Research Handbook on #Cyberwarfare is out today! | Edited by @tcstvns & me, with 23 chapters from an outstanding group of contributors, covering the theory, practice, governance, actors & institutions involved in #cyberwarfare @warstudies @ElgarPublishing elgaronline.com/edcollbook/b…

Obviously not an orderly development, but as exceptional as the last few days have been, they sharply underline a general truth, that all defence reviews are deeply embedded in a political context.

Much in here Starmer’s critics can agree with. Being PM is incredibly difficult at the best of times, which these aren’t. And you don’t get to be PM without huge ambition & self-belief: for PMs, accepting failure will always be hard. But the case for change has long been clear.

This is worthwhile, but a public open-source inquiry into this subject faces an obvious known unknown: existing lines of effort that are not public and about which the Committee won’t be briefed. That evidence gap complicates evaluation of the totality of existing efforts.

Reading this, I felt it was describing as “structural” problems that (mostly) appeared to be about how top officials weren’t working effectively together. You could maybe fudge that by changing structures, but there are other ways too.

I remember thinking, on first reading the SDR’s rubric, particularly the Treasury bit, that govt must be confident it had buy in from the reviewers. Also wondering whether those involved quietly believed the rubric would have to shift. Two years on, this looks very consequential.

I mean, it’s pretty astonishing that anyone needed a reminder, but it’s just a very surreal, de facto interregnum.

A few thoughts on Healey's departure. At the end of the day, the root cause is a failed defence review process. The review proposed things on the basis that spending would rise to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, a relatively modest pace of growth that was & is incompatible with everything the UK wants to do—GCAP, AUKUS, a strategic reserve corps for NATO on land, carrier strike & more munitions/readiness. The gov't was unwilling either to make choices among these, which would have been politically and diplomatically painful, or to spend *significantly* more in the short & medium term, instead pointing to non-credible commitments out into the mid-2030s. There was and is no credible path to the 3.5% of GDP target by 2035 that the PM publicly agreed at the Hague last year. Now the UK is going to go into the Ankara summit in a weak position, with a teetering government, and with a likely successor to Starmer who is no more likely to support higher defence spending, all with predictable consequences for the US-UK relationship.

This is a principled resignation and Healey should get credit for that, notwithstanding that leaving Cabinet during Starmer’s endgame is arguably different from leaving during a premiership you expect to last.

As I argue in @ForeignAffairs, the current transatlantic crisis of trust may actually yield a stronger future alliance bc Europeans are increasing their capabilities in #defense & #intelligence, but only if trust can be restored. @warstudies @KCLSecurity foreignaffairs.com/united-st…

Interesting read, highlighting that No.10 needs not only good foreign policy advice but also understanding of interplay between domestic politics & foreign policy, & ability to effectively communicate foreign policy for domestic audiences. Notable shortcomings under Starmer.

Interesting @rusi webinar next week on the “British Way in Cyber Warfare,” featuring two @warstudies colleagues @monica_kello & @tcstvns. Sign up details in the URL. my.rusi.org/events/webinar-t…