🚨 ALERT: Researchers discover 26 third-party AI LLM routers secretly injecting malicious tool calls and stealing credentials. Developers using AI coding agents like Claude Code to work on smart contracts or wallets may be at risk of having private keys and seed phrases compromised.

You’re describing security as closing the gap between what the user means and what the system does, and treating “good security” as *redundant specifications* that all have to line up before the system acts. That’s exactly how we built Bloxchain. **Same idea, in practice** We don’t assume one click or one key can fully encode intent. So the protocol only does something when *several* specifications agree: - **What** (the action and its parameters) - **Who** (which keys are allowed to request, approve, or execute) - **When** (for sensitive actions, a mandatory delay and a second step) - **Where** (which targets and which functions are even allowed to be called) If any of these don’t align, the system doesn’t proceed. No single “vote” is enough. **Two ways we get redundancy** 1. **Time and a second step (for high‑risk actions)** For the most sensitive operations (e.g. changing who controls the wallet), you first *request* the change. Only after a waiting period can you *approve* it. So the same (or authorized) party has to confirm the same intent at two different times. That’s two separate specifications of “yes, this is what I want.” 2. **Split between “who decides” and “who executes”** One key *signs* what should happen (the intent is in the signed message). A different key *executes* (submits the transaction and pays gas). So “what I want” and “what actually runs” are two different steps. The system only runs when both align: the right signer signed and the right executor submitted. **Risk‑sensitive friction** We don’t add extra steps everywhere. We add them where the downside of a mistake is large: - **High‑risk** (e.g. ownership transfer, changing recovery): full flow — request → wait → approve (and, where used, signer vs executor separation). - **Lower‑risk** (e.g. a routine transfer to a whitelisted contract): one flow that still uses signer executor, or other lighter checks, so normal use stays simple. So: *easy for low‑risk, harder for high‑risk*, without “more clicks for everything.” **Guards on *what* can be called** Besides “who” and “when,” we also bound *what* the wallet is allowed to do: - Only certain *functions* (e.g. “transfer”) are registered as allowed. - Only certain *target* addresses (e.g. a specific token contract) are whitelisted per function. So intent is constrained along another dimension: even with the right keys and timing, the system will only execute calls that match these rules. That’s another overlapping specification that has to match. **Roles and recovery** Control is split across roles (e.g. owner, broadcaster, recovery). No single key has full control; recovery is a separate path. So “who I am” and “what I’m allowed to do” are specified in more than one way - again, redundancy. **In short** We treat security the same way you do: minimize the gap between user intent and system behavior by requiring *multiple, overlapping specifications* to agree. Bloxchain is built so that: - Intent is expressed in more than one way (request vs approve, sign vs execute, roles, whitelists). - High‑risk actions need more of these to align (including time and a second step). - Low‑risk actions stay relatively smooth. No perfection — only risk reduction through redundancy, and different angles (action, consequences, who can do it, what’s allowed, and when) all having to line up before the system acts. --- *Bloxchain Protocol — [GitHub](github.com/PracticalParticle…)

Wall Street demands neutrality. They need infrastructure no one can capture. They need infrastructure no one can own.