If the point is several months strangulation of the regime’s financial lifeline, as opposed to destroying the island or achieving one hundred percent efficacy and leverage, then a combination of bespoke strikes disabling Kharg’s 77 mw power plant, substations and scada centers, and vessel interdiction in open waters for the remaining output, should get the job done. Stacking reversible damage to infrastructure and vbss ops to degrade output seems more sensible than taking and holding that island toward a limited end.
In any case, even granting there’s a way to accomplish throttling Iranian exports without taking Kharg, the issue that remains is escalation mgmt and market blowback. Iran still effectively holds both Hormuz and critical Gulf infrastructure hostage. Once those exports are choked the regime is on something much closer to a stopclock and that can trigger use it or lose it escalation.
Right now they’re playing the victory by survival and points game Itai Brun has already laid out so well -- parsing out the admin’s own 2-3 weeks rhetoric and gauging congressional appetite to block WPR efforts beyond 60-90 days. Dashing that hope risks unconstrained fires at desalination plants, export terminals and refineries and even the UAE’s Barakah pressurized water nuclear reactor.
US and Israeli assets are insufficient to effectively blanket the roughly thousand mile littoral with an anti access umbrella. That’s what the whole multinational maritime taskforce was requested by Washington to prioritize: ensuring critical soft sites across the rear are defended, likely before clearing and capturing the island chains. We’re seeing UK increasingly step up to that Gulf defensive plate, but France and other key European players are refusing to commit Hormuz maritime tasking until the end of the conflict, which is what has Potus incandescent.
Overlaying weapons engagement zones for instance from Abu Musa, the Tunbs, and Sir Abu Nu’ayr creates overlapping cover across key maritime approaches off the UAE. That kind of anti access setup enhances early warning and response timelines against saturation attacks from Iranian coastal missile and drone fires. But clearing and taking key island positions to establish a waterward defensive shield over the Gulf requires surging littoral defenses -- the preclearance for Tehran’s financial jugular.
That’s what’s creating serious, potentially irreversible tensions between this admin with Nato. The longer the coalition drags its feet on surging defensive assets for the littoral, the longer the global energy market remains destabilized, as it’s delaying the US clearing the island chains, likely for the Emirates to ultimately hold and man an integrated defense system over the waterway.
China and Russia view Nato fracture as a win. It’s also fairly clear that they have aggressively pursued elite capture and ideological subversion campaigns. Take a look at Helga Zepp Larouche’s proximity to Beijing and Roger Stone’s rapprochement with her late husband in 2015 or 2016 for instance. Take a look at the sophisticated game the Russians played in that period with the whole Russia hoax fiasco. The same applies for the infestation of Iranian track-II operatives at the ICG since Giustra, Soros and Pinchuk walked in between 2005-2008. This component clarifies how adversaries recognized political will as the center of gravity long before stoking tensions.
Certain interests now likely view hamstringing Trump as a way to tip the midterms, with the mindset that this is a strategically valuable approach for Nato on a longer horizon. That may account for some of the foot dragging and narrative ‘war of choice’ framing -- textbook active measures styled spin doctoring of int’l law. Those kinds of agendas have a shelf life. They are ultimately only capable of partial effect before evaporating; hard constraints and structural dynamics tend to surface in clarifying ways sooner than later. Hopefully, not too late.