מהר האיראנית: "פרטים חדשים על טיוטת ההסכם בת 14 הנקודות בין איראן לארה"ב: ההסכם כולל את התחייבות ארה"ב להסיר סנקציות, להסיג את כוחותיה מסביב לאיראן, להסיר את המצור הימי, לפתוח מחדש את מיצר הורמוז, להסיר את סנקציות הנפט ולשחרר כספים איראניים מוקפאים. ארה"ב נדרשת להציג תוכנית לשיקום כלכלת איראן, בעוד שהמשא ומתן הסופי בין שתי המדינות צריך להיות בנושאים גרעיניים וכלכליים, מבלי לדון בתוכנית הטילים של איראן. טיוטה זו צריכה לעבור גיבוש סופי במוסדות הרלוונטיים".

BREAKING: Netanyahu's office said Israel isn't part of the US deal with Iran, but Trump told Bibi it includes "removal of enriched material, dismantling of enrichment infrastructure, limiting missile production, and ending Iran's support for its terrorist proxies in the region."

Trump threatens to seize Kharg island as U.S. strikes continue axios.com/2026/06/11/trump-i…

Sources said one option Trump is considering is launching an operation that is big in scale but short in duration, with the aim of pressing Iran to change its position in the negotiations.

Returning back to war? From Tehran's perspective, the United States and Israel are pursuing a coordinated strategy aimed at weakening both Iran and the broader Axis of Resistance. This perception, combined with President Trump's continued insistence that no meaningful economic relief will be granted to Iran, reinforces the Iranian leadership's belief that it must take action rather than remain passive. This dynamic is closely linked to a simple reality: as long as there is no agreement between Washington and Tehran, spoilers on all sides will continue to drive escalation. The absence of an agreement means there is no sustainable status quo to preserve. Given the profound gaps between the Iranian and American positions on key issues, including uranium enrichment and the future of regional proxy networks, the potential for escalation can only be contained for so long. If President Trump genuinely seeks a deal with Iran, he will need to create diplomatic space for negotiations. That would require pressuring Israel to halt its military operations in Lebanon and approving at least limited economic relief during the initial phase of negotiations. Without such steps, the likelihood of dangerous escalation remains significantly higher than the prospects for a negotiated settlement. Above all, it is increasingly clear that Iran is far from being deterred. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. After 39 days of conflict, Tehran is behaving as though it emerged from the confrontation in a stronger strategic position. Rather than projecting caution or restraint, Iranian leaders continue to signal confidence, emphasizing their resilience, their ability to absorb pressure, and their determination to maintain their regional posture. Whether this perception reflects reality is almost beside the point. What matters is that Iran does not appear to view itself as a defeated or intimidated actor. As long as Tehran believes it can withstand military, economic, and political pressure, the prospects for coercing major concessions through pressure alone remain limited. This reality increases the risk of further escalation and complicates efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement. The coming hours are likely to be critical in determining whether the current escalation can be contained. With tensions running high and all sides seeking to shape perceptions of deterrence and resolve, the risk of miscalculation remains significant. Decisions made in the immediate future both in Tehran and Washington / Jerusalem, as well as by regional actors, could determine whether the crisis moves toward de-escalation or enters a far more dangerous phase. #IranWar‌

There's going to be ambiguity in whatever "deal" comes together that allows the strait to reopen. -Trump will frame this is as a nuclear deal--even though it is very unlikely that Iran has agreed to anything up-front (agreement to address in principle during subsequent rounds of negotiations is very different). -Iran will contend that it is fully in control of the strait and that a "new status quo" is now in effect--even though it is very likely Iran has agreed to allow traffic to resume as a pre-condition for the US lowering its blockade and de-escalating in general. -Trump will claim that no money is being paid--even though it is very likely that Qatar has agreed to release some frozen funds ($6 billion, perhaps more), while the lowering of the US blockade will allow Iran to resume oil exports, a key source of revenue for the government. Both sides need to claim victory. And it appears possible that both sides have realized this and are baking it into the agreement now currently being finalized.

Trump said he is not sure the U.S. should sign a deal to end the war with Iran if Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries don't agree join the Abraham Accords. "They owe it to us", he said

Trump is trying, as hard as he can, to manufacture a “victory image.” If Iran will not give him one, then perhaps the Gulf states will, allowing him to justify what increasingly looks like a deeply troubled approach toward Tehran. The problem is that this futile insistence is damaging U.S. relations with the Gulf states and, paradoxically, pushing them toward their own accommodation with Iran. Needless to say, there is virtually no chance this idea will materialize. But Washington’s persistence is steadily eroding trust with Riyadh at a moment when the Saudi leadership is already deeply concerned about renewed regional escalation. It is impractical, detached from reality, and so disconnected from the actual dynamics of the Middle East that it raises serious doubts about whether this administration truly understands the region at all. #IranWar‌ #Iran

Senator Van Hollen wants to put the United States back in the peace process business for a 2-state solution that does not exist.