When one doesn't know what one owns. $asts

In orbit again with 3 more of the largest phased arrays ever deployed in LEO 🚀🚀🚀

$ASTS - The shield and the illusion: AST SpaceMobile, SpaceX's S-1 and what LATAM operators can still do In May 2026, SpaceX's S-1 became the most explicit statement the market has seen regarding Elon Musk's intentions for the telecommunications business. By valuing its connectivity segment against a total market of $1.6 trillion, SpaceX isn't signaling a partnership with mobile carriers. It's signaling their replacement, to the greatest extent that physics allows. Not in twelve months. But the ten-year timeframe is clear. In response, the industry has rallied around a single name: AST SpaceMobile. The question worth answering honestly is whether this protection is sufficient and what Latin American operators should do in the meantime. The statement that changed the framework From the beginning of this series, we've argued that the real danger of Starlink's MVNO isn't the percentage of satellite traffic. It's the control of the SIM card and the data ecosystem built around it. SpaceX's S-1 confirms that argument was correct, and amplifies it. The document is not just a financial presentation for investors. It's a strategic positioning statement. By framing its connectivity segment against a $1.6 trillion TAM, SpaceX is telling markets—and regulators—that its ambition is not to be a complement to the mobile operator ecosystem. It's to be the ecosystem. Existing operators' terrestrial infrastructure appears in this narrative as a transient asset: useful until satellite density becomes sufficient to make it obsolete, but dispensable within a ten-year timeframe. To understand the magnitude of that in Latin America: the combined revenue of the region's leading mobile operators—Claro, Movistar, Telcel, TIM, Tigo, Personal, and the local operators in the twelve main markets—is in the range of $80 to $90 billion annually. All of that is within the Total Asset Market (TAM) that SpaceX allocated to itself in its IPO prospectus. Not a portion. All of it. Timing matters SpaceX won't have the satellite density needed to eliminate terrestrial networks in urban areas in two years. Probably not even in five. But the MVNO doesn't need that density to start capturing what matters most: SIM cards, end-customer billing, and behavioral data. That can happen long before the first satellite replaces the first urban tower. AST SpaceMobile: who it is and what it's really building Founded in 2017 by Abel Avellan, AST SpaceMobile wasn't created to compete with mobile operators. It was created to be their orbital infrastructure. This fundamental difference has structural implications for everything the company does: how it raises capital, how it negotiates with partners, how it designs its technology, and how it positions its product with regulators. The mission is technically ambitious: to connect conventional smartphones , without any modifications, directly to satellites in low Earth orbit. No specialized terminals. No additional equipment. Just the same iPhone or Galaxy that the user already has in their pocket. The architecture that makes it possible The technical difference between AST and Starlink isn't one of scale, it's one of design. Starlink uses thousands of small satellites with a high-volume approach: many nodes, narrower signals, and coverage based on density. It's effective for messaging and basic data, but the limited transmission power of a typical smartphone—around 0.2 watts—imposes a ceiling on what that architecture can deliver without modifying the device. AST solves that problem by inverting the design: instead of putting intelligence in the number of satellites, it puts it in the size of the antenna. Its next-generation BlueBird satellites deploy antenna arrays of 2,400 square feet—about 223 square meters—the largest commercial communications array ever deployed in low Earth orbit. That aperture acts as a high-gain receiver capable of capturing and amplifying the weak signal from a smartphone from an altitude of 500 kilometers. The computational core powering this is the proprietary AST5000 integrated circuit, developed over 150 man-years of engineering. It processes 10 GHz of instantaneous bandwidth per satellite, handles the Doppler shifts inherent in LEO flight, and delivers peak speeds of 120 Mbps per cell. In tests with its Block 1 satellites, AST achieved 98.9 Mbps of real-world speed on unmodified smartphones. For reference: that's residential broadband speed, not emergency connectivity. The result of this design is that the AST satellite operates as an orbiting cellular base station, compatible with 3GPP 4G and 5G standards. The user's smartphone doesn't detect a different network; it detects their carrier's network, with the satellite acting as just another cell. The handover between the ground tower and the satellite occurs seamlessly, just as it does today between adjacent cells in an urban network. Abel Avellan describes it bluntly: “Nobody is remotely close to our technical capability to deliver hundreds of megabits directly to a phone from something flying at 70,000 miles per hour 500 kilometers above you. That competitive advantage is unique.” The business model: why operators are partners, not customers AST's capital structure is not accidental. Its strategic investors include AT&T, Verizon, Vodafone, Rakuten, Alphabet (with 3.8 percent of the capital), in addition to institutional support from Vanguard with approximately 21.4 million shares and BlackRock with 14.5 million. The Cisneros Group, one of Latin America's largest media and technology conglomerates, is also a strategic shareholder. That's not a customer list. It's a list of owners. The major global operators have a direct financial interest in AST succeeding as an infrastructure provider, not as a competitor. That alignment of incentives is the mechanism AST uses to protect itself in a market where it would otherwise be vulnerable. The monetization model is equally clear: when a user connects via an AST satellite, they continue using their existing carrier plan, and the revenue generated is split 50/50 between AST and the carrier. The user does not sign any contract with AST. They do not activate any additional services. They do not switch carriers. The carrier retains the billing, the business relationship, and the data asset. AST charges for the satellite capacity provided. This approach solves two of the most costly problems in the telecommunications business. First, customer acquisition costs: AST doesn't invest in marketing or distribution; it relies on the sales networks of its 60 global partner operators. Second, remote coverage capital expenditures: the operator can extend its coverage map to areas where building towers is economically unfeasible, without investing a single dollar in terrestrial infrastructure. The scale in 2026 As of May 2026, AST has six operational satellites in orbit. The goal for the end of the year is to reach between 45 and 60 units, with launches scheduled every one or two months. Next June, a Falcon 9 will carry BlueBirds 8, 9, and 10; a critical mission that gained greater urgency after the loss of BlueBird 7 due to an anomaly in Blue Origin's New Glenn rocket, which led to an FAA moratorium on that launch platform. On the manufacturing side, the 500,000-square-foot facility in Midland, Texas, is currently processing BlueBirds 11 through 33, with a production rate targeting more than ten satellites per month. AST reported over $70 million in total revenue for 2025 with a gross margin of 68.6 percent and closed a $1.075 billion convertible note issuance in February 2026. Total available liquidity amounts to approximately $3.9 billion, sufficient to support the estimated annual capital expenditure of $1.2 billion. The FCC has already authorized AST's commercial service in the United States under the Supplemental Coverage from Space (SCCS) program, with the capacity to operate a constellation of up to 248 satellites. With nearly 60 global operating partners representing more than 3 billion subscribers, and contractual revenue commitments exceeding $1.2 billion, AST has completed its transition from a demonstration company to a scaling infrastructure utility. Architectural investment: why AST and Starlink are not the same game For Latin American operators, understanding the structural difference between the AST model and Starlink Direct to Cell (D2C) is not a technicality. It is the key to the entire strategy. Starlink operates its own satellite network and integrates it with operators who provide spectrum. The SpaceX satellite uses the operator's licensed frequencies to connect to the end user's device. The satellite technical layer is provided by SpaceX. The operator is the spectrum enabler and, in the best-case scenario, the commercial channel. If SpaceX moves toward becoming an MVNO, the operator ceases to be a channel and becomes an anonymous wholesale provider. AST operates under a different logic. Its satellites act as orbiting base stations, integrated into the operator's core network as just another cell. The standard is 3GPP. The spectrum belongs to the operator. Billing is handled by the operator. The customer doesn't notice any difference. In the Starlink model, the risk is that SpaceX could retain the SIM card. In the AST model, the operator retains the SIM card while AST operates the infrastructure that extends its coverage into space. Avellan's distinction regarding Amazon/Globalstar is relevant in this context: “Basically, we see that capacity as an emergency SOS system. To provide real broadband, you need hundreds of megahertz of allocated spectrum… our focus is broadband. That's a completely different proposition.” This isn't corporate modesty; it's product positioning that establishes AST as the only direct-to-device broadband alternative with native integration into the operator's core network. The honest verdict: a royal shield, but not a permanent solution The analysis of AST SpaceMobile circulating in telecom investment and strategy communities converges on an uncomfortable but correct point: AST is a lifeboat, not a silver bullet. The distinction matters because many operators are treating AST as if solving the rural coverage problem were enough to win the strategic war. It isn't. AST gives operators three concrete and valuable things. It gives them real coverage without terrestrial capex in areas where building towers is not feasible. It gives them customer relationship retention even when they are off the terrestrial network. And it gives them a line of defense against SpaceX in the battle for coverage. These three things have real value and are defensible. What AST can't do is reverse the structural commoditization of the mobile business. SpaceX didn't create that process. It was the result of two decades of price competition, digital disintermediation, and the migration of value to application platforms. What SpaceX is doing is accelerating that process and adding a SIM capture threat that didn't exist before. AST blocks that capture, but it doesn't return the value that has already migrated. In other words, with AST, operators can remain relevant in the future. Without AST (or an equivalent solution), they may remain as anonymous infrastructure. But remaining relevant in the future is not the same as having solved the underlying problem. It's about having bought time to solve it. AST SpaceMobile is the mechanism that allows the telecommunications industry to buy time to survive the orbital era. What they do with that time is the real strategic question. LATAM: the perfect geography, the most exposed regulatory position Latin America possesses conditions that make it one of the most relevant markets for the next stage of satellite connectivity. These include challenging geography, low coverage density across vast territories, industrial sectors (mining, agribusiness, energy, logistics) with critical connectivity needs in the field, and a mobile market of over 700 million connections with expanding digital penetration. However, it also presents specific vulnerabilities. AST's Latin American partners have already been identified The agreements that AST SpaceMobile has formalized to date include operators with a direct presence in Latin America. However, one of them requires a closer look. Telefónica is listed among AST's partners, but its Latin American presence has changed radically in the last twelve months. Under the leadership of Marc Murtra, who took over as CEO in January 2025, the company executed an accelerated exit from Hispam: it sold its operations in Argentina to Telecom Argentina for $1.245 billion, in Peru to Integra Tec International for just $1 million, in Uruguay and Ecuador also in 2025, and in Colombia it sold 65 percent of its operation to Millicom for around $400 million. In the first quarter of 2026, the operator completed its exits from Colombia and Chile, the latter sold to Millicom and Xavier Niel's fund. The sale of Mexico to Melisa Acquisition was announced in April 2026. Murtra himself stated it unequivocally: the goal is to concentrate on Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Brazil (the only Latin American market that Telefónica considers strategic in the long term). In other words, Telefónica's agreement with AST is, in practice, an agreement with Vivo Brasil, not with a pan-regional operator. The Latin American geographic coverage that the agreement represented on paper has been dramatically reduced. Millicom (Tigo) covers Bolivia, Paraguay, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia; and by partially absorbing Telefónica's Colombian operation, it expands its exposure precisely in the markets with the largest proportion of rural territory without coverage and the smallest scale to justify tower expansion. Telecom Argentina, which acquired Movistar Argentina's operations, consolidates its position in a market with vast stretches of the Pampas and Patagonia lacking viable coverage. Liberty Latin America operates in Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Panama, Costa Rica, and other markets in the Caribbean and Central America. The resulting map differs from what AST's partner ecosystem suggested a year ago. With Telefónica now focused on Brazil, the Latin American weight of the agreement falls on Millicom, Telecom Argentina, and Liberty Latin America—three operators with a real presence but without the pan-regional coverage that Telefónica Hispam provided. What remains missing from that list is equally revealing: operators without an agreement with AST (and who rely on the Starlink Direct to Cell model as their only satellite coverage option) are in a weaker strategic position. The most significant absence in this ecosystem is América Móvil. The dominant operator in Mexico and the largest in Latin America by number of subscribers (with Telcel, Claro, and their regional brands present in seventeen countries in the region) does not appear in any AST SpaceMobile filing , any public list of operator partners, or any corporate statement available as of the date of this publication. This omission is not a minor detail. It is, in itself, a strategic fact of paramount importance. It could mean that América Móvil is evaluating the situation without making a commitment, waiting to see how the constellation scales before negotiating from a position of need. It could mean that it prefers the Starlink Direct-to-Cell model, which maintains coverage without relinquishing a 50 percent revenue share to a third party. Or it could mean that negotiations are underway, but no agreement has been reached on terms. What it cannot mean, given the size of the operator and the geographic coverage at stake, is indifference. In Mexico, Telcel operates in the world's largest Spanish-speaking mobile market, with over 60 percent market share. If this operator reaches an agreement with AST, the satellite broadband layer will be integrated into the country's most extensive network, and rural access will become a Telcel asset. If it doesn't reach such an agreement, and Movistar Mexico—a Telefónica subsidiary—has it operational first, the coverage gap will be reversed for the first time in the competitive history of the Mexican market. And if América Móvil ends up relying solely on the Starlink model, customer relations in areas without terrestrial coverage will be subject to SpaceX's logic, not its own. Any of these three scenarios has consequences that extend far beyond the signal map. The regulatory window is closing The most underestimated risk in Latin America is not technological. It is regulatory, but in a different sense than is usually discussed. The danger isn't that regulators will block AST. It's that operators who don't actively participate in defining the regulatory framework for supplemental satellite coverage will end up in an environment designed by their competitors. In Mexico, the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (CRT), which replaced the IFT in October 2015 and operates under the Digital Transformation and Telecommunications Agency of the federal government, will have to define whether AST's satellites using spectrum licensed by Movistar or Telcel are an additional cell of that network, an independent satellite service, or something new. This categorization determines who can participate, under what conditions, and with what obligations regarding universal service, portability, data location, and lawful interception. In Brazil, Anatel faces the same problem with Claro and TIM as potential partners for AST. In Colombia, Chile, and Peru (where Telefónica already has relationships with both satellite providers), the question is when, not if, this regulatory discussion will take place. The operator that approaches the regulator with a structured technical proposal, public policy arguments, and an implementation timeline will have an advantage over one that waits for authorization to come automatically. The WRC-27 (World Radiocommunication Conference 2027) will establish global spectrum rules for non-terrestrial networks. What Latin American administrations present there will define the framework for the next decade. Operators not participating in that discussion today will not be part of the 2028 results. What LATAM carriers should do — with or without AST The strategic agenda for Latin American operators is not new. The three previous installments in this series have outlined it from different angles. What changes with SpaceX's S-1 and the consolidation of the AST ecosystem is the urgency: it's no longer about positioning for a future threat. The threat has a date, a legal structure, and a public offering document that quantifies it at $1.6 trillion. Five actions define the difference between the operators who will emerge stronger from this transition and those who will end up as anonymous capacity providers. 1. Negotiate access to AST from an active position, not a position of need. Operators entering negotiations with AST after SpaceX has achieved critical mass in their market will be negotiating from a position of weakness. Those entering now (with customers, spectrum, licenses, brand recognition, and regulatory relationships as assets) can negotiate terms that preserve control over the end-user relationship. The 50/50 revenue-sharing model is the current market benchmark, but that figure isn't set in stone for markets with different dynamics. What is clear, however, is that those who arrive late will have less leverage. 2. Monetize your own data assets before the competition arrives Claro, Telcel, and Movistar have years of experience tracking the mobility, consumption, and behavior of hundreds of millions of users. This asset isn't being monetized to its full potential. The first step is to build their own data platform (geolocated advertising, market intelligence, alternative credit scoring, financial services) before Starlink arrives and does exactly the same thing with the same users on its own SIM card. The M-Pesa model in Kenya remains the most cited and least imitated benchmark in Latin America. The window of opportunity to be the operator that arrives before the bank is not permanent. 3. Build vertical proposals for high-value sectors The most immediate opportunity lies not with the mass consumer. It lies with businesses and industrial sectors that require continuous and guaranteed connectivity in the field: mining in Chile and Peru, agribusiness in Brazil and Argentina, logistics and transportation in Mexico and Colombia, energy in Venezuela and Ecuador, and tourism in nature destinations throughout the region. These customers pay enterprise rates, have multi-year contracts, and don't switch providers based on price. The operator that arrives first with a guaranteed coverage proposal (using AST's satellite layer as an invisible part of its network) has a competitive advantage that no newcomer can immediately replicate. 4. To exert regulatory pressure for the principle of reciprocity The correct regulatory argument is simple: same services, same rules. If Starlink bills the end user as a mobile operator, it must contribute to the universal service fund, respect number portability, and comply with data localization obligations under local legislation. If AST operates spectrum from a licensed operator in Mexico, Colombia, or Brazil as if it were a cell of that network, the regulatory framework must reflect that technical reality. Neither of these positions is anti-competitive. They are principles of regulatory equivalence that protect both the user and the historical investment of established operators. 5. Organize a common regional front on data No single Latin American operator has the individual scale to compete with the global dataset SpaceX will build if it manages to position itself as an MVNO in ten markets simultaneously. But the combined scale of regional operators does. A data consortium among the leading operators in the six largest Latin American markets (without the need for a merger, by federating the information asset under shared governance) would create a comparable critical mass. In Europe, operators have explored similar schemes against Google and Meta. In Latin America, no one has yet implemented such a strategy. SpaceX's S-1 is the catalyst needed to make that conversation happen. Time is not neutral The four installments in this series have followed the same argument from different perspectives. Physics establishes the limits of what the satellite can do. Musk's strategy explains why those limits don't matter as much as they seem, because the real value lies not in the bits transmitted but in the data generated. The industry's response establishes that AST SpaceMobile is real, functional, and the most coherent counterproposal to SpaceX's progress. And this article concludes with the point all these elements make: time is not neutral. Every week a Latin American operator remains silent on the AST conversation, every quarter it fails to build its data platform, every regulatory cycle it lets pass without actively participating, is time working in SpaceX's favor. Not because SpaceX is already winning—not yet—but because every delay by the operator reduces its negotiating leverage and widens the advantage of the one that arrives with greater scale, more data, and less reliance on local agreements. AST SpaceMobile is the most concrete mechanism the industry has today to buy that time. But buying time only makes sense if it's used. The question that defines the next stage of mobility in Latin America isn't whether satellites will win. It's who will be on the other side of the table when that happens. Operators who come to that table with customers, data, spectrum, and a strong regulatory position will remain players. Those who arrive without those assets will be someone else's infrastructure. This text is a translation of an article from TeleSemana: telesemana.com/blog/2026/06/…

$ASTS: Quote from AST SpaceMobile in recent article: “None of the missions planned for the next few months are scheduled with Blue Origin,” the statement said.  “Our satellites are designed to be launcher-agnostic, and we have agreements in place with multiple launch providers, giving us flexibility across our launch program,” AST SpaceMobile added.

$ASTS This guy will eventually see sizable revenue, but by then he might do x2 or x4, not x10 or x20.

This is high level DD. I have mentioned it before, but too few discuss it $ASTS has an aggregate interference margin big enough to scale up a lot! Starlink spam-a-lots has to ask waiver just to operate and immediately hits diminishing returns from self interference when scaling

$ASTS Scott Wisniewski has a base salary of about $250,000. That's about $2 per/min. $ASTS customer acquisition cost is basically $2 * phone rings * [Scott] Hiya, Scott here [MNO CEO] Hello good sir, this is NN. I am the CEO of <MNO>, can we join? [Scott] Yes! Time: 1 min

Most people still think D2D is “emergency texting from space.” $ASTS already demonstrated ~100 Mbps broadband directly to normal phones. That isn’t just rural coverage. It’s a new global wireless layer. And that’s why the carrier alignment matters more than the retail hype around a $1.75T IPO. AT&T, Verizon, Vodafone, Google, 60 MNOs. These companies don’t write equity checks for science projects. They have done their due diligence. Meanwhile the market is pricing: $ASTS as uncertainty @SpaceX as perfection. One is expected to dominate everything. The other only needs to execute in a market SpaceX itself sized at $740B. That asymmetry at play here. $ASTS 🛰️

$ASTS SpaceMob listen up, and listen carefully. If I won't manage to convince my real friends to become rich enough to stop working and go on all sorts of adventures, you guys will have to step up to the mark to go skiing, climbing and drinking wine. This is your duty.

Starlink now represents ~70% of SpaceX revenue making connectivity the core cash engine of the company. Thats why $ASTS remains a top 5 position for me because D2D connectivity could become one of the most valuable layers of the space economy.

$ASTS $SPCX 🚨🚨 SPACEX JUST VALIDATED THE SPACE BASED CONNECTIVITY SUPER CYCLE 1/3 SpaceX’s S 1 is not bearish for AST SpaceMobile. It is the clearest public market validation yet that satellite communications, direct to device connectivity, reusable launch, government space demand, and orbital AI infrastructure are no longer niche aerospace themes. They are being valued as core technology infrastructure. For @AST_SpaceMobile, that is the point: the market is being forced to reprice space based networks from speculative science projects into strategic communications platforms. SpaceX may be the giant, but AST remains the cleanest public pure play on carrier integrated broadband direct to ordinary mobile phones. reuters.com/legal/transactio… Here’s the read: assuming Reuters’ report is accurately describing the public SpaceX IPO filing, this is broadly bullish for AST because it drags the entire space based communications category into the center of public market valuation. I could not retrieve a clean SEC hosted prospectus URL through the search path available here, so the SpaceX side of this analysis is grounded in Reuters’ filing based reporting, not a directly opened SEC S 1 document. Reuters says SpaceX “took the wraps off its IPO filing” on May 20, with ambitions that include Starlink expansion, Mars, and AI data centers in space. The reported valuation target is about $1.75 trillion, with Reuters also reporting a potential $75 billion raise, Nasdaq listing, and ticker SPCX. Reuters describes Starlink as SpaceX’s main revenue engine, with roughly 10,000 satellites and broadband service for consumers, governments, aviation, maritime, and enterprise customers. For AST, the most important point is category validation. Public investors are now being asked to underwrite satellite connectivity, reusable launch, AI infrastructure, government space demand, and orbital compute as one integrated mega platform. That makes AST easier to explain to generalist institutions: not as a speculative satellite story, but as a scarce public equity tied to space based broadband, carrier infrastructure, spectrum, government resilience, and future space infrastructure. The first corroboration is that SpaceX’s filing appears to confirm that satellite connectivity is no longer a niche aerospace subsegment. Reuters reports that Starlink generated $11.4 billion of SpaceX’s $18.7 billion 2025 revenue and $4.4 billion of operating profit, while SpaceX’s total addressable market claim reaches $28.5 trillion, with $26.5 trillion attributed to AI and $22.7 trillion to enterprise AI. That directly helps AST because it tells the market to stop valuing space connectivity only against legacy telecom or old aerospace multiples. Space based communications can be a platform market. The second corroboration is that direct to device is now clearly an industry architecture, not a side experiment. AT&T, T Mobile, and Verizon announced a proposed joint venture to address wireless dead zones using satellite based direct to device technologies, pooled spectrum resources, and common technical specifications. The release says the goal is to extend mobile connectivity in underserved areas and help satellite providers reach more customers through a unified platform. ASTS already sits directly in that lane, and its own release says the proposed collaboration should accelerate technical integration, improve customer experience, enhance coverage, and help eliminate dead zones. See 2/3

$ASTS: 🚨 ABEL AVELLAN ANNOUNCES THAT BLOCK-2 BLUEBIRD SATELLITES HAVE BEEN SHIPPED TO CAPE CANAVERAL AND CONFIRMS AST SPACEMOBILE WILL PLAY KEY ENABLING ROLE IN AT&T/VERIZON/T-MOBILE JOINT VENTURE Credit: u/TheEventualHorizon - Reddit

Hennessy funds on the $ASTS. We're not bullish enough!

AST SpaceMobile may launch some of its direct-to-device satellites on United Launch Alliance’s Vulcan rocket to expand the launch options for its constellation. bit.ly/3PjrdR6

$ASTS Let’s talk details on AST SpaceMobile’s SCS Authorization that was issued last week. As part of the process, AT&T/Verizon leased AST access to the Cellular A/B, Lower 700MHz, and FirstNet (AT&T Only) bands under various scenarios (up to full access in Outages). *Not an expert, just sharing my findings after doing some digging. Let me know if you find any errors. 1/n

$ASTS Anatel Brazil authorized to operate the 248 satellite constellation. Brazil has over 200M inhabitants and over 100% penetration rate of mobile phone users.