RT @Rob_Malley: Several things can be true at once: The MOU is an important & welcome achievement, chiefly because it reopens the strait o…

"The first and most fundamental is that domestic political incentives in both capitals consistently reward noncompliance: Commitments made in Brussels are abandoned when the two countries’ politicians return home." I'd go further: both sides prefer the status quo to any compromise.

If the Dems want to win, they need to shift, not to the "center" but to the land of common sense on culture war issues. ncronline.org/opinion/why-de…

I've posted quite a bit about this book but it really is phenomenal. Without self-consciously being so it's a beautiful paean to humanism, to thought and knowledge and scholarship and friendship and the ideal of the university.

A few days ago, I had the privilege of spending a few hours with Peter McCloskey, a former senior trial attorney at the ICTY who prosecuted most, if not all, of the cases related to Srebrenica. We have first met in The Hague in 2002, and then every few years over the past decade. He is an American prosecutor through and through, with all that entails. And spending time with him always helps me gain new insights. This time, I found myself reflecting on the truly historic role that he and others, such as prosecutor Mark Harmon and chief investigator Jean-René Ruez played, but also on the personal cost they had to bear in the process. There is something remarkable about meeting someone who was born thousands of kilometers away, yet can speak about Srebrenica with such intimacy, as if he had been there with us. I have always had my opinions about, and differences with, the Tribunal. But I dare say that I got to know these people and learned what was in their hearts. And for that, I am grateful.

Poučak pridruživanja Europskoj uniji za zemlje Zapadnog Balkana: što si bliže cilju, to si više izložen pritiscima susjednih zemalja, naročito članica EU koje žele iskoristiti šansu što se jednom pruža - da postignu što žele jer imaju moć da zaustave proces.

Ova naizgled nebitna vest možda najbolje objašnjava sa čim se suočavaju Srbi na Kosovu. Za one koje više zanima, sledi niz🧵

On the idea of merging the 🇧🇦’s OHR with the EU Special Representative and the EU Delegation, there are at least three reasons why this would be a bad idea. 1️⃣ This arrangement effectively already existed when the positions of EUSR and high representative were held by the same individual, while the EU Delegation remained separate. That model was abandoned in 2011 on the grounds that, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, such a dual-hatted arrangement was no longer legally feasible. To my knowledge, the Lisbon Treaty remains fully in force today. 2️⃣ 🇭🇷 has been a member of the EU since 2013. In principle, there would be no legal obstacle to appointing a Croatian national as EUSR/OHR, even though 🇭🇷 is a party to the Dayton Peace Agreement, which gave birth to the OHR. In practice, Croatian diplomats are within 🇪🇺 institutions increasingly entrusted with responsibility for Western Balkans and 🇧🇦-related portfolios, both within the Council (e.g. COWEB) and the Commission (e.g. DG ENEST political desks). Attempts to exclude Croatian nationals from such positions on the basis that 🇭🇷 is a neighbouring state have been challenged as potentially discriminatory. The same argument could arise in the case of an EUSR/OHR appointment. 3️⃣ Associating the 🇪🇺 with executive powers such as the Bonn Powers would run counter to the Union’s stated values and to several EEAS and Council legal and policy documents that define the EU’s role as that of a facilitator and mediator. Entrusting an EU representative with such powers would therefore be both conceptually inconsistent and politically unwise.

An attempt will be made this week in 🇧🇦 to appoint Christian #Schmidt’s successor as high representative. Here are 7️⃣ things to know: 1️⃣ Why now? The selection of a high representative has always been shaped by power politics and lacks transparency. What is known: this week’s attempt would not be happening without sustained pressure from the 🇺🇸 to accelerate Schmidt’s departure and launch the succession process. 2️⃣ What does Washington want? The 🇺🇸 claims to seek a successor who would: ➡️ engage all political actors, including Banja Luka ➡️ prioritise negotiated solutions over imposed ones ➡️ rely less on the Bonn Powers ➡️ be unlikely to obstruct arrangements on state property, which 🇺🇸 links to strategic, energy, investment and economic interests 3️⃣ Is there already a candidate? Several names are circulating. The 🇺🇸 has proposed its own candidate while signalling support for a European candidate meeting the same criteria. Rumours have focused on 🇮🇹 candidate(s), though 🇫🇷 and 🇬🇧 names have also been mentioned. 4️⃣ The difficult negotiations are not only about the name For weeks, members of the body in charge for appointment (PIC Steering Board) have been discussing issues far beyond succession: ➡️ Should the next mandate focus on the 5 2 agenda or mainly on state property? ➡️ Should use of the Bonn Powers remain solely with the high representative or require consultation with (or approval of) the Steering Board? ➡️ Should the next mandate be time-limited? ➡️ Should there be another successor afterwards, or should the OHR be closed, phased out or transformed? Some proposals have already met resistance, but none has disappeared. 5️⃣ Growing transatlantic mistrust Some European actors believe that effective engagement in 🇧🇦 remains difficult without 🇺🇸 backing. At the same time, there is unease about DC’s intentions. Rapid policy shifts informed by lobby efforts and financial interests have raised questions about whether decisions are driven by any strategy beyond personal or financial considerations. 6️⃣ Why so many names? Because the candidates are a symptom, not the substance, of the negotiations. Capitals are using the succession process to test others and pursue broader objectives concerning the international role in 🇧🇦. 7️⃣ What matters most? The future of 🇧🇦 does not depend on any single high representative. Recent experience showed that during serious challenges from Banja Luka in 2021/22 and in 2025, the Bonn Powers were not the instrument used to protect peace or constitutional order. Instead, pressure was managed through coordinated signalling of red lines and consequences by international and reactions of domestic actors. ➡️ My quick take The key question in Sarajevo this week is not whether there will be a successor, or who it will be. It is how local actors will interpret shifting international relationships— and act on those perceptions. That remains to be seen.

On the eve of the most consequential Peace Implementation Council since Bonn in 1997, the diplomats gathering in Sarajevo need to remember that whatever they decide about the next High Representative, his (or her - it's never been a woman and none are being mooted now) mandate and powers, will be without legal effect unless they can get the UN Security Council to approve. The intuitive way to grasp this is simply that the Security Council is the ONLY body in international law that can pierce a nation's sovereignty - and this is clearly what the Bonn PIC did in empowering the High Rep - and that therefore, the Council's ongoing participation is essential. This is so important, because with the Security Council divided, some may be tempted to appoint another High Representative without its approval (as the PIC already did with Christian Schmidt in 2021). That would be to take a terrible risk that could threaten Bosnia and Herzegovina's survival. If the next High Rep tries to act without the consent of the Security Council and against the wishes of three of its five permanent members - leaning essentially on the larger European states alone - he will be accepted by half the country and rejected by the other half, injecting enormous strains into an already fragile state system. The right course is to find the best available consensus candidate and agree on a limited mandate, to be endorsed by the Security Council, and to use the next few years to work to place Bosnia and Herzegovina on the firmest possible footing. @adicerimagic @Ivan_Pepic @slatal @sturcalo @seadnum @troccazrene @CrisisGroup @BalkansGroup @Andric1961

Da, u velikoj meri. I Kina i Indija guraju svetski GDPpc veoma napred, tako da oni koji ne rastu po tim stopama padaju.

With the PIC convening on 3-4 June to replace the outgoing High Rep, worth recalling they need the UN Security Council’s consent. foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/14…

It is not appropriate for Croatia's prime minister @AndrejPlenkovic and foreign minister @grlicradman publicly to honour a former terrorist whose cell hijacked a civilian airliner and killed a US policeman. Julienne Busic's terrorist act only shamed Croatia.

Gonna bet this is what ends us giving us the zombie apocalypse.

Fascinantno u ovome da se ne spominju ljudi koji žive u Kosovu pa čak ni Srbi a kamoli Albanci.