NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte:
Europe, with the UK and Turkey and Norway, is over 500 million people. We are facing an adversary in Russia of about 120 to 140 million people.
And we are now overly dependent on one ally with about 350 million people, making sure that we can defend ourselves against Russia. That's not sustainable long term. And that one ally cannot keep explaining this to its own public.
President Trump’s administration does not appear to be planning a formal U.S. withdrawal from NATO, as such a move would face strong resistance from Congress, the Pentagon, allies, and a number of Republicans. Instead, it is gradually reducing America’s security presence in Europe.
Recent decisions point to a consistent trend. The Pentagon has canceled the rotation of around 4,000 U.S. troops to Poland. Earlier, the United States announced reductions to its presence in Germany. Washington has also revised plans for deploying certain long-range systems in Europe, including Tomahawk missiles and hypersonic weapons.
Specific elements of America’s security presence are being reduced: the speed of force deployment, logistics, forward positioning of weapons, strike capabilities, and the predictability of the U.S. response in a crisis. NATO formally remains, but confidence in the automatic nature of American support is weakening.
The Trump administration explains this as a "redistribution of burdens." The United States no longer wants to carry the main conventional burden simultaneously in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. China has become President Trump’s primary strategic priority, while Israel’s security remains an unconditional strategic interest.
So, current policy increasingly resembles not isolationism, but selective retrenchment - a selective reduction of American commitments where Washington sees fit.
‼️ The effects of this policy benefit Russia even without any formal "rapprochement." The Kremlin does not necessarily need NATO to collapse. It is enough for doubts to emerge among allies about the effectiveness and reliability of the Alliance.
Europe is already responding: Poland is sharply increasing military spending, Germany is accelerating rearmament, and France is pushing for strategic autonomy. But there is a timing problem. The United States can reduce its involvement quickly. Europe builds capabilities slowly. It is precisely this gap in timing that now creates the main strategic risk for European security.