For nearly a half century, through eight American Presidencies, Iran has employed the most cost-effective tactic of warfare by seizing someone or something of value and holding it hostage. And while Iran has demonstrated its ability to hold out, sometimes for years, for what it wants, the U.S., with its two- and four-year election cycles, has limited patience. Read more about Iran’s hostage tactics: newyorkermag.visitlink.me/Wu…

This morning at the White House...

First things first. Had to get the real Chinese experience.

העיתון האיראני השמרני "חוראסאן", המזוהה בדרך כלל עם הקו הביטחוני של המשטר, מעריך כי הסכם אפשרי בין טהראן לוושינגטון רק ידחה את העימות בין הצדדים ולא יביא לפתרונו. במאמר מערכת שפורסם היום נכתב כי יש לראות בהסכם מנגנון להפסקת הלחימה הנוכחית בלבד ולא מענה למחלוקות היסוד. העיתון טען כי העימות עם ארצות הברית, ובייחוד עם ישראל, הוא "מאבק קיומי" שיוכרע רק בניצחון של אחד הצדדים, וכי הסכם מדיני יהיה לכל היותר הפוגה זמנית לפני "העימות הסופי" @Yoav__Zehavi

I predict: Iran’s current leadership will end up cracking down on hardliners

They don't want to give Trump a birthday gift! (seriously, this is being discussed as an important factor among Iranian commentators)

‌ اصرار عجیب ترامپ بر امضای تفاهم با ایران در روز یکشنبه و آزمونی برای تیم مذاکره‌کننده ساعتی پیش ترامپ بار دیگر تأکید کرد که یادداشت تفاهم با ایران یکشنبه امضا خواهد شد. این درحالی است که مسئولان ایرانی صراحتاً اعلام کرده بودند که تفاهم نهایی نشده و یکشنبه قطعاً انجام نمی‌شود.

original iran nuclear deal: “under no circumstances will iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapon.”

US official, in a backgrounder, saying the Iranians are trying to do what the Trump side is clearly trying to do as well: sell the deal as a win domestically: “I think there are a few things to keep in mind here, guys. So, number one is that the Iranian hardliners, some of them want to kill the deal, but I think most of them actually want the deal, but they also want to message it to their internal audiences in a way that maximizes their upside and minimizes our upside. That's totally predictable, but just because they're sort of engaged in domestic propaganda doesn't mean that we have to follow suit.”

"Cushing’s current inventory is 21.6 million barrels, according to the US Energy Information Administration. That’s dangerously close to operational stress levels, the tipping point at which Cushing struggles to supply all of its customers..." cnn.com/2026/06/12/business/…

Reuters reports that the UAE may have discussed unlocking billions of dollars for Iran as part of a broader de-escalation framework. Abu Dhabi has officially denied the story, so caution is warranted. - Still, the report highlights an interesting dynamic inside the UAE itself. - Historically, Dubai and the Al Maktoum family have maintained a more pragmatic approach toward Iran, reflecting the deep role of Iranian capital, trade networks and expatriate communities in Dubai’s economy. Even during years of sanctions, Dubai remained one of Iran’s most important commercial lifelines. - Abu Dhabi and the Al Nahyan leadership, by contrast, have traditionally viewed Iran primarily through a security lens: missiles, regional influence, maritime security and the IRGC. - If discussions of this kind really took place, they may reflect the convergence of these two perspectives. - What is particularly notable is Reuters’ reference to meetings involving Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed. If accurate, this would suggest that any outreach to Tehran is no longer merely a Dubai commercial preference, but a strategic calculation by Abu Dhabi itself. - In that sense, the most important question is not whether the figure was $10 billion, $20 billion, or nothing at all. - The real question is whether key Persian Gulf states have concluded that regional stability and economic normalization with Iran now serve their interests better than continued confrontation. #Iran reuters.com/world/middle-eas…

The growing rapprochement between the UAE and Iran undermines a key assumption that has shaped much of the Israeli debate over the past year, namely, that Gulf states would move closer to Israel, expand the Abraham Accords, or even support a more confrontational regional posture toward Tehran in the wake of the war. In reality, many Gulf states are deeply frustrated with Israel. From their perspective, they were drawn into a regional crisis that imposed significant economic and security costs on them. Since the strikes on Qatar, many in the Gulf increasingly view Israel not as a source of stability, but as a potential driver of regional escalation. As a result, there is little prospect of major new normalization steps with Israel absent dramatic progress on the Palestinian issue. Gulf leaders understand that the Iranian regime is not going anywhere, and they see no strategic benefit in trying to isolate Tehran or push it into a corner. This does not mean that Gulf states have become naïve about Iran. They remain deeply aware of the challenges and threats posed by Tehran. However, their preferred strategy is de-escalation and coexistence rather than confrontation. From their perspective, maintaining channels of communication with Iran is a necessity, not a choice. #IranWar‌