Senior Policy Analyst at @JINSADC | previously @CNA_org | Alum @ColumbiaSIPA. Views my own. RT/Like ≠ endorsement.

Joined September 2020
5 Photos and videos
Yoni Tobin retweeted
Release the Iran memorandum of understanding. What can be the reason for withholding a document that has already been signed?
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Yoni Tobin retweeted
The emerging U.S.-Iran deal remains murky, with competing accounts describing very different arrangements. @jinsadc has detailed the different accounts of the deal now taking shape, all involving major U.S. concessions to the Iranian regime.
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In my new piece in @RCDefense w/ Maj Gen Charles Corcoran (ret.), former Commander of the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center, I examine: 1) what was surprising about the Iran war 2) its implications for future wars 3) lessons for U.S. acquisition strategy realcleardefense.com/2026/06…
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Yoni Tobin retweeted
Forcefully opening the Strait of Hormuz would help restore U.S. credibility and re-establish deterrence against Iranian efforts to open and close the strait like a light switch. Tehran is counting on Trump’s reluctance to resume military activity. If Iran is left able to dominate the Strait, the Gulf Arabs’ economic future is endangered, along with regional peace and security. The decision lies with Trump.
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Yoni Tobin retweeted
For the first time ever, China has effectively made a sovereignty claim to a portion of the Pacific Ocean.
🚨THE BASHI BREAKOUT: 🇨🇳#China has, for the first time, pushed a paramilitary sovereignty assertion past its own "10-dash line" & beyond the First Island Chain to challenge a maritime negotiation it isn't party to. On May 28, 🇯🇵#Japan & the 🇵🇭#Philippines announced they would delimit their overlapping exclusive economic zones as prescribed by #UNCLOS. Beijing's answer was to send a flotilla through the Bashi Channel & into the open Pacific east of 🇹🇼#Taiwan, into waters that even its own most expansive maps don't (yet) claim. The key is in which ships Beijing sent: China uses its navy to assert capability--what it can do by force. It uses its coast guard & other government ships as a paramilitary force to assert sovereignty--what it claims. Not one ship in this flotilla was a warship, because this was a sovereignty claim. That's what's really new here. For over a decade China used these same gray-zone tactics to assert sovereignty inside its South China Sea "nine-dash line". This week's action pushed somewhere new--going past even the 10th "dash" Beijing added to its 2023 map. Beyond the First Island Chain. This assertion was aimed not at Taiwan alone, but at two 🇺🇸US treaty allies. @China_MFA branded the Japan-Philippine talks "completely illegal and void", while a June 1 @globaltimesnews editorial called the idea "an extraordinary and almost unprecedented absurdity… akin to two neighbors sitting in your living room and discussing how to divide your backyard." Note how China's "backyard" continues to expand. So, in fact, does its "living room". What SeaLight's tracking shows: 🔹 From 1-5 June, CCG cutters Daishan (2502) & Baita (2304) ran the first clockwise patrol over 200nm east of Taiwan's easternmost island--well past the 10th "dash" on Beijing's 2023 map. 🔹 Late on June 7th, a second wave of 3 provincial Maritime Safety Administration cutters & a rescue tug pushed into the Bashi Channel. The formation entered Taiwan's restricted waters ~30nm off the southern tip, drew a 7-ship Taiwan Coast Guard standoff, then also pushed east. Beijing's state media left no doubt about what it all meant, first with an official @XHNews/@globaltimesnews announcement, then a June 7 Global Times viewpoint column naming the operation "a sovereignty declaration with both legal significance and political signaling." Taiwan's NSC chief @josephwutw named it "expansionism in disguise," Defense Minister Koo said it was "cognitive warfare." Both are quite correct. But the deeper target is Tokyo, Manila & Washington DC, since if Beijing can run a paramilitary sovereignty assertion directly against two US allies' lawful EEZ talks in waters far beyond even its own claim lines, the real message is that China's maritime claims are not just expansive and ambiguous, they are unbounded. 📊 Tracking by @StarboardIntel
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There's lots of talk about how "transactional" U.S. foreign policy is. If only... From @MatthewShea__ of @jewishinsider: "Of great concern ... are Riyadh’s active agreements with Russia China. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has steadily expanded nuclear cooperation w/ Beijing."
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U.S. policy should involve America getting safer when we give valuable things to other nations. If that isn't the case, what's the point? In the Middle East, that means, among other things, pushing back on Chinese Russian influence. If we're doing so, it's not clear how.
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Iran's pre-war SLV launches show that it was closer to a U.S.-range missile than many realize. Fmr. Commander of U.S. Space Command, General William Shelton (ret.), and I have written SLVs "could provide Iran with a rapid route to an ICBM" if the regime goes down that path. (1/
Jun 4
“It has long been within the Islamic regime’s goal to develop a missile capable of reaching the U.S.” If Iran gets a financial infusion from a deal, it will have the resources to make that goal a reality, warns JINSA’s IDF MG (ret) Yaakov Amidror. jpost.com/middle-east/iran-n…
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The same principle applies to Iran's ballistic missiles. Threats, like an ICBM capability, may seem to be on the horizon now - but they won't stay there forever. (10/
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So, the real question is how quickly Iran's regime can shift its capabilities into much higher gear should it choose to do so - and what that would mean for the rest of us. (11/
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