supply chain, at procurement, with evidence.
Roughly 300,000 defense contractors are in scope. Most of them have a spreadsheet.
This isn't a concept. It's live, it issues real receipts today, and it was built for the exact gap Miasma exploited. The deadline isn't moving. The attacks aren't slowing. Inventory was never going to be enough.