next stress test of the #Hezbollah #Iran narrative is the following: if #Israel decides not to ceasefire claiming an imminent threat, #US says (as expected) #Israel has right to self defense, will #Iran quit the MOU with #US? What guarantees did Tehran get from US 4ceasefire?

What is noteworthy about the Paydari protests and the criticism coming from commentators such as Shariatmadari is that they attack Araghchi and Qalibaf as if they had personally made Iran’s strategic decisions throughout the negotiations. - The criticism often gives the impression that the foreign minister and the speaker of parliament were acting on their own, formulating negotiating positions and making major concessions independently. - Shariatmadari accuses Araghchi and Qalibaf of reopening Hormuz, arguing that the Strait should have remained closed to strengthen Iran’s demand for compensation from the United States, in line with the Supreme Leader’s public position. - Yet while he harshly criticizes Araghchi and Qalibaf, he says almost nothing about those within the military-security establishment who would have had to approve such decisions in the first place. #Iran

Izadi one of the most senior academics at Tehran University here reflects the internal strategic pressure the Iranian govt faces not to settle now.

They don't want to give Trump a birthday gift! (seriously, this is being discussed as an important factor among Iranian commentators)

Signing of the MOU between Iran and the US will not be tomorrow, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson says, as per Iranian media. The possibility that it will happen in the coming days is not ruled out, Baghaei said as per Tasnim.

Iran’s deputy FM Gharibabadi discussed the draft Islamabad MoU with the Russian and Chinese ambassadors in Tehran. - Tehran seems to be keeping Moscow and Beijing closely informed about the negotiation track. If this MoU is really linked to a possible understanding with Washington, Iran clearly does not want its two main strategic partners to learn about it from the media, or from the Americans. - I guess there is also an internal message here. - By publicly mentioning coordination with Russia and China, Tehran is telling its domestic hardliners that any potential deal with Washington does not mean a geopolitical shift away from the Iran-Russia-China axis. - There is also a diplomatic layer. If the process moves forward, Iran may need Russian and Chinese political cover at the UN, the IAEA, and possibly the Security Council. Keeping them inside the conversation now makes sense. - So, Islamabad is no longer just a Pakistani channel. - It is becoming part of a wider diplomatic architecture involving Pakistan, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt-and now, indirectly, Russia and China. My reading: this does not mean Moscow and Beijing are mediating the Islamabad MoU. But it does suggest Tehran considers the draft serious enough to consult them before any major move. #Iran #IranWar

Told @CNN: “The authority, influence, and institutional significance of the presidency have declined considerably since after the Rouhani era...Today, both the president as an individual and the administration as an institution are largely confined to implementing decisions that are made elsewhere – particularly within the Supreme National Security Council.” edition.cnn.com/2026/06/12/m…

Told @lcmporter @TheNationalNews that the current Iranian leadership, especially Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, wants to see that any MOU has the support of the regime’s ideological base. In the context of war, the regime does not want to risk messing with internal cohesion by provoking criticism from Iran's ultraradical factions. thenationalnews.com/news/men…

My personal feeling is that more than Mojtaba Khamenei’s final approval, what matters is the emergence of a general consensus among senior IRGC commanders. #IranWar

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