Love the work the
@composio does. Security incidents are brutal, especially for infra companies. Hoping they recover stronger than ever.
Problem is bad actors now have really really powerful models to hack even companies that treat security as their top priority.
Having seen some of the worst classes of production and security incidents firsthand at
@zomato, we decided very early at
@ZenactAI that customer data security cannot be treated as a compliance checkbox problem.
We went to uncomfortable extremes from day 0:
* Sensitive customer data is isolated into separate AWS data vault accounts altogether
* Even internally no human can access those vault accounts
* Even if we wanted to inspect customer data directly, our architecture is designed to prevent it
* Customers can bring their own AWS accounts as well. BYOC, BYOK
* Encryption at rest, in transit, and during storage pipelines
* KMS to minimize long-lived secrets and token exposure across systems
* SSO IAM Roles zero IAM users to eliminate developer/automation access tokens entirely
* Strong auditability boundaries around every privileged action
AI agents, automation systems, and long-running infrastructure dramatically increase blast radius when things go wrong. The industry will need much stronger primitives than just "SOC2 compliant".
This incident is another reminder that security architecture decisions made in the first few months matter far more than the security page written later. And the cost of those decisions if done in the first few months, its actually quite low.
Here’s my update on the security incident we disclosed earlier today.
On May 21, an attacker probed our systems extensively, gained a foothold in an internal agentic tool we use to monitor our infrastructure, and escalated through our automated remediation systems and sandboxed execution environment over an approximately 8-hour window. The attacker demonstrated deep knowledge of our API surface and internal architecture, and compromised a small subset of GitHub Tokens on Composio’s platform before we removed their access.
As a precautionary measure, we have revoked every user’s GitHub tokens, not only those with direct evidence of compromise. We have paused all new releases until our investigation is complete. We have thoroughly verified that our supply chain, and our Python and TypeScript SDKs and our CLI binary, remain safe. We have engaged external incident response experts to assist with investigation and remediation, and we continue to investigate for any further signs of compromise.
We have identified a small percentage of users affected via GitHub tokens, and have contacted each of them directly.
We will keep the below security bulletin updated over the coming hours and days, and we expect to ship product enhancements rapidly to help mitigate attacks of this kind in the future. All of our focus right now is on investigation, communication to customers, enhancement of security measures, and sanitization of our environments.