This is the most serious comment the piece has drawn, and you've earned a serious answer, because you've done something none of the others did: you conceded the consumption point and moved the argument to firmer ground. You're right. The real question about concentrated wealth is not consumption. It is agency — who decides what gets built, financed, and ignored. I accept that framing completely. I just think it leads to the opposite of where you're heading.
Start with what we agree on. Wealth is not passive; it is capital allocation; capital allocation is decision-making power over the future. Yes. So the only question that matters is the comparative one you've implicitly raised and not answered: compared to whom? Decision-making power over capital does not vanish when you take it from billionaires. It moves. The honest debate is never "concentrated private capital vs. some frictionless social optimum." It is "concentrated private capital vs. the concrete alternative allocator" — and the only allocator large enough to replace them is the state. So the real question is: who allocates capital better, and under what discipline?
Here the asymmetry is decisive, and it has three parts.
First, skin in the game. When Bezos or Ortega allocates wrong, they bear the loss — their capital evaporates, and the decision right passes to someone who allocates better. When the state allocates wrong, the taxpayer bears the loss. A system where the decider eats his own mistakes corrects; a system where he doesn't, compounds them. That is not a moral claim about billionaires being virtuous. It's a structural claim about feedback. Private capital is disciplined by loss; political capital is disciplined by the next election, which is to say barely.
Second, the knowledge problem, which is the deeper version of your "who decides" question. The reason capital allocation is hard is that the relevant knowledge — what people want, what things cost, what will work — is dispersed across millions of minds and is mostly unspoken. No central allocator can assemble it. The price-and-profit system is the only mechanism we've found that aggregates that dispersed knowledge and feeds it back as a signal. Concentrated private capital is still subject to that signal — the market overrules a wrong-headed billionaire ruthlessly, as the corporate graveyard shows. Concentrated state capital is not; it allocates by political salience, and political salience is not social welfare either — it's the loudest lobby, the next election, the prestige project. You correctly note that "what maximizes returns is not always what maximizes social welfare." True. But "what maximizes votes" tracks social welfare worse, not better — which is why the empirical record of state capital allocation, from the nationalized industries to the sovereign-investment disasters, is what it is.
Third — and this answers your strongest examples directly — the cases where capital genuinely does harm are almost all cases of capital fused with state power, not capital acting against it. The commodity spike that starves the poor, the sovereign-debt trap that guts a developing country's health budget: look closely and you find central banks, capital controls, politically rigged lending, IMF-and-government co-productions, subsidies, and protected cartels. These are not the free market overruling the public good. They are precisely the marriage of concentrated capital and concentrated political power that you're proposing to deepen by moving more allocation to the state. The disease you're describing is cronyism — capital using the state and the state using capital — and the cure for cronyism is not more state, which is more to capture. It is less surface for capture.
So I'll meet your reframing on its own terms and turn it over. Inequality of agency is the right concern. The concentration of decision-making power is the danger. Which is exactly why I want that power held by many competing private allocators — each disciplined by loss, each overruled by the market when wrong, each replaceable by an upstart — rather than fused into the single largest and least correctable allocator of all, the one with no competitor, no bankruptcy, and no skin in the game: the state. We agree on the question. The concentration of power is the problem. The state is its maximum form, not its remedy.