Completed the Study on the Paper “A Large-Scale Study of Telegram Bots” (ICWSM 2026)
Dear cybersecurity research colleagues,
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I have completed an in-depth analysis of the first large-scale study dedicated to the Telegram bot ecosystem (arXiv:2603.24302). Conducted by researchers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tsinghua University, University of Cambridge, and Princeton University, the work examined 32,071 bots, 809 million messages, and 106,000 channels (68,000 of which are new) — the largest public dataset ever produced on the topic.
In addition to updating previous datasets, the authors developed an autonomous interaction framework via the Telegram Bot API, which extracts real bot functionalities through commands and responses, going far beyond static descriptions.
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Core Threat Intelligence Insight: Malicious AI Bots as Critical Infrastructure
The study documents an explosive growth in generative AI-based bots starting in March 2023, coinciding with the release of GPT-4. These bots are concentrated in the Utility and, especially, Underground categories (~5% of the total, or approximately 1,539 bots), functioning as malicious AI endpoints.
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Malicious Capabilities Identified
The vast majority of AI bots in the Underground category offer generative AI abuse services, including:
• Deepfake and nudification (automatic removal of clothing from images);
• Face-swap in explicit content;
• Generation of non-consensual images.
These bots transform Telegram into an accessible and monetizable hub for digital sexual abuse via AI, enabling mass distribution of non-consensual content.
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Concrete Command Examples Observed in Malicious AI Bots
Through systematic analysis of command lists and interactions (via the authors’ framework), the study reveals recurring patterns. Representative examples extracted include:
• AI abuse processing commands: /nudify, /undress, /deepnude, /removeclothes, /ai_nude, /generate_nsfw
• Face-swap and deepfake commands: /faceswap, /swapface, /deepfake, /ai_face, /face_swap
• General generation commands: /generate, /process, /img2img, /create, /transform
• Integrated financial commands: /pay, /deposit, /withdraw, /balance, /wallet, /buy
• Referral and viralization commands: /invite, /referral, /ref, /bonus
• Mandatory Telegram commands: /start, /help (used to initiate flows that request photo upload payment)
These commands typically lead to workflows that request the victim’s image upload followed by payment (Telegram Stars, TON, or cryptocurrencies) to process the content.
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High-Risk Operational Patterns
• Superficial disclaimers (“ 18” or “use only with consent”) with no real age or authorization verification mechanisms.
• Evasive reuse: bots recreated with minor username variations (Levenshtein distance 1–2).
• Strong integration between AI bots, payment gateways, and referral systems (71% of Finance/Scam bots include payment commands; 65% include referral).
• Migration of services previously restricted to Tor to Telegram, leveraging its mobile-first interface and native payments.
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Broader Intelligence Context
Although 34% of bots are categorized as Finance (with a median lifespan of just 9 days), malicious AI bots operate as a programmatic infrastructure layer of the underground economy. They scale non-consensual abuse operations, directly monetize deepfakes, and expand reach to non-English-speaking communities (Russian 30%, Farsi, and Arabic), even when descriptions are in English.
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Implications and Practical Recommendations from the Paper
The study reinforces that Telegram bots are no longer isolated tools but have become critical infrastructure for cybercrime. The authors’ four practical recommendations for threat hunters and moderators are:
1. Prioritize analysis of the full command list (/start, /help, nudify, deepfake, etc.);
2. Correlate bot domain with the language of messages where the bot is mentioned;
3. Group bots by similarity of description