Thank you and I'm not saying the food at every Prison I was at was bad in most places it was OK, I never say ALL Officers were bad they weren't the same as not all Prisoners can be rehabilitated some choose not to, I try and give an honest reflection of my Prison experiences

Our researchers are conducting a survey at HMP & YOI Downview at the start of an inspection. If you have information about the establishment, please email: hmiprisons.enquiries@hmiprisons.gov.uk

What is most frustrating about announced inspections is how management behaviour changes drastically when one is imminent. Higher management suddenly appear on the frontline, touring wings and units, scrutinising paperwork, and insisting that records be brought up to date — paperwork that had often been allowed to fall behind for weeks or months beforehand. There would be a flurry of activity to “catch up,” not because standards had suddenly improved, but because scrutiny was imminent. Even outside of announced inspections, there was a clear awareness among staff of which higher management would be visiting a unit. Staff would arrive and jokingly announce to each other, “Today it’s [Name] doing the unit check — we must be up to date with our paperwork!” — referring to things like food temperature records, risk documentation, and other essential administrative tasks. This was recognition that certain managers were highly professional and insisted that standards be maintained consistently. Yet, outside of these visits, paperwork and other administrative duties often fell behind. This wasn’t necessarily due to negligence — the focus of frontline staff is overwhelmingly on maintaining safety and control, keeping prisoners secure, and responding to urgent incidents. Accurate paperwork is vital for safety and fairness, but in a busy, high-pressure environment, administrative tasks can understandably slip. The problem arises when such slippage becomes normalised, and when professional management visits are seen as theatrical rather than a genuine attempt to embed consistent standards. When announced inspections trigger visibility, urgency, and professionalism that are otherwise absent, they lose their value entirely. They measure how well an establishment can prepare for scrutiny — not how safely, ethically, or consistently it actually operates. This problem is compounded by inspection and investigation reports — whether from His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP), internal investigations, or other oversight bodies — routinely containing the same repetitive action points year after year. Violence, self-harm, staff shortages, poor purposeful activity, and leadership failures are highlighted repeatedly, yet the systemic problems remain. Over twenty years of largely the same concerns being raised, acted on, and then raised again should have been enough evidence of systemic failure. Some paperwork backlogs and inconsistencies were even deliberately manipulated, either due to misunderstanding of systems or to ensure targets were reached — yet these failures, whether accidental or deliberate, corroded trust in internal processes over decades. More recently, I reported concerns about the treatment of prisoners on a particular hospital wing. A few changes were made in response to earlier issues, but these adjustments have not fully addressed the underlying problems. This situation serves as a clear example of how systemic issues persist even when isolated fixes are implemented: those raising concerns are often sidelined or marginalised, while some of the staff responsible for wrongdoing remain in post. My concerns appear to have received no meaningful acknowledgement, except that I was told, “those staff you mention have left now.”It is deeply frustrating that, in practice, it is those acting correctly who end up disadvantaged, while those guilty of misconduct or wrongdoing frequently remain unchallenged. This is not just theoretical. In a completely different context, the Medomsley Detention Centre scandal shows just how catastrophic systemic failure can be when serious issues are ignored or dismissed over decades. Medomsley was a youth detention centre in County Durham that operated from 1961 until the late 1980s. An independent investigation by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman found that detainees were subjected to widespread physical and sexual abuse for years, with the culture of violence going “unchallenged” throughout its entire period of operation. The ombudsman concluded that staff knew or should have known about the abuse, yet collusion, incompetence, or a lack of professional curiosity allowed it to continue. (itv.com) The abuse included extreme violence, humiliation, and sexual assault — part of a regime paid for and run by the state — and despite repeated allegations, external oversight bodies failed to intervene for decades. Thousands of former detainees have now come forward, and the government has formally issued an apology for these historical abuses. (gov.uk) If such systemic failure could occur over more than two decades in one institution — with oversight bodies aware, and with evidence repeatedly being ignored or dismissed — why should we be surprised when serious issues in today’s prisons go unchallenged until they become part of the historical record? The core lesson is simple: inspections, reports, and oversight are only as effective as the leadership that acts on them. Brief spikes of professionalism around inspections or the visits of highly professional managers are not a substitute for sustained leadership, accountability, and a culture that genuinely listens, learns, and protects people — both prisoners and staff alike. During my career, I observed how operating reactively rather than proactively meant higher management were constantly dealing with the consequences of previous failures — including tragic outcomes such as the murder of Zahid Mubarek — leaving little time or focus to embed meaningful training. Many sessions were cancelled due to staff shortages, and training was often squeezed into limited slots when units remained fully operational, meaning professional development was episodic rather than consistent. I would highly recommend that, in future, units be periodically shut down to allow full, uninterrupted training for staff. The lack of proactive leadership also allowed misconduct and falsification of risk assessments to go unchecked, creating unsafe conditions for prisoners and staff alike. Experienced staff who tried to raise concerns were often sidelined or marginalised, while those guilty of misconduct or wrongdoing frequently remained unchallenged in their posts. This culture — reactive, egotistical, and protective of reputation over safety — has persisted for decades and continues to have catastrophic consequences for morale, prisoner welfare, and the integrity of the service. There is also a broader systemic concern about how staff implicated in serious misconduct are dealt with. In many workplaces, including the public sector, disputes are sometimes resolved through settlement agreements (formerly compromise agreements), which can include confidentiality clauses. These agreements can prevent disclosure of facts or even the existence of the agreement itself. Legally, a confidentiality clause cannot stop someone from making a protected disclosure, but in practice, these agreements can obscure wrongdoing and protect reputations while leaving systemic issues unresolved. (acas.org.uk, nao.org.uk) What grabs my attention in this area is how my own situation — being effectively pushed out, seeing my career damaged after raising concerns, and observing others treated similarly — unfolded. This should have been an area of genuine concern for government, regulators, and oversight bodies, as someone had to be astute enough to understand the difference between legitimate confidentiality and what should not be kept quiet — especially when public safety or misconduct is involved. Money and compensation should never dictate whether the truth is told. This is why I have pushed for easier, externally managed whistleblowing routes: internal reporting too often fails, causes harm, and leaves the door open for corruption rather than accountability. (acas.org.uk)

Prison security is porous unless or until every person arriving on site is searched. Everyone. No 1 Gov, the SLT, their visitors, custody managers, frontline staff, educators, health, legal, food & canteen delivery, chaplins, IMB monitors, visitors. No exceptions. No exemptions.

A high security prison’s efforts to combat drug drones are being thwarted by heritage concerns over installing metal security grilles on its Victorian windows @DavidLammy @JamesTCobbler @PrisonPlanet @PresidentPriso1 @InsideHMPS @NotThatBigIan @DannyShawNews @POAUnion @POAnatchair @PGA_Prisons @PrisonStorm @HMIPrisonsnews @charlie_taylor6 telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/01…

Mitie embarrassing: my latest on a new prison's failures and the uselessness of state monitoring by the MoJ. Get a grip, @JamesTCobbler ! spectator.com/article/the-cr…