Form the Lowy Institute job description requirements of candidates: must possess "excellent written and oral communication skills, including for non-specialist audiences".
1. Academic Ethical Integrity?
As an example, consider the recent Sam Roggeveen David Vallance authored paper "Understanding the Chinese military threat to Australia" recently making headlines. Specifically: in the Introduction, the authors state "Nevertheless, Xi has also instructed the PLA to be ready for a Taiwan invasion by 2027, and training activity around the island has increased and become more sophisticated in recent years" but give no source, footnote or other reference indicating where and when exactly Xi issued this supposed instruction. That omission / lack of qualification (especially if deliberate) arguably serves Lowy/ASPI stakeholder interests, such being another job description requirement of candidates: "Strong stakeholder engagement skills across government, business, and civil society".
Xi has not in any public statement used that language. Xi publicly set 2027 (the PLAâs centenary) as a milestone for PLA modernization: achieving âbasic modernizationâ and the capability to âwin regional warsâ, not a public deadline to âinvade".
The specific claim that Xi instructed the PLA to be ready to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan by 2027 originates from US intelligence assessments, not a direct, verifiable public Xi directive. Specifically: to 1) Adm. Philip Davidsonâs March 2021 Senate testimony that the "China threat" to Taiwan was âmanifest... in the next six years" - this became known as the âDavidson Windowâ, and 2) CIA Director William Burns in 2023 stated publicly that US intelligence knew âas a matter of intelligenceâ that Xi had instructed the PLA to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful "invasion" (while noting it was not a decision to attack in 2027) - this became known as the "Burns Formulation".
Burns was referring to US intelligence indicating that Xi Jinping had given instructions or directives to PLA leadership to achieve a certain level of readiness for a Taiwan contingency (often framed by Western officials as an âinvasionâ) by 2027, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Peopleâs Liberation Army. However, no public details on the supposed intelligence itself, whether declassified reports, specific sources (human intelligence, signals intelligence, etc.), or documents have been released. This is presented as a capability/ readiness goal, not evidence that Xi had decided on war or set 2027 as an invasion deadline. Burns explicitly and repeatedly caveated his remarks on this point. More recent US intelligence assessments (including the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment) have nuanced this: China does not currently plan to "invade" Taiwan in 2027 - 2027 is a readiness/capability benchmark, not a fixed invasion date or commitment.
Burns made the most precise reference to âas a matter of intelligenceâ on February 2, 2023, during public remarks at an event at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. (while accepting an award/ceremony at the School of Foreign Service). According to contemporaneous reporting by such as Reuters, Burns said that the United States knew "as a matter of intelligence" that Xi had ordered his military to be ready to conduct an invasion of self-governed Taiwan by 2027, noting that ânow, that does not mean that heâs decided to conduct an invasion in 2027, or any other year, but itâs a reminder of the seriousness of his focus and his ambition.â A few weeks later, on CBSâs Face the Nation (interview recorded/ aired around Feb 26â27, 2023), Burns gave a very similar statement: âWe do know, as has been made public, that President Xi has instructed the PLA to be ready by 2027 to 'invade' Taiwan, but that doesnât mean that heâs decided to invade in 2027 or any other year as well.â
Hence: When Burns said âas a matter of intelligence,â he was referring to classified US IC judgments about Xiâs internal directives to the PLA. The specific evidence behind that judgment has never been made public. Yet, the Lowy article authors assume it as a given fact - "invasion" - while claiming to analyze capabilities, not intentions. It is a typical Lowy / âestablishmentâ Australian "security theory" driven think-tank product: data-driven on hardware/trends, forward-looking, and aligned with the policy consensus favoring AUKUS, higher defense spending (~2.4% GDP target), and US alliance strengthening: i.e. pre-suppositional confirmation bias.
2. "Securitization Theory" Hedging?
âäžćœćšèèźșâ (âChina threat theoryâ) is a Western securitization process that constructs China as an existential threat to justify containment, alliances (e.g., AUKUS), and military spending. Speculative / conditional language ("might", "if", etc.) in this so-defined "China Threat" discourse reflects a confirmation bias inherent in strategized modal verb sequencing, as informs the Lowy paper's heavy use of hedging language throughout the scenarios and projections sections:
- âIf China merely sought to send a warning, it might strike an offshore oil facility... If it sought to achieve economic effects... it might attack ports... If it sought to coerce the government by punishing the Australian population... it might use missiles or cyber weapons...â
- â... It might seek to disrupt Australiaâs national life at sea.â
- âTwo developments could dramatically escalate this threat: â
- âChina could plausibly develop it over the next decade.â âCould quickly and dramatically escalate...â
This is standard practice in risk/threat security theory premised assessment writing. Analysts use conditionals because capabilities do not equal intent or inevitability. However, the cumulative effect of enumerating multiple plausible âmight/could/ifâ scenarios does create a sense of expanding risk and vulnerability, even when qualified. This style is characteristic of the âChina Threatâ discourse prevalent in Australian (and US) security institutions and aligned think tanks like Lowy and ASPI. These organizations often frame PLA modernization primarily through the lens of worst-case regional contingencies (Taiwan counter-intervention), then extend the implications to Australia. Critics (including some Chinese state media responses to this specific paper:
@globaltimesnews reporting CN Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian, the full transcript of Lin's remarks:
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbâŠ) argue this approach prioritizes threat inflation to justify policy choices like AUKUS and defense budget growth, while downplaying diplomatic or economic de-risking options.
If the Lowy Institute job candidate is required to represent "stakeholder needs" and the stakeholders in the Lowy/ASPI think tank sector are US Weapons Manufacturers and US State Dept. / Defence Dept. alliances, the candidate might seek to obfuscate an appropriated phraseology attributed to Xi by omitting context in order to create "China Threat" discourse style securitized confirmation bias. They could then structurally frame conditional modal verb use to construct an imminent threat capability which, while purely speculative, is rendered urgent through its succession of modal verb conditionals. Their intention in doing so could thus be to justify AUKUS at a time when, in Australia, there is a public hearing into AUKUS. They could then publish this as a capability "paper" timed in release to counter this public hearing.
3. "Invasion" Rhetoric in China Threat Discourse Construction
Of the recent Melbourne testimonials for the AUKUS public hearing, Jennifer Parker dismissively noted the contribution of "đŠđșâs former Deputy Ambassador to đšđł in the 1970s". Most revealingly, she did not even mention this former diplomat by name, anonymizing him in effect.
His name is John Lander. He was in fact not only Australia's Deputy Ambassador to China (1974-1976) but also Australia's 1st Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran (1985-1988) and thereafter worked in the Office of Multicultural Affairs under the Hawke and Keating Governments. To elaborate Lander's core points, in his own words as in the accompanying video interview series below:
(from video 1 đœ): "In July 1971,... we produced a Policy Planning Paper providing policy advice to the government, which said that the alliance with the United States would mean less to us in the future than it had in the past and that Australia should develop independent policies based on Australian national interest and the interest of our near neighbors. This was a reaction to the fact that we realized that we couldnât rely on the United States to protect Australiaâs interests... and that United States policy actions could in fact be quite inimical to Australiaâs interests. And of course today its far more relevant than it was then.
With the revelation that the US was moving to the recognition of the Peopleâs Republic of China, plus the fact that Gough Whitlam as leader of the Opposition had already declared that were he to win government he would immediately recognize the PRC... We had spent all that time in the lead-up to the election preparing for the transition from recognition of the ROC to the recognition of the PRC. So I was also involved, as a very junior officer at the time in the documentation and preparation of advice and so on regarding the negotiations for the Joint Communique on the Recognition of the PRC. That led fairly quickly to the formulation of the wording that is now in the Joint Communique of the Recognition of the PRC which acknowledged, that is recognized and accepted the position of the PRC that Taiwan is a province of China. The narrative these days, that somehow Taiwan is separate from China and must be protected from any âinvasionâ by China, is a false narrative."
(from video 2 đœ): "The military activities by the PLA and PLA-Navy and Airforce around Taiwan I see as essentially expressions of the determination of the PRC to prevent the alienation of Taiwan from Chinaâs sovereign territory. And it is interesting that most of the military activity around Taiwan is in response to provocative actions by the United States and its allies, including Australia. And it is important to note that since Australia does not deny that Taiwan is part of Chinaâs sovereign territory, intrusions by Australian warships or Australian aircraft into Taiwanâs waters or into Taiwanâs airspace, are in fact intrusions into the territory of China. And it could be argued quite reasonably I think that China has the right to defend itself and, if necessary, forcibly repel such intrusions. Weâre very lucky that China has until now chosen not to take that kind of action. So Australiaâs policy with regards to Taiwanâs status is paradoxical because on the one hand we say yes Taiwan is part of Chinaâs sovereign territory and on the other we say we have the right to conduct freedom of navigation operations in Chinaâs sovereign territory."
"And so that translates very quickly to the whole question of China, and Elbridge Colby, one of the United States warmonger strategists, made it very clear in his book The Strategy of Denial that it was the intention of the US to use Taiwan both as pretext and proxy to instigate a war involving China again with the purpose of bogging China in a protracted conflict which would inhibit its economic growth and impede its capacity to cooperate in economic development with other countries. And the US has made it perfectly clear that it expects Japan, the Philippines and Australia to come to the defense of Taiwan. So that (the 3 countries) would be part of the network of proxies that would be used to embroil China in a war that would distract it from its peaceful development, cooperation right across the Global South."
(from video 3 đœ): "So the US sees Chinaâs role as the alternative guarantor of a world economic system distinct from the system set up by the United States, as the principal threat to US interests and even its survival. Because increasingly the countries that are cooperating within the BRICS framework, in their bilateral trade relationships, are moving towards trade
in each otherâs own currencies and reducing the reliance on the USD as the currency of exchange. That hasnât reached crisis point yet but the trend is in that direction. And it is that decline that I think the US sees as really the principal long term existential threat because once the US dollar ceases to be in demand by countries all around the globe it will cease to have value. And that will then render the 37 trillion dollar debt the US owes to a large number of countries in the rest of the world un-payable. It will render the United States basically insolvent which is why Trump said it would be like losing World War Three.
The US has of course described Australia as, I quote, the epicenter of the projection of US power in the Indo-Pacific. So even if the US engaged in a kinetic war with China, it would be launched from, and conducted from, Australia. Which would inevitably make the facilities in Australia a target for China."
An Oral History of John Lander's diplomatic career is forthcoming through transmedia publisher
@OpalSkyMedia.