The story is actually quite simple.The fundamental problem began with the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) without a coherent alternative strategy. That decision reinforced Supreme Leader Khamenei’s long-standing suspicions about the agreement and about negotiating with the United States more broadly.
Once President Trump chose to exit the deal, the chances of returning to it became extremely slim. Trump himself encountered this reality when efforts to reopen diplomacy, such as the attempt to engage Foreign Minister Javad Zarif at the White House, failed to gain traction.
The consequences are clear and measurable. Iran’s large stockpile of enriched uranium, its deployment of advanced centrifuges, the technical knowledge it has accumulated, and its increasing proximity to nuclear threshold status are all direct outcomes of the U.S. withdrawal. That decision effectively eliminated the possibility of returning to a diplomatic track on terms more favorable than those achieved under the original agreement.
Everything else is secondary.
#iran
The second point is irrelevant to this debate, and the first has some pretty serious logical flaws. Simply put, there are better explanations for why Iran expanded enrichment when it did.
1. Why didn’t Iran expand enrichment more quickly after Trump withdrew from the deal? Were they “scared” of what Trump might do? Evidence suggests other factors were more important. First among them, Iran (and the other JCPOA participants) wanted desperately to keep the deal alive. Tehran’s play was to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Europe, and try to maximize alternative arrangements for sanctions relief (remember good old INSTEX?). Moving rapidly to expand enrichment would not serve that strategy. Toward the end of Trump’s first term, Iran ditched this (failed) approach. Hence why we started to see the build up.
2. Is that continued accelerated build up under Biden due to US “weakness?” Again, evidence suggests more important factors. Iran wanted to strengthen its negotiating hand. It concluded that prior restraint had not served it well. The 60% in particular was in response to the Israeli sabotage against the above ground centrifuge manufacturing plant. Also no doubt that some in Iran saw 60% as creating a more viable pathway to the bomb. Again, all of this was made doable by the U.S. withdrawal from the deal.
3. I have my qualms with the Biden administration’s approach to talks, but it should also be recognized that whatever loose “understanding” was later achieved led Iran to dilute some of that 60%, and U.S. willingness to hold off on BoG resolutions led Iran to refrain from adding more centrifuges or turning existing ones on. One can criticize that approach, but it’s at odds with the claim that “weakness” (as some critics labels it) only leads to Iranian enrichment expansion.
4. Perhaps most importantly, the “Iran was scared of Trump” narrative is also contradicted by the fact that in Trump’s second term, Iran significantly increased its 60% production. If they were deterred, one would expect the opposite result.
There also may be other factors that drove these Iranian decisions (eg, technical) that are less visible to those of us on the outside, adding another layer of complexity.
Bottom line: The argument that Biden’s “failure to deter” caused Iranian expansion, and conversely that Trump’s “pressure and deterrence” did, does not hold up to scrutiny.